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Abstract
Software testing, one of the most important methods for quality assurance, has become too
expensive and error prone for complex modern software systems. Test automation aims to
reduce the costs of software testing and to improve its reliability. Despite advances in test
automation, there are some domains for which automation seems to be difficult, for example,
testing software to reveal the presence of security vulnerabilities, testing for conformance
to security properties that traverse several functionalities of an application such as privacy
policies, and testing asynchronous concurrent systems.
Although there are research works that aim to solve the problems of test automation for
these domains, there is still a gap between the practice and the state of the art. These works
describe specific approaches that deal with particular problems, generally under restricted
conditions. Nevertheless, individually, they have not made noticeable impact on the practice
in test automation for these domains. Therefore, there is a need for an integrated framework
that binds specific approaches together in order to provide more complete solutions. It is also
important for this framework to show how current test automation efforts, tools and frame-
works, can be reused. This thesis addresses this need by describing a general model-based
testing framework and its specialisation for the testing domains of security vulnerabilities,
privacy policies and asynchronous systems.
The main characteristic of the general framework resides in the separation between be-
havioural (control) and data generation specifications. This framework is defined on the basis
of labelled transition systems and context free grammars. Labelled transition systems allow
behavioural models to be kept simple and tractable while extended context free grammars
allow for the generation of data values that later will be used in the execution of test cases.
The extended grammars in the data generation models contain a representation of the global
state of the system, which allows for example, the history of the execution of test cases to
influence the generation of subsequent data values.
Besides the general pattern described in the behavioural and data generation models,
each specialised testing domain requires models that represent particular characteristics of the
ii
system and the testing objectives for that domain. Vulnerability testing requires a model that
describes the properties of a system that make it vulnerable and another one that describes
what are considered to be the malicious intentions of an attacker. Privacy policies testing,
requires the addition of a model that describes the conditions under which the execution of
a defined operation is restricted or permitted. An important characteristic of the privacy
policies described in this thesis is that they include the concept of obligations, this is, actions
that require to be performed before the execution of the test case is considered successful.
This framework considers test cases that fulfil bounded obligations.
In testing asynchronous systems, this thesis focuses in a defined subclass of systems in
which actions can be partitioned into controllable and observable actions where execution
of controllable actions is decided by the testing framework and observable actions designate
the response of the system to the controllable stimuli. Different from other approaches for
asynchronous systems, this thesis uses sets instead of queues to keep tracking of expected
observable responses. This allows the present approach to deal with imperfect communication
channels and with delays and loss of information, where the order of the observations is not
important.
The practical applicability of the approaches presented in this thesis is demonstrated in
several case studies from various domain applications, namely web-based applications, finan-
cial exchange protocols and operating systems. Particularly, the case study on operating
systems demonstrates the integration of the general approach with an existing testing frame-
work. This case study describes advantages, disadvantages and trade-offs of such integration.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and statement of problems
In today’s world, software is involved in a wide range of our daily activities. Computers (and
their software) are considered to be some of the most useful tools for people to communicate,
find information and to buy goods and services. With the fast and relatively inexpensive
data transfer that the internet provides, and with the ever growing processing capabilities of
today’s computers, it makes sense to put them to use in order to try to earn an income or
just to make life easier.
As we have become increasingly dependent on software systems, the quality of software
has also become increasingly important. Numerous methods have been developed to improve
and assure software quality. Software testing is one of the earliest [46] and among the most
important methods used in industry for quality assurance.
Software testing has become a complex process for modern systems. Test automation
is an attempt at solving the problems of software testing in terms of cost and reliability.
Model-based testing is one approach that aims to support further and, if possible, to enable
the full automation of software testing. However, test automation and the application of
model-based testing approaches have developed in specific application domains while still
presenting difficulties in others. The following sections of this thesis discuss software testing,
test automation and model-based testing, the relationships between them and the problems
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
of their current approaches in specific application domains.
1.1.1 Software testing
In simple terms, software testing is an activity that amounts to observing the execution of a
software system in order to validate whether it behaves as intended and to identify potential
malfunctions [15]. Nevertheless, software testing embraces a variety of activities, techniques
and actors, and its own complexity grows along the growing pervasiveness, criticality and
complexity of the software systems.
Novel properties of modern computer programs make their testing difficult. Most of cur-
rent software systems, for example, airline reservation systems, financial transaction systems
and computer operating systems, are interactive and concurrent [127].
Interactive systems interact with an external environment that they do not control. For
these kinds of systems, security has become an extremely important issue in software devel-
opment. Interactive systems run continuously, reading inputs all the time and reacting to
them, for instance, by sending outputs. The continuous trend towards distributed and mobile
systems pervading everyday life and communicating through increasingly interconnected net-
works, poses increasing security risks for interactive systems because they are being exposed
to hostile and malicious environments.
In concurrent software systems that communicate asynchronously, it may be impossible
to tell beforehand in which order the operations in a program will be executed. At a higher
level of abstraction, observable events that occur during the execution can be interleaved in
many different ways. However, predicting the order of these events is impossible because the
speed of execution may vary in different contexts at different times. In concurrent software,
there may be errors which can be detected only if a certain interleaving of events takes place.
1.1.2 Test automation
In software development practice, testing accounts for as much as 50% of total development
efforts and the increasing complexity of software systems makes software testing an error prone
task [13]. In general, testing is a difficult, expensive, time-consuming and labour-intensive
2
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process. Moreover, testing is (should be) repeated each time a system is modified. Hence,
software testing is an ideal candidate for automation. Automation may help in making the
testing process faster, less susceptible to errors and more reproducible [116].
Test automation has developed along time and has evolved from record and playback
testing frameworks to data-driven and keyword-driven frameworks, resulting in benefits of
scalability, better performance and testing and increased productivity [3]. Each of the au-
tomation approaches has its own advantages and disadvantages. A record and playback
approach, for example, records a set of test activities and then plays them back repeatedly in
order to carry out the testing process. It speeds up the testing process as the process can be
repeated a number of times once the testing steps have being recorded appropriately in the
testing scripts. However, usually the scripts used for this purpose contain hard coded values
which must be changed if small changes are made to the application. This adds the overhead
of updating the script. In the worst case scenario, all the tests must be re-recorded if complex
changes are made to the application being tested.
The keyword-driven approach, also known as action word approach [26], is becoming the
preferred method in industry test automation forums. It has better reusability than record
and playback and data-driven methods [64]. However, from a practitioner’s point of view [3],
it requires more effort to be implemented initially, is more time consuming and requires, for
testing application specific functions, proficiency in a scripting language.
An important amount of research effort has been allocated to study the automatic gen-
eration of test cases, including test oracles. Model-based testing is one technique that has
received substantial attention [99, 39]. Advances in the theories of software testing enable
further automation of the testing process, especially by exploiting the developments in model-
based testing [15]. However, in general, the current practice of software test automation in
industry is mostly limited to recording manual testing activities and replaying them as re-
gression testing scripts [25].
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1.1.3 Model-based testing
The general idea of model-based testing is as follows. An explicit behavioural model encodes
the intended behaviour of an implementation called the system under test (SUT). Traces of
the model are selected and these traces constitute test cases for the SUT. Models, represented
as state charts, labelled transition systems or UML models, are more abstract than the SUT.
Additional components perform the concretisation of the test cases to make them executable
against the SUT [103].
Robinson [108] shows the differences between manual testing, automated testing with
scripts and random testing with keywords, although Robinson does not use the term keywords,
and compares them with model-based testing. According to Robinson, the key feature of the
model-based testing approach is that it understands the application and knows what the
application is supposed to do. Then, it generates test sequences dynamically and can detect
when the application is not functioning properly.
Robinson [108] is not completely fair with the keyword-driven approach. This approach
does not necessarily execute the “keywords” in a exclusively random fashion. Heuristics can
be applied to guide the execution. Moreover, one can consider keyword-driven testing as a
precursor to the model-based approach. In a way, keyword-driven testing can be viewed as a
piece of model-based testing in that it provides the components for the test execution engine
needed for it [27]. Keyword-driven testing, however, doesn’t deliver the highly leveraged
“automated test design” output that model-based testing provides.
Model-based testing is a natural approach if one considers that in any testing approach,
automated or manual, the intended behaviour of the system is implicitly represented in a
tester’s mind [103]. The main contribution of model-based testing resides in representing this
model explicitly. Additionally, model-based testing supports further automation by repre-
senting the system’s model in a way that it can be read and understood by a machine.
Model-based testing provides important benefits. First, a model serves as a unifying point
of reference that all teams and individuals involved in the development process can share,
reuse, and benefit from. For example, confusion as to whether the system under test needs to
satisfy a particular requirement can be resolved by examining the model. Secondly, the most
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popular models have a substantial and rich theoretical background that makes numerous tasks
such as generating large suites of test cases easy to automate. For example, graph theory
readily solves automated test generation for finite state machine models [42].
Additional benefits of model-based testing are the possibility of finding more bugs and a
lower maintenance effort than traditional test automation. More bugs can be found because
an arbitrary number of different test cases can be generated from a single model. The main-
tenance is reduced to a few changes in the model where, for traditional automation, it would
imply changes in hundreds or thousands of test cases.
Automated execution of test cases in model-based testing also brings benefits. It makes
it possible to run a large number of generated test cases. It also enables a so called online
model-based testing approach. In online testing, a test is generated simultaneously as it is
being executed. This makes it possible to modify the course of a test execution according to
the observed responses of the SUT.
1.1.4 Problems of current automation
Most test automation approaches have failed to support testing practitioners in the domain of
security testing [120], while testing concurrent software is notoriously difficult due to problems
with non-determinism and synchronisation [112].
Software security is defined as the absence of properties and features (commonly referred
to as vulnerabilities) that pose a risk to the operator of the software or third parties if they
are exploited with malicious intent [120]. Although the presence of security features such as
cryptography, strong authentication techniques and access control plays an important role in
software security, it is the presence of vulnerabilities that poses most of the security risks [101].
Most test automation approaches are able to test the functionality of the security features,
however, they are not adequate to identify security vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are often
subtle and hard to detect [129] and testing to reveal them inside an implementation requires
a different approach [115].
Security vulnerability testing is motivated by understanding and simulating a hostile and
malicious environment where an intelligent adversary is bent on breaking the system [101].
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It is usually associated with penetration testing and red-teaming. Current penetration testing
refers to executing a suite of scripted tests that represent known exploits [115]. One of the
main problems of penetration testing as an assurance technique is that, usually, it depends
on the tester’s skills, and the knowledge and documentation of procedures, assumptions and
requirements is poor or non-existent [8].
Additionally, testing for security related properties, such as privacy properties, has only
been addressed in literature as functional testing for specialised software components such as
policy decision points [81, 78, 80, 79], and inside relational databases [1, 29]. Nevertheless,
these properties traverse several functionalities and issues related to them rarely appear within
these specialised components. Therefore, there is a need for testing these security properties
within all relevant functionalities of the system.
Testing and validation of asynchronous systems have to address different characteristics.
Many of these characteristics, such as local non-determinism and communication delays, have
been addressed theoretically [31, 18]. However, from a practitioner’s point of view, these
solutions are not always available. In particular, automated testing tools need to deal with
practical implementation challenges. For example, perfect communication channels (without
losses or delays) used in the theory are not present in real systems. Therefore, automated
testing approaches need to handle systems with imperfect channels. In the same way, if some
subsystems rely on external choices, these approaches need to provide mechanisms to handle
non-determinism.
A shift to model-based testing could help to alleviate the problems with testing security
vulnerabilities and security related properties as well as being able to help to address testing
of asynchronous systems. However, it seems that the leap from traditional scripted testing to
model-based testing is as hard as moving from manual to automatic test execution [51]. In
practice, this shift does not occur because of a number of reasons:
• There is a lack of general knowledge on how to model (or represent) security vulnera-
bilities [120] and how to combine the representation of other security properties, such
as privacy policies, with traditional behavioural models.
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• Literature suggests that testers are required to know different forms of state machines,
formal languages, and automata theory, probably one different formalism for each type
of property or vulnerability [42, 51].
• Models themselves have also some drawbacks. The biggest one of those is the explosion
of state-space needed. Even a simple application can contain so many states that the
maintenance of the model becomes a difficult and tedious task.
• The necessary concretisation of test sequences derived from a model to be able to execute
the test on the implementation is often neglected in model-based testing literature
[129]. Therefore, practitioners have a constrained perception of model-based testing
capabilities.
1.2 Aims and research question
The overall aim of this thesis is to investigate the characteristics of a model-based framework
for the automated testing of, mainly, security vulnerabilities and security related properties
such as privacy properties. It is also an aim to make this framework general enough to be
applied in testing software systems in other domains. With focus on software assurance this
framework needs to solve the problem of representing and documenting existing software
vulnerabilities. Discovering new kinds of vulnerabilities in software systems will be out of the
scope of this framework.
In a more detailed manner, the framework developed in this thesis should present the
following features:
• provide an integrated modelling approach that supports the definition of the system’s
properties that characterise the presence of defined security vulnerabilities, possible
ways of exploiting these vulnerabilities and the effects that a successful exploit has on
the software behaviour;
• provide a way of integrating current descriptions of security properties, such as privacy
policies, into this modelling approach;
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• target the concretisation of test sequences for automated execution;
• facilitate the testing of systems in domains other than software security, such as asyn-
chronous systems and operating systems; and
• maintain the advantages of data-driven and keyword-driven approaches and facilitate
integration with existing test automation tools and approaches.
In summary, the research question that this thesis addresses is which features of model-
based testing frameworks, e.g., type of models and definition of test objectives, support the
automation of the testing process for security related properties such as security vulnerabilities
and preservation of privacy? Do these features support the testing process for other non-
related domains, e.g., asynchronous systems, and support the reuse of existing artefacts and
tools in current testing frameworks?
1.3 Main contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are summarised as follows.
• The present thesis describes a general model-based testing framework that emphasizes
the separation between behavioural models and data generation models. This separation
makes it possible to keep models tractable while it also enables the generation of concrete
test cases that include necessary data values to be used in their execution against the
SUT. The generic specification of the models abstracts this approach from idiosyncrasies
of more specific languages and makes it portable between domain-specific languages
and tools. Behavioural models are described using labelled transition systems whereas
data generation models are described in a general fashion using extended context free
grammars.
• This thesis also describes how the general model is specialised for generating test cases
on specific security testing domains, namely, security vulnerabilities testing and privacy
policies testing. For each testing domain, behavioural and data generation models
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become a general pattern of the system’s specification while specific models represent
special characteristics and the testing objectives for the particular domain.
The thesis establishes that testing to reveal the presence of vulnerabilities requires the
modelling of the properties of an implementation that lead to a particular vulnerability
(the implementation model) as well as the intentions and knowledge of a malicious
user. Under the assumption that the behavioural model is correct, this thesis defines
that a vulnerability is product of a faulty relationship between the behavioural model
and the implementation model. The thesis calls faulty context the representation of
this relationship. Thus, following a fault-based approach, this thesis defines in which
contexts vulnerabilities can be present and exploited.
For the privacy policies domain, this thesis presents a general structured way of rep-
resenting policies, particularly privacy policies. This thesis addresses the fact that
(privacy) policies are traversal to the applications in the sense that they are applied to
every occurrence or execution of a defined action, subject, of course, to the evaluation of
a triggering condition. The privacy policies considered in this thesis include the concept
of obligations and address their testing. The thesis also addresses the fact that on the
presence of a contracted obligation the test case can only be evaluated after a second
condition (linked to the obligation) has been triggered. In this case, the thesis makes
an important assumption that is that unbounded obligations do not exist. The thesis
provides a specific algorithm to drive the generation of test cases for this particular
domain.
• A general framework should be applicable to different domains. This thesis demon-
strates that this framework is applicable in domains different from security testing.
Domains such as asynchronous systems testing and operating systems testing, provide
interesting cases for studying the applicability of the framework.
For the domain of asynchronous systems the thesis provides specific algorithms to drive
the generation and execution of test cases. The provided algorithms are capable of
dealing with imperfect communication channels, that is, channels with losses and delays,
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where the order in which actions are observed does not necessarily reflect the order of
execution.
In dealing with operating systems, this thesis demonstrates the testing of device drivers.
It explores two slightly different approaches of modelling device drivers functionalities
and compares them in terms of the number of test scenarios that each one produces
and the granularity of control over the operations executed.
• The thesis also demonstrates, via examples, that the presented approaches can be imple-
mented using existing tools and can also be integrated with current testing frameworks.
It presents the advantages, disadvantages and trade-offs of such integration focusing on
the level of detail of the models.
1.4 Thesis outline
The following provides a brief outline of content, for all subsequent chapters in this thesis.
• Chapter 2 presents a general overview of software testing and test automation in the
domains of security testing (vulnerabilities and privacy properties) and testing of con-
current asynchronous systems; with a particular focus on the model-based testing ap-
proach. It also describes commonly used modelling formalisms that serve as a basis
for the models presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The aim of this chapter is to equip the
reader with essential-knowledge that provides a point-of-reference for understanding the
description of the testing framework presented in this thesis.
• Chapter 3 presents a general model-based framework for test automation that can be
applied to a wide range of systems and testing domains.
• Chapter 4 describes specific details that allow the general framework to be specialised
and applied to the testing domains of security vulnerabilities, privacy policies and asyn-
chronous systems.
• Chapter 5 presents four case studies. In the first case study, the general framework is
used in the domain of operating systems to demonstrate its practical applicability and
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the reuse of current test automation frameworks. The second and third case studies
demonstrate the applicability of the framework specialised for testing security vulnera-
bilities and privacy policies in the context of web-based applications. The fourth case
study shows the framework, specialised for testing asynchronous systems, applied to the
testing of the Financial Information eXchange (FIX) protocol.
• Finally, Chapter 6 presents the thesis conclusion - a brief summary of work carried-out,
conclusion and directions for future research.
11
Chapter 2
Literature review
2.1 Preliminaries
The testing framework in this thesis is based on the general formalism of labelled transition
systems. In this section, general concepts related to labelled transition systems are presented
with the aim of providing the reader with the essential knowledge needed to understand the
presentation of the framework described in this thesis.
2.1.1 Labelled transition systems
A labelled transition system is a structure consisting of states with transitions, labelled with
actions, between them. The states model the system states; the labelled transitions model
the actions that a system can perform.
Definition 1 A labelled transition system (LTS) is a 4-tuple (Q,A,→, q0) where
• Q is a non-empty set of states of the system,
• A is a set of action labels,
• → is the transition relation, →⊆ Q×A×Q, and
• q0 represents the initial state of the system.
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Figure 2.1: LTS model of a vending machine
The transition relation→ denotes possible state changes; if (q, a, q′) ∈→, one can say that
the system can move from state q to q′ by performing action a. As customary, q
a
−→ q′ is
written instead of (q, a, q′) ∈→. Transitions can be composed. Suppose that in state q′ the
system can perform action a′, which means q′
a′
−→ q′′. Then one can compose, q
a
−→ q′
a′
−→ q′′,
which is written as q
a···a′
−→ q′′. Composition of transitions can be generalised to qi
a1·a2·...·an−→ qj
which expresses that the system, in state qi, can perform the sequence of actions a1 ·a2 ·. . .·an,
and may end in state qj . As it is well pointed out by Tretmans [119], the use of may is relevant
because of possible non-determinism. That is, a composed transition can exist such that with
the same sequence of actions, the system will end in a state other than qj , e.g. qi
a1·a2·...·an−→ qk.
Consider the graph in Figure 2.1. It is a pictorial representation of a LTS that models
the behaviour of a vending machine. That is, it models a machine that accepts some coins as
payment for an item, lets the user choose the desired item and returns some coins as change if
needed. To improve readability, consider actions i for inserting coins, s for processing the user
selection, d for delivering the item, and c for giving back the change. The non-determinism
referred to in the previous paragraph is present in this simple model. Consider the sequence
of actions σ = i · i · s · d · c. One can derive two composed transitions from this sequence,
q0
σ
−→ q4 and q0
σ
−→ q3. The first transition means that the machine has delivered the item
and all the change due; the second transition represents the case where the machine has still
some change to give back to the user.
A labelled transition system contains information about all possible behaviours of a sys-
tem. However, in software testing one usually needs to reason about a particular behaviour
or subset of behaviours. To achieve this, the following concepts associated with a LTS need
to be introduced.
Definition 2 (Path) Given a LTS M = (Q,A,→, q0), a path in M is a sequence π =
q0a0q1 · . . . such that for all i we have q
a
−→ q′. We denote with paths(q) the set of paths
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starting in q. We use paths(M) for paths(q0). With Paths(q,qn) one denotes the set of paths
starting in q and ending in qn. As a notational convention, write q −→ qn, if paths(q,qn) is
not empty and q −→, if there exists a state qn such that q −→ qn.
Definition 3 (Trace) The trace α of a path π, denoted trace(π), is the sequence α = a0 ·
a1 · . . . an of actions in A occurring in π. With traces(M) = {trace(π)|π ∈ paths(M)} one
denotes the set of traces in M . Analogously, traces(q) denotes the set of traces of all paths
that start in state q. In case α is finite, |α| denotes the length of the trace α and the function
last(α) returns the last action in α.
Additionally, there are circumstances in which particular properties of a state need to be
described. With this objective in sight, this thesis defines a state predicate as a Boolean-
valued function built from system states. Formally, given a suitable universe of constants and
function symbols with fixed semantics, the set of all possible state predicates is defined as
State predicates = {sp | sp : Q → Bool}. Given a state predicate sp and a state q, sp(q)
determines if sp holds in q.
2.1.2 Input-Output transition systems
A labelled transition system specifies the possible interactions that a system may have with
its environment. These interactions are abstract, in the sense that they are only identified by
a label; there is no notion of initiative or direction of the interaction. Usually the environment
can also be modelled as a LTS. In this case, an interaction can occur if both, the system and
its environment, are able to perform that interaction. That is, the system and its environment
synchronise over common actions.
This paradigm of abstract interaction is sufficient for analysing and reasoning about a
large number of applications [119]. However, many real world systems communicate with
their environment in a different way. For these systems, there is a clear distinction between
inputs and outputs, where inputs are actions initiated by the environment and outputs are
actions initiated by the system. The literature assigns two important properties to these
systems:
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• outputs from the system are never refused by the environment, and
• inputs from the environment are never refused by the system.
The second one is the most important and is also known as the input-enabled property.
Input-output transition systems are a special kind of labelled transition systems that model
this class of systems with inputs and outputs.
Definition 4 An input-output transition system (IOTS) is a labelled transition system where
the set A of actions is partitioned into disjoint subsets of input actions AI and output actions
AO and where all input actions are enabled in any reachable state:
∀q′ · q −→ q′ , ∀a ∈ AI : q
a
−→
Consider the set A of actions in the LTS of Figure 2.1. Then, consider disjoint subsets
AI = {i, s} and AO = {d, c} such that A = AI ∪ AO. Even under these considerations, the
system in Figure 2.1 is not an IOTS because it lacks the input-enabled property. However,
in a LTS there can be some states that refuse certain input actions, and thus one can opt
for not showing them explicitly. Then, a labelled transition system can be seen as a partially
specified input-output transition system. For example, in the vending machine example, it
refuses any user selection before a coin has been inserted, and refuses additional coins to be
inserted after the selection has been made.
There are two reasons for writing partial specifications. One is that it does not matter
how implementations respond to unspecified input actions. The other is that the environment
is assumed not to offer such inputs, so there is no need to specify them [54]. We believe the
latter is usually the reason for not specifying certain input actions. Nevertheless, sometimes
our assumptions are not highly accurate when it comes to real implementations. Thus, models
need to be refined and specify how the system deals with all inputs.
One way of completing a partially specified IOTS is to add a special state to the system
and to add transitions to this state for all non-specified inputs. This way assumes that the
reason for under-specifying certain input actions is that one doesn’t care or know what the
15
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Figure 2.2: Demonic completed IOTS model of a vending machine
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Figure 2.3: Angelic completed IOTS model of a vending machine
behaviour of the system is after those actions have been executed. This means that in an
underspecified state – i.e., a state reached after an unspecified input action – every action
from the label set is correct. This behaviour is known as chaos [62], and the method that
completes the IOTS by introducing it, is called demonic completion. A characteristic of
demonic completion is that the new state acts as a sink. That is, once the system reaches
such a state it will never leave that state again. Figure 2.2 shows the demonic completed
IOTS of the vending machine’s LTS in Figure 2.1.
Another way of making systems input-enabled is, in every state q and for each non-specified
input action a, to include a self-transition q
a // q . This self-transition makes the system
accept those inputs that were previously refused but without changing the system’s state.
This method is also referred to as angelic completion. In Figure 2.3 we show the angelic
completed IOTS for our vending machine.
The input-enabled property of IOTS brings on another concept for one to deal with. Since
all input actions are enabled in every state of the system, it is up to the environment to decide
whether an input action will occur, or not. Conversely, since the environment is said not to
refuse any output action, output actions depend only on the system to be executed. All
this means that in a given state a system can choose between executing any output action or
waiting for the environment to execute an input action. However, there will be, possibly, states
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where no output actions are possible and the only alternative is to wait for the environment.
Such a state where the system cannot autonomously proceed is called a quiescent state.
Definition 5 (Quiescent state) Let M = (Q,AI ∪ AO,→, q0) be an IOTS. A state q ∈ Q
is quiescent, denoted by δ(q) if ∀ω ∈ AO : q 6
ω
−→.
Definition 6 (Quiescent traces) The quiescent traces of a IOTS M are those traces that
may lead to a quiescent state. This is, Qtraces(M) = {σ ∈ A∗|∃q′:q0
σ
−→ q′ ∧ δ(q′)}
The framework in this thesis does not mention explicitly the concept of quiescence but it is
implicitly stated in the models of asynchronous systems when the tester defines the accepting
states. In other words, quiescent states in asynchronous systems define the accepting states
of an asynchronous model.
2.2 Software test automation
Test automation refers to the process of using computers to assist in the process of software
testing. The main goal of test automation is to make the testing process faster, less susceptible
to errors and more reproducible [116].
Test automation has developed along time and has evolved from record and playback
testing frameworks to data-driven and keyword-driven frameworks [3]. Hayes [53] presents
this evolution from the practitioner’s perspective. According to Hayes, because of their cost of
maintenance, pure record and playback tools were rapidly modified to include programming
features giving place to scripting frameworks (also known as linear frameworks). The different
approaches followed by test automation frameworks are summarised in Table 2.1 [3, 53, 68].
In the remaining part of this section, this thesis describes the keyword-driven framework
in greater detail. As it was defined before, one of the aims of this thesis is to maintain and
take advantage of the advances in the execution of test cases that current test automation
frameworks present. Later, model-based testing is also described in greater detail. This thesis
uses model-based testing with the aim of providing an integrated framework that addresses
test case generation and execution.
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Table 2.1: Test automation frameworks
Framework type Description
Linear Automated scripts contain all necessary components for the execution of
the test inside their bodies. This approach lacks modularity and scripts
hardly can be reused.
Functional de-
composition
This is a framework that involves the creation of modular functions for
executing fundamental actions that occur during test execution. These
actions may then be called upon and executed independently of one
another, thus allowing them to be reused by multiple tests within an
automated test suite.
Data-driven An enhancement to the functional approach in which most of the com-
ponents to be executed still exist inside the body of the script. However,
the data used in these scripts is typically stored in a file that is external
to the script, which promotes script reusability.
Keyword-driven A further enhancement to the functional approach. In this approach
the logic of the execution is separated from the executable components
themselves. These components remain inside the scripts’ bodies but the
logic is described by a set of keywords (functions at a much higher level
of abstraction than in the functional approach). Tests are developed in
a tabular format that is interpreted and executed by a driver script or
utility.
Model-based Often called “Intelligent frameworks”, model-based frameworks go be-
yond creating automated tests that are executed by the tool. Provided
with information about the application, in the form of state models,
these frameworks generate and execute tests in a semi-intelligent, dy-
namic manner.
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Figure 2.4: A general architecture for a keyword-driven testing framework
2.2.1 Action-words and keywords
The keyword-driven approach [43], also known as table-driven approach [52] and action-words
[26], is a test automation approach that separates the scripts that execute automated test
cases from their logic and test data. Keyword-driven testing is a logical extension to data-
driven testing.
In a simplified way, a keyword-driven framework contains three elements: a library of
keywords, a set of data tables and a set of test scripts [3]. A keyword is typically a verb or
verb-like phrase that is associated with an external library function (the script) responsible
for executing the application commands necessary to satisfy the objective of the test. The
data tables provide the necessary data elements for the scripts to work. These elements are
used and interact in a testing framework as depicted in Figure 2.4.
The main elements of the keyword-driven framework in Figure 2.4 are defined as follows:
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Test Case file. Contains the detailed steps to be carried out for the execution of a test case.
It is in the form of a table that contains columns with information for each step, such
as keyword, object name and parameter.
Control file. Contains details of all the test scenarios to be automated. Control files are
usually tables that contain the scenario ID, the path to the data repository, the path
to specific test case files and a flag that defines if a defined test case will be executed or
not. Usually the tester is able to select a specific scenario to execute based on turning
on or off this flag.
Keyword Interpreter. Reads information from the test case and control files. In case
parameters are defined using variables, it performs the matching between the variables
and their values in the data repository.
Application map. Is one of the most critical components, which is used for mapping the
system’s operations and objects, from names human testers can recognize to a data
format useful for the automation tool. For example, when testing a GUI, a naming
convention can refer to each component in each window by using the type of object and
the name of a property (e.g. button with label “login”, text field with label “password”).
Then use the Application Map to associate that name to the identification method
needed by the automation tool to locate and properly manipulate the correct object in
the window.
Scripts. Modular reusable routines or functions that perform generic tasks by calling the
SUT’s interface. The scripts (as shown in Figure 2.4) are particular instances of the
utility scripts. The utility scripts are completely generic in that they are based in the
type of object(s) and the operation to be performed. It is the application map that
selects the scripts to be executed and defines the exact instance of the object(s) to be
used during the execution of the script.
The two most important advantages of working with action words are probably readability
and maintainability [26]. Tests are easy to read because all details needed for their execution
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(like which buttons have to be pushed or at what location on the screen an outcome can be
found) are hidden behind the action words. Moreover, the application map enables the scripts
and keyword driven tests to have a single point of maintenance, on the task of identifying
particular objects in the SUT’s implementation. For example, if a new version of an applica-
tion changes the title of the window or label of the components, it should not affect the test
cases. The changes will require only a quick modification in one place–inside the Application
Map. In this thesis we aim to maintain these advantages of the keyword-driven approach.
The action-words approach is fairly flexible and generic, and this makes it suitable for
implementing an approach as specialized as model-based testing [27]. A first way of repre-
senting a model in the action-words framework is by using decision tables in the control file.
With decision tables the execution of actions can be selective and repetitive. A table that
contains different rows with specific data values for each can be used to select the action to be
executed. Data values can be generated in a loop to trigger the execution of the correspondent
action as many times as desired.
The relationship between models and the action-words approach is not limited to decision
tables. Complete state machines can be represented in action-words. Buwalda [27] uses the
terms situation and move to describe nothing more than states and transitions. Situations
are explicitly given a name (tag) and moves describe, also explicitly, the “jump” from one
situation tag to another.
There is no reason to limit the description of the model to the approaches cited above.
The way in which a model is described depends on the skills of the testers. They need to
understand the problem area and the model technique(s) involved [27]. Thus, by allowing the
testers to describe models in different formalisms, one can reuse the implementation of the
action-words (the script code) and fully link action-words with model-based testing.
2.3 Model-based Testing
Extensive research has been performed in the area of model-based testing. Annotated bib-
liographies and surveys at different points in time during the last decade have reported the
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advances in this area [99, 122, 39, 60]. Some authors (see for example [76, 71, 96, 113]) refer
to model-based testing also as specification-based testing. In this thesis the term model-based
testing is preferred but the terms model and (formal) specification are used without distinc-
tion (unless explicitly stated the contrary). In any case, both terms refer to the introduction
and use of software models (or formal specifications) into the testing process.
Formal software specifications have been incorporated into testing in several ways. They
have been used as a mean of executing testing into the earlier phases of software development
as well as a basis for test case generation. On one hand, by using executable specifications
in evolutionary prototyping, the testing process can start much earlier and can therefore be
more effective [104]. On the other hand, since formal specifications define mathematically the
behaviour of a piece of software, complete test cases can be derived from them. The de facto
meaning of model-based testing is related mainly to test case generation.
Model-based testing is a black-box testing technique that relies on explicit behavioural
models that encode the intended behaviour of a system and possibly the behaviour of its
environment. The idea that motivates this technique is that the existence of an artefact that
explicitly defines the intended behaviour can help mitigate the problems that traditionally
appear on the process of designing test cases (unstructured, not reproducible, not documented,
among others). In a recent survey article, Utting et al. [122] define model-based testing as
the automatable derivation of concrete test cases from abstract formal models, and their
execution.
Based on the works of Hierons et al. [59] and Utting et al. [122] a generalised process
of model-based testing is presented in the following section. This process contains four steps
that refer to three main elements: models, the process of generating test cases and the process
of executing these test cases. Issues related to these three elements are also discussed.
2.3.1 Process
A generic process of model-based testing usually involves four stages:
• Stage 1. Building an abstract model of the system under test. This is similar to the
process of formally specifying the system, but the kind of specification/model needed
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for test generation may be a little different to that needed for other purposes, such as
proving correctness, or clarifying requirements. The level of abstraction of the model
is also variable. Sometimes, abstraction refers to the fact that the model neglects or
disregards certain functionality or quality attributes, such as security.
An initial validation of the model can be considered on this stage. However, Utting
[121] does not consider it to be a crucial step when the case is test case generation. It is
because if the model contains errors, the generated test cases will find and report them.
• Stage 2. Defining test selection criteria and abstract test case specifications. The
selection criteria describe, possibly informally, a test suite. In general, it can relate to
a given functionality (when it is based on requirements), to the structure of the model
(state coverage, transition coverage, predicate coverage), to stochastic characterisations
(randomness, user profiles) and also to a well-defined set of faults. A test case specifi-
cation formalises the notion of the selection criteria in terms of the same language as
the model, or maybe operations over the model.
• Stage 3. Generating a test suite. Given the model and a test case specification, an
automatic tool is capable of deriving concrete test cases. In general, there are many
test cases that satisfy the specification and generators pick some in a random way, by
applying some heuristic like picking boundary-values, or by using elaborate searching
algorithms to find them. However, in some rare cases, the set of test cases that satisfy a
test case specification can also be empty. In such cases, either the domain of values used
in the generation process is considered inadequate and another set of values is required,
or, if all possible values have been considered, the model does not present the property
represented by the test case specification.
• Stage 4. Executing test cases. Consider that a test case is composed of three dis-
tinguishable parts, input data, expected output (which includes data) and a control
sequence. This control sequence defines the set of steps or operations required to realise
the test cases. In executing a test case, the SUT runs following what is indicated in the
control sequence using the input data as parameters and comparing the oracle (output
23
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
expected by the test case) with the actual results from the SUT. This comparison forms
a verdict, which can take the outcomes of pass, fail and inconclusive. A test case passes
when expected and actual output conform. It fails when expected and actual outputs
do not conform, and it is inconclusive if no decision can be made.
It must be recalled that model and SUT reside at different levels of abstraction, and
that these different levels must be bridged. Hence, the input part of the test cases
could need to be adapted for execution on the SUT, and outputs could also need to be
abstracted to match the oracle.
2.3.2 Models
According to Offutt [96], there are three main approaches inside specification-based testing:
model-based, transition-based and property-based. Each one is different from the other on the
type of notation they use for describing the specifications. Although presented here as different
approaches, later this thesis avoids the dichotomy between model-based and property-based
models.
Model-based specification languages, such as Z, B, VDM and OCL, attempt to provide for-
mal specifications of the software based on mathematical models. These languages generally
use pre- and post-conditions to describe the relation that exists between inputs and outputs of
a system. Transition-based specifications describe software in terms of state transitions. Typ-
ical transition-based specifications define preconditions on transitions and triggering events.
Preconditions are values that specific variables must have for the transition to be enabled.
Triggering events are changes in variable values that cause the transition to be taken. These
events “trigger” the change in state. Algebraic specification (or property-based) languages
describe software by making formal statements, called axioms, about relationships among
operations and the functions that operate on them. This kind of specification is also known
as functional specification.
Other approaches have been used in specification-based testing. Most of them extend the
previous ones by adding mechanisms to specify additional characteristics like time, concur-
rency and parallelism, and probabilities. Utting et al. [122] describe them as history-based,
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operational and stochastic notations. History-based notations model a system by describing
the allowable traces of its behaviour over the time. Various notions of time can be used,
leading to different kinds of temporal logics. Formalisms like message sequence charts are
also considered in this group. Operational notations describe a system as a collection of ex-
ecutable processes, executing in parallel. This group includes the process algebras, like CSP
and CCS, and Petri nets. Stochastic notations describe a system using a probabilistic model
of the events and input values. In general they are used to describe the system’s environment
rather than the system itself. As an example, Markov chains are used to model expected
usage profiles so that the generated test cases exercise that usage profile [128].
In addition to selecting which approach should be used to describe the model(s) of the
system, it is equally important to define what is going to be modelled. This is called the
model subject [122]. A model can either describe the intended behaviour of the system or
describe the possible behaviour of the environment. On one hand, the model of the system
serves to define an oracle for its functionalities. Moreover, its structure can be exploited for
the generation of the test cases. On the other hand, the model of the environment is used
to restrict the possible inputs to the model of the system, acting then as a test selection
criterion. Environment models can also be used to define exactly the stimuli that exert only
certain “parts” of the system where the tester believes there is a major probability of finding
problems.
Most often, for test case generation process, both models are used. Different combinations
of the models serve different purposes. Figure 2.5 illustrates the possible combinations. The
vertical axis shows how much of the behaviour of the system is modelled, while the horizontal
axis shows how much of the environment is modelled. The shaded area shows all the possible
combinations. In the following some combinations are discussed.
Extreme positions are marked with S,E and SE. The model S includes all the details
about the system but says nothing about the environment. Then, the input space for the
system is not constrained, and any behaviour of the environment is expected. Model E is the
opposite, where full knowledge of the environment and nothing about the expected behaviour
of the system is explicitly represented. This constrains the input space for the system but
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Figure 2.5: Model subjects of model-based testing (source: [122])
cannot be used as an oracle to verify its execution. Position SE is the most extreme case
where everything about the system and the environment is modelled. This kind of model
would be as complex as the implementation of the system (or even more). Thus, it is not
practical. Models in positions M1 and M2 are the likely ones to be used in model-based
testing. Those models combine certain aspects of both, the system and its environment, and
simplify the understanding by hiding the irrelevant details. How much and which details are
hidden depends on the level of abstraction of the models. It is important to note that the level
of abstraction can be induced by the modelling language itself by not providing any means of
modelling certain aspects, or can be defined by the modeller who explicitly disregards certain
information.
2.3.3 Test case generation
From a well described set of models one can generate test cases. Two main issues have to
be discussed when the test case generation takes place. First, it has to be defined which test
cases are going to be considered. Secondly, it has to be defined how these test cases are
going to be generated. The answers for which test cases are generated refers to what is called
test selection criteria and the answer for how they are generated refers to the test generation
technology.
A test selection criterion defines the characteristics that will be evaluated on a test case
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for it to be considered relevant. Traditionally, three major criteria have been used in testing:
structural coverage criteria, data coverage criteria and fault-based criteria. Other criteria
such as ad-hoc test case specifications and random and stochastic criteria have also been used
on a minor scale. The approach presented in this thesis emphasises the use of fault-based
criteria. It is not that the other criteria are not important but, according to Morell [89], the
fault-based approach is more adequate when the motivation is to demonstrate the absence of
pre-specified properties (or faults).
Fault-based criteria. The fault-based criteria use an alternate way of showing program
correctness. This alternate way is based on falsification, which means that it shows that the
program is not incorrect. If a program has a limited potential for being incorrect, then a
test set demonstrates correctness when it shows the potential is not realised. A fault-based
criterion tries to specify incorrectness by defining potential faults for program constructs. The
most popular criterion of this kind is mutation testing [50]. Initially mutation testing creates
mutant programs from an original one by altering a single program construct, for example,
replacing one logical operator with another. The rules that define which changes are valid or
useful are called mutation operators. Subsequently, the mutants are executed with a defined
test case and the execution results are compared with the execution results of the original
program. If they are different then the test case distinguishes the original program from the
mutant, hence it reveals the flaw inside the mutant program. A test case (or test suite) is as
good as the percentage of mutant programs it distinguishes. Of course, even a test suite with
a perfect mutation score (100% of mutants distigushed) is only guaranteed to be effective
against those faults introduced into the mutant programs. This characteristic is common to
all fault-based approaches.
The test generation technology refers to the technique that is used to actually construct
the test cases. Again, different techniques have been explored by different research works.
Manual derivation of test cases, for example, is always a possibility, however it does not
take real advantage of the potential of automation of model-based testing and that could be
considered a waste. In the following sections this thesis discusses briefly some automated
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techniques used in test case generation, such as graph search algorithms, model checking, and
constraint solving.
Dedicated graph search algorithms. There are limitless numbers of existing graph
algorithms which can be applied to determine a test path, for example, the shortest round
trip, depth first search and most likely paths. Even a random path algorithm that generates
any sequence of transitions on the graph can be used for stress testing. However, a random
path does not guarantee coverage of all states and transitions and this is not meaningful in a
large testing scheme. One of the more effective and efficient graph algorithms used to satisfy
coverage is the Chinese Postman algorithm [22]. The Chinese postman algorithm has been
already applied successfully in protocol testing and behaviour testing especially when state
charts are used as models. The interested reader is referred to the work of Petrenko [99] for
a detailed bibliographic survey on test case derivation using this technique.
Model checking. The purpose of a model checker is to verify or falsify specified prop-
erties of a model. In order to use a model checker for test case generation, a set of properties
(usually reachability properties) is generated and the model-checker is asked to verify the
properties one by one. These properties are constructed in such a way that they fail for the
given system specification, leading the model checker to produce a counter-example. The
counter-example shows a valid sequence of states that any conforming implementation should
follow. This sequence of states becomes a test case. The main challenge in generating these
properties is to generate them in such a way that the set of counter-examples generated will
be adequate to satisfy a previously defined coverage criterion.
Constraint satisfaction. Most of the technologies described before (except for random
testing) have to satisfy some constraints. Thus, the problem of generating test cases from
a formal specification can be represented as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP). A
constraint satisfaction problem consists of a finite set of variables and a set of constraints.
Each variable is associated with a set of possible values, known as its domain. A constraint is
a relation defined on some subset of these variables and denotes valid combinations of their
values. A solution to a constraint satisfaction problem is an assignment of a value to each
variable from its domain, such that all the constraints are satisfied. Formally, the conjunction
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of these constraints forms a predicate for which a solution should be found.
When linked to the testing terminology, the predicate for which a solution is searched is
the test case specification. Domains for the variables of the CSP are directly related to the
data type defined for the variables in the test case specification. Then, a concrete test case is
the set of state, input and output variables, with a value of their domains assigned to them.
A constraint solver implements an algorithm for solving well-formed constraints within a
CSP in accordance with a constraint theory. The constraint theory CT defines the semantics
of a constraint system and is composed of a set of transformation rules over one or more
specific domains. The syntax of well-formed constraints is defined by the set of allowed
constraints C. At the heart of any constraint solver there is a search method that looks among
many combinations for a valid solution for a given predicate. Search methods for solving
constraints include alternating variable, simulated annealing, genetic algorithms, iterative
relaxation and different heuristics. McMinn [86] has reported the use of genetic algorithms,
simulated annealing, and evolutionary algorithms for test case generation. The author has
developed previously [2] a constraint solver that uses a branch-and-bound tree to search over
partially ordered types with the aim of generating test data for unit testing.
2.3.4 Test case execution
The last step in the testing process is the test case execution (and evaluation). Test execution
refers to the activity of running the system under test (SUT) using the generated test case
inputs and comparing the results of this execution with the generated expected outputs. Two
approaches for test case execution are relevant to us: the on-line and the off-line approach.
The on-line approach mixes test case generation and execution. Thus, some part of a
test sequence is generated and then applied on a SUT execution. Then, the test generation
algorithm generates another part of the test sequence and executes the SUT with this (partial)
test, repeating this process several times. The advantage of this approach is that the test
case generation algorithm can react to the actual outputs of the SUT. This is especially useful
under the presence of non-determinism in the SUT and to avoid problems of state explosion
when specifications on a low level of abstraction are used. This is also known as the on-the-fly
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approach.
The off-line approach completely separates test case generation from execution. Thus, all
the test cases are generated strictly before they are run. The advantages of this approach
include the fact that generated test cases can be applied using existing test management tools
and a set of test cases can be generated once but run many times. The last fact is especially
useful in regression testing and when the generation process is slower than the test execution.
2.4 Software security
Software security is the idea of engineering software so that it continues to function correctly
under malicious attack [85, 120]. The first books and academic classes on this topic appeared
in 2001 [5, 125], although some previous research work can be identified in the area of software
vulnerabilities [106, 41, 40]. In the last decade, a number of other works have provided
a philosophical underpinning for software security and have discussed particular technical
issues. This thesis focuses on technical issues related with software testing and the use of
models to support it.
Security testing can generally be classified into security functional testing and security
vulnerability testing [101, 85, 82]. Security functional testing involves testing the product
or implementation for conformance to the security function specifications, for example, the
specification of an encryption module, as well as for the underlying security model, generally
described as a security policy, for example, an access control policy or a privacy policy. The
conformance criteria state the conditions necessary for the product to exhibit the desired
security behaviour or satisfy a security property. In other words, security functional testing
involves what the product should do. Security vulnerability testing on the other hand is
concerned with the identification of flaws in design or implementation that may be exploited
to subvert the security behaviour which has been made possible by the correct implementation
of the security functions. In other words, security vulnerability testing involves testing the
product for what it should not do.
Model building is a standard practice in software engineering. The construction of models
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during the systems design improves the quality of the resulting systems by providing foun-
dation for early analysis and fault detection. Testing activities have found a useful partner
in formal modelling, giving raise to model-based testing. It seems security testing is (slowly)
joining this approach. Model building is also carried out in security and policy specifications.
In fact, a model of the system will provide a clear figure of what must be protected and
which interaction points (with the environment and potential malicious entities) need to be
addressed. However, as Basin et al. point out in [12], there are two gaps in the integration of
system and security modelling into the overall development process: 1) security and system
models are typically disjoint and described in different ways (languages), and 2) even when
security properties are considered in early models and security mechanisms are implemented
into the system, there is hardly a mapping between the two. This thesis addresses this prob-
lems by defining, when possible, a general way of representing security and system models
and, when it is not possible, by defining an algorithmic way of mapping those models.
Diverse testing techniques, including model-based strategies, can be applied with success
for (functional) testing of security modules such as intrusion detection systems and modules
for enforcing access control methods (see [72] for more examples). However, testing for con-
formance to a security policy, especially when this policy traverses several functionalities,
and testing to reveal the presence of security vulnerabilities have not been widely explored in
literature. This thesis focuses on these last two testing domains.
2.4.1 Privacy policies
Privacy policies are an example of the specification of high-level properties that traverse sev-
eral functionalities. These high-level policies usually set the requirements for other more
specific security policies, such as those governing authentication, access control and informa-
tion flow [6]. There have been various works both in privacy modelling and in policies testing
but these two areas have rarely been addressed together.
The first problem that has been studied is the formalisation of privacy policies. In addition
to the classic languages for privacy policies [37, 102], other specialised access control languages
such as XACML [132] have been used to describe privacy requirements [4]. It is interesting
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that different languages, such as EPAL and XACML, share the same underlying structure
and that their differences are mainly syntactic. It suggests that the research that has been
carried out in the area of access control policies can also be adapted to be used in the area of
privacy policies. Ultimately, one can achieve privacy by controlling who has access to which
information in the system. The main problem with this approach is probably linked to the
concept of obligations. This thesis discusses the research in testing access control policies and
its application in testing general privacy policies later in this section.
Independently from specific languages, Barth et al. [11] present a framework based in
contextual integrity to support policies enforcement. This framework is equipped with a
modal logic for reasoning about privacy policies. This framework takes the basics of its
model from Karjoth and Schunter [69] who present a general privacy model. Nevertheless,
none of these two frameworks consider testing as an area of application.
Other formalisation efforts have been done with the aim of comparing privacy policies [9] or
analysing obligations [65]. Others [82] have applied formalisms used to describe behavioural
models, such as FSM, to model access control policies for, later, using known generation
algorithms [33] to generate test cases that provide structural coverage for a defined policy.
However, there is no previous work that formalises and uses a privacy policy to generate test
cases for testing a system’s implementation.
The general framework presented by Karjoth and Schunter [69] seems a good starting
point to define a suitable way of describing privacy policies with the aim of generating test
cases.
Extensive research has been done in the area of testing access control policies [82, 83, 4,
23, 24, 81, 78, 80, 79, 63, 105]. Most of them aim to evaluate access requests against policies
(test case generation), while others compare versions of policies with each other and check
policies for internal consistency [23, 24].
All the approaches cited above focus into testing a particular security mechanism - the
policy decision point (PDP) - and verifying that the description of the policy itself represents
what the requirements meant. For example, on one hand, Martin and Xie [78] present an
approach for automatically generating test cases for a given access control policy. Their
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approach considers each rule in isolation and attempts to satisfy the constraints required for
that rule to be applied. Then, they measure the coverage of the generated test cases in terms
of the number of exercised conditions. On the other hand, Martin et al. [81] use a random
approach to generate requests against an access control policy. They test the correctness of
the policy against its intended responses, not if an implementation meets the policy. They
manually set some parameters to force the randomly selected test cases to provide condition
coverage.
Those approaches rely on the assumption that there is a logical module - the policy enforce-
ment point (PEP) - that interprets and enforces the execution of obligations. Paradoxically,
there is no specific mention in literature about testing PEPs. The problem is that the PEPs
can be implemented in different places in a system. Their functionalities can also be parti-
tioned and split among different modules. Thus, even when policies are analysed and test
cases are generated from them, there is no description of how these test cases can be linked
to a particular system.
Only recently the problem of testing a PEP has been recognised [90, 91]. In their first work
Mouelhi et al. [90] present a framework to qualify security test cases applied in the testing
of the PDP and PEP modules of a system. They compare traditional functional test cases
against test cases generated by an access control policy. The qualification criteria are based
in the mutation testing approach. This work shows that in most cases there is a significant
difference between functional and security test cases in terms of mutation scores. This work
suggests that security specific test cases are needed and that they should be derived directly
from the security policies, supporting the approach presented in this thesis.
In a second work, Mouelhi et al. [91] present an approach to transform functional test cases
into access control test cases. This approach relies on the existence of a suite of functional
test cases that cover 100% of the executable statements and proposes the selection of relevant
test cases for which a new test oracle is generated. This new test oracle should verify that
the security mechanism triggered by the policy works properly. This thesis addresses this
problem for general privacy policies rather than specific access control policies. Moreover, the
approach in this thesis does not rely on the previous existence of a suite of test cases. Rather,
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it uses a behavioural model of the system to derive relevant test cases that exercise the rules
and conditions in the privacy policy.
The concept of obligations is important in privacy policies [69, 61]. Privacy policies may
not only grant access to data but may also make statements about actions that have to be
performed. In simple terms, obligations are actions that are required to be performed before
the execution of the test case is considered successful. Current approaches for testing access
control policies disregard obligations claiming it is PEP’s responsibility to enforce, and test,
their execution. Only the approach of transforming functional cases into access control cases
could address the testing of obligations. However, obligations are not mentioned explicitly
in this work and the testing focuses in the interaction between the PEPs and the PDP only
in terms of access permissions. This thesis considers that a complete test for conformance
to privacy policies includes the testing of bounded obligations. Obligations, in general, are
examples of liveness properties and this kind of properties can not be established by testing.
Bounded obligations are those obligations whose execution can be verified in a limited period
of time or after a finite sequence of actions.
2.4.2 Security vulnerabilities
Features and functionalities of every software program can be represented in abstract software
models. In an ideal world the actual behaviour of the software is equivalent to the one specified
by its model. However, in the real world software applications sometimes miss described
functionalities and present some additional functionalities. A software vulnerability can be
seen, in fact, as a system functionality that must not be present. This is illustrated in Figure
2.6.
Models are abstractions and as such they carry contextual assumptions about the environ-
ment. Consider an abstract model that specifies only the relation between inputs and outputs
of a defined operation. This kind of model assumes that this operation will be used only to
transform the specified set of inputs into their respective outputs. If the operation is used
with any input that was not previously specified, then there is no way to know the correct
output and any output could be acceptable. When a particular input is not considered in a
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Figure 2.6: Intended vs. implemented software behaviour (source: [115]).
model, this model is underspecified. Underspecification is inevitably linked to abstraction.
Most security problems are due to underspecified functionalities triggered by underspec-
ified inputs. In general, under-specified functionalities are added by programmers during or
at the end of the coding phase. Moreover, usually, functional testing of parts of the system
related to these inputs is not conducted. This is where vulnerability testing is useful, testing
the product for harmful additional behaviour.
Before continuing on discussing vulnerability testing, consider the work of Fithen et al.
[44] with the aim of formalising the definition of vulnerabilities. They define vulnerabili-
ties as unplanned system features that an intruder may exploit, if certain preconditions are
established, to achieve particular impacts on the system that violate its security policy.
In the previous definition, preconditions refer to the set of conditions that must exist
for an event to occur, the exploitation of the vulnerability in this case, and impacts refer
to the conditions that will exist as a result of the vulnerability exploitation. Seacord and
Householder [109] take this definition and separate explicitly the definition of vulnerabilities
from the definition of an exploit (the exploitation of a vulnerability). In the same way, this
thesis defines a vulnerability as being the set of preconditions that enable an exploit and
an attack as the technique that takes advantage of a vulnerability to violate an explicit or
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implicit security policy.
Although the literature agrees on the definitions, there still seems to be little or no con-
sensus on the way security properties and vulnerabilities have to be modelled. However,
recent works ([32],[133],[12]) tend towards formal methods for modelling security properties.
According to Chinchani et al. [32], formal models offer an elegant solution to vulnerability
assessment. Although agreeing with the previous assertion, this thesis still points out that
among formal models, different notations or languages have been used and developed. Maybe
the difference resides on what (which security goal, a security functionality, an attack or
vulnerability) is going to be modelled.
Using the formalisms and notation described in Section 2.1 this thesis defines vulnerabil-
ities and their associated concepts as follows.
Definition 7 (Vulnerability) A vulnerability is a state predicate that defines the conditions
that enable an attack.
Definition 8 (Vulnerable state) Given a set of states Q in a model SE that includes
details of the SUT and its environment, and a state predicate v that represents a particular
vulnerability, a state q ∈ Q is vulnerable if v(q).
Definition 9 (Attack) Given a vulnerability v and a state predicate i that represents the
(malicious) desired impact on the system, an attack is a path from q to q′ where v(q) and
i(q′).
With the previous definitions this thesis defines its focus on vulnerabilities that arise from
defects in the software itself and its configuration, that is, how the software is “connected”
to its environment. These definitions also provide the basis for including these concepts
into behavioural models and providing solutions to some of the problems in current security
vulnerabilities testing.
Traditionally, security vulnerability testing has been done using penetration testing [8].
In this approach, once a software product is finalised, a group of security consultants subject
the software to a set of (malicious) attacks and verify the software’s resilience to such attacks.
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One of the main problems of penetration testing is that its success depends on many factors,
few of which can be measured and standardised. The most obvious variables are tester
skill, knowledge, and experience. Without a standardised procedure and without adequate
documentation of security requirements, assumptions, threats and attack patterns, security
findings can’t be repeated across different teams and vary widely depending on the tester.
This thesis explores the assumption that models can provide an adequate way of documenting
security properties, assumptions, vulnerabilities and attacks.
In the way this thesis sees it, a security model is a framework for understanding and solving
the problem of security for a particular purpose. A large list of software vulnerabilities has
been compiled and classified through the years with the aim of avoiding these vulnerabilities
in future developments [74, 97, 88, 34]. The purpose of vulnerability models is to serve as a
tool for verifying the absence of these vulnerabilities in software applications.
State transition based approaches have been used before to model other security related
properties and applications. Examples of these are security protocols and penetration attacks.
Many network security related properties, such as confidentiality and authentication, can be
verified by analysing the traces of a state transition system and determining whether the
properties are preserved for each trace or not.
Attack graphs [100] represent a popular state-transition model for security problems anal-
ysis. In this approach, all possible actions are represented as transitions while different states
of a network are defined by the edges. The goal is to find a path from an initial state (consid-
ered safe) to one or more states where security is compromised. These paths are considered
possible attacks. The work by Sheyner et al. [110] is the first formal treatment of attack
graphs. They showed that model checking can be used to automatically generate attack
graphs. Their modified model checker was able to output all the counter examples (all the
possible attacks), thus, enabling the tool to show all the multi-stage, multi-host attack graphs.
However, this approach suffers from state explosion and this affects its scalability.
Petri nets have also been used for security modelling. A Petri net consists of places,
transitions and tokens. Places are represented by circles and can be compared to nodes in a
graph. Action or flow is modelled with tokens that move between places along transitions.
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Transitions are represented by rectangles and connected to places by arcs. Transitions have
AND semantics, meaning that a token is passed only if a token is available at each of the
input arcs. McDermott [84] used Petri nets for modelling attacks in an approach he called
Attack Net. In this model, attack steps are represented by places similar to nodes in attack
trees. Transitions are used for the explicit modelling of attacker actions which extends the
expressibility of this model compared to attack trees. Helmer et al. [55] extend the express-
ibility of attack modelling using Coloured Petri Nets. A CPN is a Petri net in which tokens
are associated with tuples (“colours”). These tuples contain additional information for the
objects of an attack. In this way, for example, when a transition requires the input tokens
to appear in a defined order, they can carry with themselves a time mark. This mark allows
the transition to verify the order of appearance. Recently, Xu and Nygard [133] have used
Petri nets to model software applications, threats and threat mitigations (security counter-
measures) as a whole. They extended the classic transition-based modelling of Petri nets with
concepts from the aspect-oriented paradigm. Their approach uses three models and is centred
on verification. An important condition of this approach is that the three models must be in
the same level of abstraction in order to be combined.
Several authors [133, 129, 114] agree on the use of the term threat as a condition that
precedes a vulnerability. Security threats are potential attacks, i.e., misuses and anomalies
that violate security policies. Security threats are always present, and vulnerabilities only
appear when the threats have not been mitigated by security countermeasures (security func-
tionalities or assurance techniques). A useful technique related with the concept of threats
is threat modelling. Threat modelling takes a data flow approach to application security. It
helps the testers understand where input comes from and how an adversary can manipulate
it to cause the system to fail. Moreover, a threat model describes a number of actions that
an attacker may take to exploit a vulnerability of the system. This thesis explores the com-
position of a threat model with the behavioural model to verify if a given implementation
enables (inadvertently) a specified attack.
Modelling approaches differ in the kind of information the models contain. As a summary
one can argue that the relevant information to be recorded in an attack (or vulnerability)
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model for security purposes consists of the conditions under which an attack can be performed,
the capabilities and resources that are required, the steps of the attack (and their order in
time), the interdependencies of the attack steps, and the effects on the SUT after the attack
has been performed.
2.4.2.1 Other related domains
Above it has been described that modelling efforts cited in the literature have concentrated
on specifying security policies, especially access control policies. However, much effort has
also been put into the specification of protocols. In a daily increasing networked environment
it is necessary to secure data travelling among the network nodes and also to certify that the
network components communicate in a secure manner. Driven by the need for communication,
research in protocol modelling and testing has proceeded along a separated and privileged
trail with respect to software testing [15]. The following are provided as examples of these
research efforts.
• Security requirements of protocols can normally be expressed as correspondence asser-
tions or as constraints on protocol traces. These assertions may also contain references
to the past or the future. Thus security protocols have been specified using logic lan-
guages, such as the language described in [35], and languages based on process algebras
like CSP or CCS, such as the one used in [106]. Some specification mechanisms have
explicitly used temporal logic for reasoning about the past and future and others have
captured this in the semantics of the logical predicates.
• Other specification languages that deal with the state of the system have also been used
to model security protocols. The Z language, for example, was used by Long et al.
[77] for modelling cryptographic protocols involving most of the common cryptographic
operations such as symmetric and asymmetric encryption, message digests, and nonces.
The central idea of Long et al.’s work is that security requirements can be specified by Z-
invariants, using disjoint types of data for specifying keys, nonces, and encrypted data,
mathematical functions to represent cryptographic operations, and logical constraints
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over the data and functions.
It seems worthwhile looking at the advances and results in protocol testing. Although
these results have been conceived for a very specialised area, several ideas can be adopted
and adapted for security testing, particularly to exploit the advances in model-based testing.
2.5 Concurrent asynchronous systems
Concurrent systems are those systems in which two or more components, threads or dis-
tributed components, for example, are active simultaneously and interact with each other
[36]. One way in which components in a concurrent system interact with each other is by
exchanging messages. Asynchronous systems are concurrent systems that read and respond
messages as schedules permit. There is no assumption of a global clock or ordering of ex-
ecution among any two components (the sender and the receiver) [56]. This means that a
component may send a message at any time, and may receive a message at any time, and also
that a message that arrives to a component would have to wait an undefined period of time
to be processed. In the meantime, as it will be not efficient to wait for an answer the sender
of the message will continue performing other tasks.
There are many research works that aim to describe asynchronous systems to obtain a
greater understanding of their properties and/or perform their testing. Each of these works
use different techniques to represent the systems. For example, Tretmans, in one of the
most cited works on the area [118], uses labelled transition systems to describe asynchronous
systems, Campbell et al. [28] uses interface automata and Mare´chal et al. use symbolic
transition systems. These last two formalisms are based on LTS. Others that use LTS are
Veanes [124], that extend the concepts of refinement and alternating simulation for their
use with asynchronous systems, and Bhateja et al. [16] that introduce different equivalence
relations.
Bhateja et al. [16] review and analyse some recent work in the area of testing for asyn-
chronous system. They work on the settings of labelled transition systems, inspired by the
earlier work of Tretmans [118]. To differentiate between actions executed by the SUT and
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actions executed by some element of the environment, they define input and output actions.
They use queue semantics to “postpone” input actions and define the equivalence of two
systems if one can be transformed into the other by means of postponing input actions. The
use of a queue semantics limits the applicability of this approach to channels in which only
communication delays occur. That is, it allows different interleavings between input and out-
put actions but requires the order of each subset of actions to be maintained. This thesis, in
contrast, proposes the use of a set semantics in order not only to postpone observable actions
but also to deal with imperfect channels where the order of observable messages is not guar-
anteed. Moreover, the practical approach in this thesis complements the theoretical approach
of Bhateja et al. [16] by defining algorithms to perform the generation and execution of test
cases.
Along with transition systems, Winskel [131] describes other models used for describing
asynchronous systems, such as synchronisation trees [87] and Hoare traces [21]. These models
are called interleaving models because they identify concurrence or parallelism with non-
deterministic interleaving of atomic actions. They abstract away the fact that the systems
are composed by several independent computing agents and model the behaviour of the entire
system in terms of purely sequential patterns of actions.
Winskell [131] also presents a different kind of models, called non-interleaving models,
such as Petri-nets [95] and event structures [130, 123]. These models are not as abstract
as the interleaving models and maintain information on the (physical) separation among
the components of the system. Nevertheless, Winskell himself shows relationships among
the different models and how interleaving models can represent the same properties as non-
interleaving models by integrating elements such as a naming system for actions. Others have
also worked on the transformation of one formalism into another. Here this thesis presents
some examples with emphasis on event structures. Henigger [57] generates an equivalent prime
event structure from a system of asynchronously communicating state machines. Nakata et
al. [94] link context-free processes specifications to the concept of symbolic event structures.
They use the properties of event structures to derive the protocol specification of a distributed
system. Herbreteau et al. [58] present an algorithm to generate labelled event structures from
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a well-structured LTS specification. In principle, the well-structured condition is necessary
to deal with infinite state systems.
Not specially linked to any formalism, Hendrickson et al. [56] present a technique to build
the description of the system from the observation of the message exchange occurring among
the components of the system. The interesting part of this work, from the perspective of
this thesis, is the definition of the observed elements; events, representing the execution of
actions, and the relationships among these events, especially the causality relationship.
With respect to testing and validation, asynchronous systems present challenging char-
acteristics, such as local non-determinism and communication delays. These characteristics
have been addressed theoretically in various research works [118, 31, 18]. Tretmans [118]
introduces a so called “queue semantics” where two output traces are considered equivalent
if one can be transformed into the other by postponing the occurrence of output actions. No
reordering among output actions is permitted. This idea exploits the concept of quiescence
in LTS. Boreale [18] et al. propose the use of a bag instead of a queue for the case of parallel
output actions. Effectively they allow the reordering of actions that are executed in parallel.
This occurs mainly to reduce the number of interleavings in the model and to allow different
components to be modelled independently. Nevertheless, both research works assume the
use of perfect communication channels, thus output actions modelled in a defined sequence
will always be observed in that sequence. However, from a practitioner’s point of view, this
assumption does not always hold. The modelling and testing of asynchronous systems in this
thesis does not assume perfect communication channels. Here, the idea of Boreale et al. for
parallel actions is extended to sequential actions under the assumption that a component can
observe actions in a different order from which they were executed, due to delays and losses
in the communication channels.
Several testing tools, among which we can cite TGV [67] and TorX [14], have been used
in experiments with distributed and synchronous systems. TorX uses an on-the-fly testing
approach. In [14] TorX is used to test a Conference Protocol. Contrarily to the assumptions
in the present thesis, the experiment in [14] assumes that the communication is reliable and
message exchange can be modelled as (FIFO) queues. TGV, on the other hand, requires
42
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
test cases to be serialised first, consequently, it cannot deal directly with concurrence and
introduces unnecessary synchronisations between distributed testers.
Finally, the work in this thesis is based on very well defined conformance testing theories
and conformance relations such as IOCO [117]. However, the systems we are interested in
are not always input enabled. That is, some inputs are only enabled by causality relations
with other inputs or outputs. Implicitly this thesis implements the idea of Boreale et. al [18]
that process input cannot be forced. Formalisms such as IOLTS [117], trace automata and
concurrent transition systems [111] have also been used to model concurrent systems. All
these formalisms have a basis into LTS. Therefore, the use of LTS in this work is general
enough to support other formalisms and integration with current approaches.
2.6 Testing tools
Given that the main objective of this thesis is to define the characteristics of a framework
that supports the automation of the testing process, hereafter we present a set of tools for
test generation and/or execution. The list of tools mentioned here does not pretend to be
exhaustive and the only criterion for its selection is its availability.
2.6.1 TGV/CADP
TGV [67] stands for Test Generation with Verification technology. It is tool conceived to gen-
erate test suites for protocols. TGV uses models described in several specification languages.
Those languages include Lotos[17], SDL, UML and IF[19].
TGV uses test purposes not only to determine the coverage criteria but mainly to direct the
generation towards “interesting” functionalities. With this objective in sight, TGV takes as
input two Input Output Labelled Transition Systems. One IOLTS describes the specification
while the other formalises the behavioural part of a test purpose. The tool computes the
synchronous product of both IOLTS following the approach in [30]. This product results in
a new IOLTS where some states are labelled as accepting or rejecting states based on the
information contained in the test purpose. Test cases are then generated by selecting accepted
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behaviours.
TGV offers the possibility of generating a complete test graph that contains all test cases
corresponding to the test purpose, or generating individual test cases. In the complete test
graph, pass verdicts are based on traces that reach accepting states. Traces that do not lead
to an accepting state are truncated with an inconclusive verdict. Any other trace that is
present in the implementation but not in the test graph receives the fail verdict.
This tool produces test cases described in an early version of the TTCN standard [47]. To
achieve this, a depth-first searching algorithm transforms the IOLTS into a test graph that
represents the observable behaviour of the system. Message parameters are obtained form
the labels in the original IOLTS.
2.6.2 TorX/CADP
This tool is representative of the family of test generation tools based on an Input- Output
Labelled Transition System (LTS) model of the system under test. It accepts models written
in the Promela and Lotos languages. It was designed for conformance testing of reactive
systems.
TorX [14] requires a real implementation and a formal specification of that implementation.
It works as the arbiter that checks the correct behaviour of a real implementation during its
execution based on the formal specification. It combines test generation and test execution in
an integrated manner. It uses the on-the-fly testing approach, i.e. instead of generating the
entire test case and then applying it, the tool generates only the next event that is available
according to the specification and immediately executes it.
The TorX test generation algorithm is based on a walk through the state space of the
specification. This walk can be done randomly or controlled by the test purpose, which is
anything that represents a set of traces over the model. A test purpose acts as a test case
specification and makes it possible to drive the random walk.
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2.6.3 Microsoft Spec Explorer
Spec Explorer [28] is a model-based testing tool initially developed at Microsoft Research as
a result of continuous research in the area [10, 49, 92]. Spec Explorer enables modelling and
automatic testing of diverse kinds of systems, including concurrent object-oriented systems.
We distinguish between two versions of this tool. The first version [28] developed as part of a
research project and not available for commercial uses, and the new implementation, offered to
be released in conjunction with Microsoft’s development suite – Visual Studio 2010. Hereafter
we refer to the original, or first, implementation unless the contrary is explicitly stated.
Spec Explorer used model programs to express the system behaviour as abstract state
machines [48]. A model program is a program, much smaller and simpler than the real im-
plementation, that usually defines a subset of the implementation’s features. The original
implementation of Spec Explorer used a specific language, Spec# (an extension to the lan-
guage C#) to write the program models. The new implementation will use program models
written in C#. The code written in C# will be complemented by a coordination language
(known as “Cord”) which will provide features to combine models, generate test data and
select certain scenarios that are especially relevant for testing.
A model written in Spec# contained the definition of classes and variable types. Instances
of these classes and types defined the state of the system. The model also contained actions.
Actions were methods with preconditions that defined in which state of the system they may
occur and for which input parameters.
The model program defined, by exploration, an interface automaton over which an explicit
state model checking algorithm was used to compute the (possibly infinite) space of all possible
sequences of method invocations. Method invocations were restricted to those that do not
violated the pre- and post-conditions nor the invariants of the systems. Invariants were
properties of the system defined to hold always, before and after the execution of an action.
To avoid, or at least soften, the problem of state-explosion, Spec Explorer included two
mechanisms to reduce the size of the automaton. First, it provided the tester with the
possibility of defining an equivalence relation over states. In this way, Spec Explorer performed
state grouping, pruning away states that even when distinct were undistinguishable from the
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tester’s perspective. Second, it implemented state-dependent parameter generation which
allowed it to compute the parameter domains of each action with respect to the current state.
This eliminated the possibility of generating infeasible states.
In Spec Explorer, test cases were generated by traversing the graph of the interface au-
tomaton. Test cases were evaluated under the assumption that the SUT must accept at least
as many inputs as the interface automaton defines and that, conversely, the automaton must
accept at least as many outputs as the system may produce. More formally, there was a
relationship of alternating refinement between the model and the SUT.
Finally, with respect to the execution of the test cases, Spec Explorer offered two ap-
proaches, on-line and off-line test execution. In off-line test execution, a standalone test suite
was generated with complete behavioural coverage over a restricted domain of system inputs.
In on-line testing, Spec Explorer exploration generated the next actions and their parameters
based on the observed history of the test run. This last feature is very useful for testing
non-deterministic systems.
2.6.4 SmartMBT
SmartMBT∗ is a model-based testing tool implemented in Prolog. Its host language provides
the tool with necessary features like backtracking. Its test case generation process is based on
the theory of testing with labelled transition systems. It implements widely used algorithms
and approaches. Its test generation, for example, measures transition coverage, and uses the
Chinese Postman algorithm to produce test sequences that cover all the transitions in the
LTS.
SmartMBT takes as input an LTS represented by the set of state variables and the set of
actions of the system. The states of the LTS are ultimately the product of the possible values
of the state variables. The transitions of the LTS are represented by Prolog predicates that
encode pre- and post-conditions for a defined action. Pre-conditions are interpreted as guards
rather than as actual pre-conditions in the sense they are described in the process algebras
[62]. That is, if the model gets into a state where the pre-conditions of a given transition do
∗developed by KJRoss and Associates
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not hold, then the action represented by this transition will not be available for execution.
Contrarily, in standard process algebras, if pre-conditions do not hold, then the action can
still be executed, but no guarantees are given with respect to the post-conditions (state of
the system after execution).
SmartMBT implements three algorithms for generating test sequences. The first one
completely automates the process by using the Chinese Postman algorithm. It uses the LTS
and a transition coverage criterion to drive the generation of sequences. If a reset operation
is available on the model, one sequence will be generated so that it covers all transitions of
the underlying LTS. If no reset operation is available, several sequences will be generated, the
change between one sequence and another working as a reset.
The second algorithm is an implementation of random walks. Traditional random walks
techniques such as the transition tour (TT) method [93] are driven by coverage. In SmartMBT
the random generation algorithm is not driven by coverage but driven by the tester. The tester
can limit the number of steps in a sequence as well as define weights for each action. The
weight of an action defines a relative probability of execution, i.e., actions with higher weights
will have higher probabilities of being executed than those with lower weights.
The third technique implements an interactive approach. In this technique, sequence
generation is driven by the user one step at a time. That is, given a defined state of the
model, the tool calculates the set of executable actions and presents it for the tester to choose
which action to execute. Once the tester has made a choice the tool calculates the next state
of the model and starts the process again. The random and interactive approaches can be
interleaved.
SmartMBT also implements both approaches for test case generation, off-line and on-line
generation. For the off-line approach, sequences are generated uniquely from the model taken
as input. The on-line approach requires the implementation under test (IUT) to be executed
together with the SmartMBT tool. It also requires the tester to provide an extra module to
transform action labels from the model into executable calls to the IUT. When this approach
is used, for each action executed on the model, SmartMBT checks that the same action can
be executed on the IUT. A verdict, pass or fail, is produced for each step of the sequence.
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Test automation framework
This chapter presents the concepts and elements that are required in an automated process
of testing software. It includes a description of these elements and the relationships between
them in terms of a simple and general structure that constitutes a framework for test au-
tomation. The focus of this chapter is on the concrete way in which these elements can be
linked together to enable the (model-based) testing of a broad spectrum of software systems.
3.1 General framework
In a model-based testing framework there are two central elements: the requirements specifi-
cation and the implementation. Requirements are specified by models and the implementation
is known as the SUT. The present testing framework uses the term models in a general way
to refer to specifications. It avoids the usual dichotomy of model-based and property-based
specifications [107]. Moreover, complex systems and properties require the use of different
specification paradigms to be described completely. The present framework allows the use of
different kinds of specifications in a unified fashion.
In the present testing framework, a model specifies a set of behaviours that a system can
exhibit. A behaviour at the model level is described as a sequence of actions where the order
in the sequence implicitly defines the rules and conditions for actions to be performed. Thus,
models specify what actions a system can perform and when or under which conditions they
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can be performed.
In an abstract way, actions refer to the central elements of most specification paradigms.
For example, they represent events in a history-based specification, identify uniquely a transi-
tion function in a transition-based specification, represent processes in operational specifica-
tions, or define the time of a particular snapshot of the system in a state-based specification.
Therefore, the present testing framework allows the tester to choose among different mod-
elling languages or notations in order to describe the models provided that there exists a
definition of how these models map to sequences of actions.
Ideally a single model specifies all the behaviours of an entire system. However, as systems
turn complex, any attempt of representing all, or most of, their features in a single model will
produce a complex model. In order to manage complexity, different modelling languages and
notations tend to specialise on some characteristics of the software while disregarding others.
Moreover, even when specified using the same language or notation, models are sometimes
split to represent different parts of the system. Thus, a software system is specified using
a collection of different models which in turn can be written in different languages and can
define the system at different levels of detail.
In a general way, this testing framework addresses the separation of the control or oper-
ational part of a system from the data the system uses or processes. Models that represent
the control flow of the system are called behavioural models. Behavioural models disregard
details that refer to data handling to make themselves more manageable. All data related
specifications are handled by another group of models called data generation models.
This testing framework uses behavioural models to derive abstract test case specifications
from them. These abstract test cases represent an abstract behaviour of the system (or a set
of them) and are a formalisation of the objectives defined for the testing process. Abstract
behaviours represent a defined flow of control in the system but still disregard most data
specifications.
The testing framework composes abstract behaviours with the data generation models
to specify (concrete) behaviours. Concrete behaviours define the control and data flow of
the system. Thus, the composition of these models leads to the generation of behaviours
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with values. Behaviours with values are not only more specific representations of how the
system behaves, but also solve non-determinism that arises from the use of abstract models.
Behaviours with values lead to the generation of test cases, which is the first objective of a
model-based testing framework.
The process of generating test cases has a core element which is the generation algorithm.
The generation algorithm is usually tailored to suit different testing objectives and types
of models. This process not only derives a valued behaviour from the system’s models but
additionally defines the oracle of the test case. In an abstract way, the oracle is a predicate
over the system’s behaviour which is evaluated after the execution of the test case.
The second objective of a model-based framework is to execute generated test cases to
produce a verdict. This thesis presents a testing framework that is capable of executing
concrete test cases in an automated fashion. Therefore, the testing framework defines a link
between the generated test cases and the SUT. For a specified software system, the models
and the SUT are linked by a relationship described as a mapping. Figure 3.1 shows a pictorial
representation of this mapping relationship. This relationship links actions at the model level
to operations at the implementation level.
At the implementation level, operations represent functions or procedures of common pro-
gramming languages, calls to APIs, or available functionalities inside a GUI. At this level, a
behaviour is represented as a sequence of operations. To represent behaviours as sequences
seems natural as the latter are present on all specification formalisms cited before. Addition-
ally, it enables the framework to define naturally the fact that a single action at the model
level can map to a sequence of operations at the implementation level.
In the following sections, this chapter presents a more detailed description of the core
elements of the framework, namely the models, the test generation process and the test
execution process. Then, this chapter also presents a tailored description of these elements
for different testing domains. A testing domain is defined by the particular characteristics of
the SUT and the defined objectives of the testing process.
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Figure 3.1: Relationship between models and SUT
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3.2 Models
3.2.1 Behavioural models
In an abstract way, a behaviour is defined as the change of state in a system that is triggered
by the execution of an action; therefore, the central elements to build a model that describes
behaviours are states, transitions and actions. Subsequently, the underlying formalism behind
the models in this framework is based on labelled transition systems (LTS).
Hereafter a model M refers to a LTS with elements (Q,A,→, q0, F ) where Q is the set of
states of the system, A is a set of action labels, → is the transition relation →⊆ Q×A×Q,
q0 represents the initial state of the system and F ⊆ Q is the subset of accepting states of
the system. Note that the subset of states F is an addition to the standard definition of LTS
shown in Section 2.1.1. This subset implements the concept of quiescent states defined in
Section 2.1 and, in general, represents the knowledge of the tester of what is considered an
acceptable behaviour of the system and what is not.
In general, a model represents a set of behaviours. The model of a software system
represents all the possible behaviours of that particular system. For test automation, it is
desirable to be able to describe a particular behaviour, which at the model level is called an
abstract behaviour. An abstract behaviour is just a path in the (abstract) model, however
for pragmatic reasons this thesis separates the trace of the path from the sequence of states,
resulting in the following definition.
Definition 10 (Abstract behaviour) An abstract behaviour in the model M is a pair of
sequences (σ, α) where
• σ is a sequence over Q, and
• α is a sequence over A;
such that for every j in {1 . . . n}, where n is the number of actions in α, qj−1
aj
−→ qj.
In an abstract model, and extensively in an abstract behaviour, an action a is said to be
enabled if given the current state of the system q, there exists a state q′ such that q
a
→ q′.
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At an abstract level, the present testing framework does not define what a state is or how
it is represented. This gives flexibility to the tester at the time of selecting a suitable notation
for the models. However, this framework assumes that during the test generation process,
implementation details are introduced into the models to make them more specific. These
implementation details are represented into the states of the system as a mapping between a
set of variables SV, also known as the state variables, and a set of values Val.
The mapping between state variables and values could be specified into the behavioural
models themselves. However, behavioural models usually elide specification of values to main-
tain simplicity. Therefore, the present framework defines a data generation model that is de-
scribed separately. This separation between behaviour and data makes model-based testing
tractable. Now, this thesis presents a detailed description of these data generation models.
3.2.2 Data generation models
The present framework uses context free grammars with rules guarded by predicates as a
mechanism of generating test data. The guards enable or disable a specific production rule.
This allows different elements of the framework and the tester to direct the generation of test
data by modifying the context in which these guards are evaluated. Additionally, this data
model allows TLA [73] like actions to be associated with each production rule. The actions
can modify the context associated with the data generation. This allows the generation to be
influenced by the history of previously executed actions and generated data. The elements of
the data generation models are defined more precisely as follows.
First of all, the values to be associated with an action not only depend on the internal
state of the system but mainly on the state of the system’s environment. Thus, the framework
assumes a set of global variables V that includes the set of state variables of the system SV
as well as new variables necessary for data generation. A particular assignment of values
to these variables is called a valuation. Towards controlling the data generation process the
framework defines a control statement to be a predicate/action pair over V. This is written
as {g; ξ} where g is a predicate and ξ is an action (as per the TLA definition) over V. The
framework assumes that the action cannot modify any variable that is part of the models
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of the system either at the behavioural or implementation levels. This is to ensure that
the integrity of the model is not violated by the data generation process. Technically this
can be written in TLA as “unchanged SV ”. However, it is not explicitly written inside the
specifications but implicitly considered in any data generation model. The symbol ρ denotes
a particular assignment of values to the variables in V .
Next, this thesis defines the extended context free grammars and how they derive values.
Definition 11 A guarded grammar G is a tuple (N,T, S, P ) where N is the set of non-
terminal symbols, T the set of terminal symbols, S belonging to N the initial symbol, and P
is the production relation. Each element of P is a member of
BP ×N × (N ∪ T )∗
where BP is a control statement.
Typical elements are written as {g; ξ}γ → δ where γ ∈ N and δ ∈ (N ∪ T )∗
A one step application of a production rule and its generalisation to multi step applications
in the context of a valuation is defined below.
Definition 12 We write δ1γδ2 →ρ (δ
′, ρ′) if
{g; ξ}γ → δ is a production rule such that g is true in ρ and
δ′ = δ1δδ2 and ρ
′ is the result of executing ξ in ρ.
A multi step application δ ⇒ρ (δ
′, ρ′) is performed if
there are sequences δ0, δ1 · · · δn and ρ0, ρ1 · · · ρn such that
δ0 = δ, δn = δ
′, ρ0 = ρ, ρn = ρ
′ and
for all i between 0 and n− 1 δi →ρi (δi+1, ρi+1)
Using these extended grammars the present testing framework derives the values needed to
make behavioural models and abstract behaviours more specific or concrete. In the following
sections, this thesis defines how these grammars are composed with the behavioural models.
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3.2.3 Composing behavioural and data models
Given a behavioural modelM = (Q,A,→, q0, F ), the testing framework associates a grammar
with each action in A. In this way, the framework uses the generated values to make each
abstract behaviour at the model level more specific. In the framework there is not a unique
grammar Ga but a collection of grammars for each action a in A. Each grammar Ga defines
a different set of production rules so that the same behavioural model is used for generating
tests with different data values.
The association between behavioural models and grammars leads to the definition of a
global model. In this global model the framework defines a global state that represents an
abstract behaviour of the system jointly with a sequence of values and the current valuation
of the set of variables V . A global state represents a (concrete) behaviour of the system.
The global model modifies its state by extending the current behaviour of the system. The
following definitions formalise these concepts.
Definition 13 (Global state) A global state is represented by a tuple written as (σ, α, ω, ρ)
where
• σ is a sequence of model states,
• α a sequence of model actions,
• ω a sequence of values, and
• ρ the current valuation of the set of variables V .
Definition 14 The initial global state is (q0, ǫ, ǫ, ρ0) where ρ0 is an initialisation of the vari-
ables in V .
The extension of a given global state defined as a transition is presented below.
(σq, w, α, ρ) → (σqq′, wa, αv, ρ′) where
q
a
→ q′ and
Sa ⇒
∗
ρ (v, ρ
′) where v ∈ Ta
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The above definition states that the initial global state has no generated action or symbol
and the model is in its initial state with the global variables having a suitable initialisation.
Whenever the action a can be exhibited by the behavioural model, the grammar Ga is required
to generate a value (v) to be associated with the action. The grammar Ga is always run from
the initial symbol. The valuation of the global variables are used to guide the derivation of
the value v.
From the composition of behavioural and data generation models, behaviours with values
can be derived. These behaviours are the core components of test cases. This thesis will now
describe the process of selecting one or more behaviours to compose or generate test cases.
In general, an action a that can be exhibited by the behavioural model is said to be
enabled. For practical purposes, however, an action a is enabled only if the global state can
be extended using a. A function enabled over a behaviour and a single action that indicates
whether this action is enabled by the given behaviour, is formally defined as follows.
Definition 15 (Enabled) Given a model M , a behaviour BM represented by the global state
(σq, α, ω, ρ) and a single action a in A, enabled(B, a) holds iff
there exists v such that (σq, α, ω, ρ)→ (σqq′, αa, ωv, ρ′).
In addition to the previous definition, consider also the function lastState(B) that returns
the last state in the sequence of states σ of the behaviour B. Hereafter when this thesis refers
to a behaviour it refers to the respective global state.
With the previous definitions, this thesis now defines the process of generating test cases
by extending the initial behaviour of a system.
3.3 Test generation
Test generation is the process that uses a set of models to produce a set of behaviours
representative of a defined software property. These behaviours are then executed against
the SUT and the result of their execution is validated to verify the defined software property.
The set of generated behaviours is called a suite of test cases. A test case is, then, linked to
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a (concrete) behaviour and provides a mechanism for validation. The testing literature refers
to this validation mechanism as the test oracle.
The present testing framework provides, in general, a way of representing behaviours in
terms of labelled transition systems. The framework requires also a suitable way of describ-
ing the test oracle. The testing framework uses the concept of state predicates (defined in
Chapter 2) to represent this oracle. The set of constants and function symbols, and their
semantics, needed to describe the state predicate depend directly on the system under test
and the testing domain. Considering the above described elements, the testing framework
defines a test case as follows.
Definition 16 (Test case) Given a model M that represents the possible behaviours of a
software system, a test case is a pair TC : (BM , sp) where BM is a behaviour of M such that
the last element in the sequence of states is qj and sp (the oracle) is a state predicate such
that sp(qj) holds.
Given a model based on a LTS, the goal of a test case when executed is to show the
presence (or absence) of a defined transition in the SUT. Thus, in abstract terms, the test
generation process
• identifies the transition(s) that represent the testing objectives,
• searches the models for this transition, and
• produces test cases that include the behaviours that lead to the desired transition(s).
Testing objectives are a set of required properties of the SUT. On one hand, these prop-
erties can be implicitly included in the algorithm that represents the test generation process.
For example, consider a coverage criteria that requires all transitions of the behavioural model
to be tested, the test generation will include some “touring” algorithm such as the Chinese
Postman algorithm. This algorithm will select a particular behaviour that contains all the
required traces. On the other hand, the properties of interest can be included in a model
that when composed with the behavioural and data generation models show the required
transitions for the test cases. This approach implements the concept of testing purposes [38].
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Independently of which approach is implemented to generate test cases, behaviours inside
the test cases are executed against the SUT by the test execution process. This thesis will
now discuss the generalities of this process.
3.4 Test execution
In general, test execution refers to the process of taking a (concrete) behaviour and executing
its sequence of actions with their correspondent values as parameters using the proper SUT
interface and operations. Additionally, it is expected that the results of an execution will
be compared with the expected results. The expected results for each action execution are
defined by the sequence of states on the behaviour. The overall expected result of a test case
is defined by the state predicate (oracle) of the test case.
The test execution process for the present testing framework is composed of four different
steps or phases:
• The first step is the implementation of the map between actions and operations and
the implementation of the Adaptor scripts that communicate directly to the SUT’s
interface. This step follows the action-word approach described in Chapter 2.
• The second step is the actual execution. This execution uses the previously implemented
scripts to control the SUT and is performed following an on-line or an off-line approach.
Both execution approaches are described in Chapter 2.
• The third step is validation. Generally, the Adaptor scripts contain assertion clauses
that determine whether the oracle predicate holds for the current state of the SUT or
not.
• Finally, there is the update of the state of the model and the global (environment) state.
3.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter has described a general testing framework based in models. It has focussed on the
separation between the behavioural models and the data generation models. This separation
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enhances mainteinability and reusability of the models, mainly of the behavioural models.
Behavioural models have been described using LTS. This description allows the modeller to
concentrate on the high-level functionalities (actions) of the SUT and how and when they
become enabled in order to be used. Specifically this is how and when the user can access
them by using the different interfaces of the SUT. Data generation models are described
using extended CFGs. Different from traditional CFGs, the extension used in this thesis
provides each production rule in the grammar with a logical predicate, the guard condition,
and actions, as per TLA definition. The actions allow the update of the current global state
of the system. Actions in the data generation model are not allowed to modify the state of
the behavioural model, thus the integrity of the behavioural model is not compromised.
This chapter has also defined the way in which behavioural and data generation models
are composed so that they can be used in the test generation and execution processes. The
composition of these models gives place to an implicitly defined global model of the system.
In this global model, each state is defined mainly as a behaviour (in the behavioural model)
with values (provided by the data generation model). The valuation of global variables in a
global state represents properties of the behaviour contained in that state.
Finally, the process of generating a test case is defined, in simple terms, as the process of
“walking” over the global model, effectively, extending a given initial behaviour towards the
desired behaviour for the test case. The way in which this walk is performed is dependent on
the type of system and the testing objectives. In the following chapter this thesis will discuss
how this process is specialised for different types of systems and testing objectives.
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Framework specialisation for
different testing domains
The processes of test generation and test execution are implemented in different ways for
different testing domains. A testing domain is defined by the type of SUT as well as by
the testing objectives of the process. In a testing domain, it is not only the test generation
process that is instantiated to suit different testing domains. For different kinds of systems,
different properties need to be included in their models. Moreover, even when testing the
same type of systems with different testing objectives (e.g., to reveal vulnerabilities, or to
validate some behaviour against an asynchronous communication protocol) some properties
need to be modelled while others can be disregarded. In this chapter, this thesis presents the
particular modelling requirements as well as the generation process defined in detail for the
(security) vulnerabilities, privacy and asynchronous systems testing domains.
4.1 Vulnerability testing
4.1.1 Modelling for testing vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities in software systems usually result from (a series of) implementation choices,
such as the use of existing components, the use of predefined structures available in pro-
gramming languages, or the integration with other systems. In any case, a vulnerability is
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a behaviour that was not specified originally but that is added “unwillingly” at some point
during the implementation of the system.
The present testing framework uses three separate, but logically related, models for the
testing of security vulnerabilities. The first model is a standard specification model that is
usually abstract and is described as a state transition system. The second model applies the
concept of fault injection and represents a localised mutation of the first model. It contains
low level implementation details related to a specific security concern and usually is described
as a program model. The third model represents the intentions of an attacker and works as a
test purpose [118] for the test generation method used in this domain. The attacker’s model
contains unwanted behaviour of the system’s environment. The attacker’s model, implicit
or explicitly, contains the data generation model for specific vulnerabilities. By separating
the various models, the testing framework allows the specification to be incomplete or under-
specified, and thus reduced in complexity, while it is still able to catch vulnerabilities using
the implementation and attacker models.
The general description of the framework specified that a key concept on it is model
composability. To facilitate the composition of the models, restrictions apply on how these
models are specified. Consider S = (QS , AS ,→S , qS0, F
S) being the abstract specification
model and I = (QI , AI ,→I , qI0, F
I) being the implementation model with V I as the set of
state variables in this model. Also consider A = (QA, AA,→A, qA0, F
A) being the attack
model and V A its set of state variables. Similarly consider that the abstract model states are
also defined in terms of a set of state variables V S . Under the previous considerations, for a
well defined set of models, the following properties hold.
• The implementation model introduces concerns that were underspecified in the specifi-
cation model, that is, there is a mapping function from V S to V I . This mapping is a
total function.
• There is a mapping function from AS to AI that is also total.
The complexity of the attacker’s model depends on the kind of vulnerability that it ex-
ploits. Simple attacks are modelled as unique transitions, e.g. an SQL injection attack on the
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login function of a web based application. More complex attacks require a different number
of preparation steps which lead the system to a vulnerable state but more importantly reveal
information about the system. The attacker uses this information later to perform the attack.
Following [20], the framework assumes that the knowledge of the attacker is available.
It is modelled within the state space of the attacker model and is denoted by KA. The
knowledge of the attacker records information about the structure and internal data of the
software; i.e., database structure and users data. The attacker’s model defines the special
action update knowledge() in AI that updates KA and a boolean symbol known() that
returns true if a defined record in KA has stored its correct value. Action update knowledge()
executes always when an action in AI is executed. However it is not explicitly modelled unless
the elements updated into KA are of interest and enable the attacker to perform an attack.
This ends the definition of the modelling requirements for the security vulnerabilities
testing domain. The models and elements described above are used in the test generation
process described in the following section.
4.1.2 Generating tests to reveal vulnerabilities
For the domain of security vulnerabilities testing, this thesis suggests a fault-based approach
to test case generation. Different from classical fault-based approaches, the approach in this
thesis is not based on one faulty model, but in the combination of three models, as described
in the modelling requirements for this domain. The implementation model is central to test
case generation and identifies the implementation level vulnerabilities present in the software.
When combined with the specification model it reveals under-specification problems in specific
contexts. When combined with the attack model it gives an exact localisation of the security
vulnerabilities.
The implementation model may not be an abstract model in a strict sense. There are
situations in which the real implementation (or some of its modules or components) can be
used as a “model”. Consider, for example, a web application that uses a SQL engine in the
background. It can be very complex to model an entire SQL engine. Furthermore, an abstract
model of the SQL engine can fail to consider the same features that make the web application
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vulnerable. Thus, in this case, it is recommendable to include a fully functional SQL engine
as part of the “implementation model”.
The combination of the three models produces what this thesis calls faulty contexts. From
the conjunction of specification and implementation models this thesis identifies three faulty
contexts mainly related to under-specification problems and not-holding assumptions. These
contexts are illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1(a) shows a context where there exists an under-specification in the input space.
The initial state s1 is divided into two different states s1a and s1b. The implementation of the
operation op makes this distinction during execution. That is, the execution results in two
different transitions with different final states. State s3 is not described into the specification
and is potentially harmful.
The context shown in Figure 4.1(b) refers to an under-specification problem in the output
space. That is, the implementation contemplates a specific concern (represented by state or
output variables) that is not considered in the specification. This new concern divides the
final state s2 into two states s2a and s2b where s2b is a (potentially) dangerous state.
Finally, the context shown in Figure 4.1(c) describes the case where the specification
assumes that the execution of operation op is triggered always from safe states s1 and s2. The
specification does not consider dangerous state s4 or assumes that this state is unreachable.
However, the implementation contains a transition s4
op(in) // s3 that represents a security
problem.
Considering the three models described in the modelling requirements, the test generation
method described here consists of finding if a particular transition (defined by the attacker
model) is present in the implementation model in any one of the faulty contexts described
before.
Automated analysis of the models is a desirable feature of any model-based testing frame-
work. Automated analysis is also required to perform the search for a particular transition in
all but very simple software models. Graphical representations are mainly useful for intuitive
descriptions but can hardly be used in automated analysis. Therefore, in order to support
tool based analyses we need to represent the models in a more suitable notation.
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Figure 4.1: Faulty contexts for test case generation
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For practical purposes the testing framework in this particular domain uses first order
logic predicates to represent the models. The translation process is straightforward as states
in the transition systems can be represented as first order structures. With this translation
as its aim, the testing framework defines state based expressions Preop[v] and Postop[v
′]
where v and v′ represent the valuation of the state variables before and after op’s execution,
respectively. These logical expressions represent the pre- and post-conditions of the operation
op.
With the pre- and post-conditions expressed as logical expressions the framework defines
the existence of the transition s
op // s′ in a model M as
• PreMop [v] is true; and
• PostMop [v
′] is true
and, in general, the problem of searching for a defined transition is equivalent to finding
a solution for the logical predicate PreMop ∧ Post
M
op . As a notational convenience, hereafter
references to these predicates drop the variables from the description when the pre-condition
and post-condition involve all the variables of the relevant operation.
The faulty contexts previously described are defined also by logical predicates:
1. PreSop ∧ ¬Pre
I
op ∧ ¬Post
S
op ∧ Pre
A
op ∧ Post
A
op
that defines that the faulty transition executing op must start on an initial state of
the specification (indicated by PreSop) which can be accessed by the attacker (indicated
by PreAop) that is not considered valid in the implementation (indicated by ¬Pre
I
op). It
should end on a final state different from the one expected in the specification (indicated
by ¬PostSop) and this final state should be marked as a harmful state (indicated by
PostAop). This captures the intuition in Figure 4.1(a).
2. PreSop ∧ Post
S
op ∧ Post
I
op ∧ Pre
A
op ∧ Post
A
op
defining that the faulty transition must start on a valid initial state of the specification
(PreSop) and must end on the expected state of the specification and of the implemen-
tation (PostSop ∧ Post
I
op). The final state (as described in the implementation model)
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should be marked as harmful as it is part of the attacker model (PostAop). This state was
marked considered safe (PostSop) in the specification. The faulty state was abstracted
away while defining the ‘super state’ S2 as shown in Figure 4.1(b).
3. ¬PreSop ∧ ¬Pre
I
op ∧ Pre
A
op ∧ Post
A
op
that defines that the faulty transition starts from a state not considered in the speci-
fication (unreachable state) or implementation (see Figure 4.1(c)) (¬PreSop ∧ ¬Pre
I
op)
but available to the attacker (PreAop). The transition must end in a state marked as a
harmful state (PostAop).
If the generation process finds a solution for any of these predicates it means that it found
a faulty transition in each of the correspondent faulty contexts. A faulty transition represents
a negative test case (also called a counterexample) that if present in the implementation shows
that the faulty model has been implemented. Given a standard test execution and verification
process, the verdict for a negative test case must always be fail when executed in a correct
implementation.
4.2 Privacy policies testing
4.2.1 Modelling for testing preservation of privacy
Privacy testing refers to testing if an implementation complies with a given privacy policy. The
central element for this kind of testing is the privacy policy. However, policies are usually
incomplete specifications and the framework requires an additional model that defines the
general behaviour of the system. Thus, for privacy testing the specification is split into two
models, the behavioural model and the privacy policy.
The behavioural model is described in terms of a LTS as it is usual in the present test-
ing framework. However, this model contains enough information (implementation details)
to be linked to the privacy policy. These implementation details turn this model into an
implementation level model.
A behavioural model at the implementation level assumes the existence of sets Var and
Val of variables and values, respectively. States on this behavioural model are represented as
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a map from Var to Val, and actions are parameterised. A parameterised action, an element
of A× Val , a(v) is present or contained in a behaviour B = (σ, α, ω, ρ) if α contains a and v
is the correspondent value of a in ω. Henceforth, for this testing domain, this thesis refers to
parameterised actions simply as actions, unless the contrary is explicitly stated. Additionally,
for a variable x, the notation ρ(x) stands for its current valuation and ρq(x) stands for its
valuation at the state q.
For privacy testing the testing framework defines, additionally, Users as the set of user
names that represent all entities that can execute an action in the system. A user name is
represented by a particular value, so Users is a subset of Val. Additionally, the framework
defines that an action a(v) is executed over a variable x if there exists a behaviour b =
(q · q′, a, v, ρ) in the model and ρ(x) = v. An action execution is always associated with a
user. So the framework assumes that there exists a variable currentuser in Var, and for every
state q there exist a value u in Users such that ρq(currentuser) = u.
Privacy requirements usually make reference to implementation level details. However,
these requirements are usually written in natural language or in specific languages such as
P3P[37] or EPAL[102]. To facilitate composability among the models, the framework requires
a uniform and structured description of these policies. The framework refers to this structured
representation as its privacy modelling language.
4.2.1.1 Privacy modelling language
The main components of the privacy modelling language are rules and policies. A rule is the
most elementary unit of a policy. This is a generalisation of policy specification languages
such as EPAL and P3P. In order to define rules and policies, variables and users of the system
need to be categorised. Conceptually the categories are sets and a subset relationship defines
a hierarchy among them. However, for a practical application, this thesis defines these types
in a functional way.
• DataCat is a set of functions that categorise the variables of the system. For every f in
DataCat, f is a function from (Var ∪ Val) to Bool, i.e., f ’s type is f : (Var ∪ Val) →
Bool. The elements in DataCat form a partial order hierarchy such that if data1 ≥ data2
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then for all v ∈ (Var ∪ Val), data2(v)⇒ data1(v).
• AgentCat defines a set of functions that categorise the users of the system. For every g
in DataCat, g is a function from Users to Bool, i.e., g’s type is g : Users → Bool. The
elements in AgentCat form a partial order hierarchy such that if ag1 ≥ ag2 then for all
u ∈ Users, ag2(u)⇒ ag1(u).
Privacy policies categorise users and data as several access-control policy languages do.
Privacy policies are different, however, from other access-control policies, in that the former
include into their rules the concept of obligations. An obligation is an action a system guaran-
tees will be executed as a consequence of the execution of a current action. To be assessable,
an obligation fulfilment needs to be bounded, usually, by the occurrence of an event. The
following definition formalises the concept of an obligation and also states when it has been
satisfied (fulfilled) by the system.
Definition 17 (Obligation) An obligation is a triple O = (β, δ, υ) where δ is an element
of DataCat, β defines an action the system is committed to execute over a data element y
such that δ(y), and the action υ defines when it can be evaluated if the obligation has been
satisfied or not. Given an obligation O = (β, δ, υ), let qβ and qυ be the states of the system
after the execution of actions β and υ, respectively. The obligation O is satisfied if there exist
a behaviour B = (σ, α, ω, ρ) that contains β and υ and a predicate p such that p(qυ)⇒ p(qβ).
Using the previous types and definitions, the following definitions formalise the concept
of privacy rules and privacy policies.
Definition 18 (Privacy rule) A privacy rule is a 6-tuple (π, a, d, ag, c, O), where
• π : {allow,deny} stands for “permission” and defines either the rule allows or denies
the execution of an action a(v) : Action over a variable x ∈ Var such that, given d :
DataCat, d(x);
• ag : AgentCat defines who is allowed or denied to trigger the execution;
• c is a predicate; and
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• O defines an obligation the system acquires when the rule is applied.
When the testing framework reads and analyses a privacy rule, it assumes the condition
c = true and the obligation O = nil (where nil represents an empty record) whenever their
values are not explicitly defined.
Definition 19 (Privacy policy) A privacy policy is a tuple P = (AH,DH,R) where AH
is a set that contains the elements of AgentCat in the policy, DH is the set of all available
elements of DataCat in the policy, and R is a sequence of rules.
The order in which the rules are defined into the policy is important. Most policy spec-
ification languages rely on the order of their rules for conflict resolution. In the present
framework this order defines applicability of the rules and, most importantly, prevents the
generation of test cases that will lead to incorrect assessment. In our case, specific rules are
written first while more general rules are written last. Given the rules R = [r1, r2, . . . , rn] in
a privacy policy P , the statement ri ≤ rj is true if and only if i ≤ j. The operator < between
rules defines an order relationship which in turn is used in the generation process.
The collection of rules in a privacy policy is heterogeneous in the sense that some rules
apply to specific parts of the system and not to others. Rules have also different scopes
over the system, that is, some rules can be very specific and others can be more general.
These characteristics define two relationships, a relationship between the rules and parts
of the system that is referred to as applicability and another relationship among the rules
themselves, referred to as the conflict relationship.
4.2.1.2 Applicability and conflict resolution
Privacy rules affect the workings of defined parts of the system but not others. Moreover, some
rules are also intended to restrict some behaviours only when the system is on a previously
specified state. From this arises the concept of applicability that defines when a rule has
actually effect over the system’s behaviour.
Definition 20 (Applicability) Given a system represented by the model M and a privacy
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policy P , a rule r = (π, a, d, ag, c, O) is applicable if the system is in state q ∈ Q and the
following conditions are met:
• in the model M , ∃a ∈ A · q
a(v) // q′ ;
• action a(v) is executed over x ∈ Var and d(x);
• q(currentuser) = u and ag(u) where u ∈ Users; and
• c(q) holds.
In any given state of the system, an applicable rule allows or denies the execution of action
a and commits the system to fulfil the obligation (β, δ, υ).
Definition 21 (Conflicting rules) Whenever two given rules ri and rj are applicable in a
given state q we say that ri and rj are in conflict. A privacy policy has a conflict resolution
scheme such that, given the conflicting rules ri and rj, if ri ≤ rj then ri is applied.
The above definitions make it clear, given the current state of a system and an intended
action, which rule from the policy applies to the system. This is useful when a system tries
to enforce a policy. However, in a testing context, the inverse case arises. In other words,
given a particular rule from the policy, the testing process needs to identify the state where
the intended action of this rule will be applied. The problem arises when for a given rule rj
there exist other conflicting rules ri, with i < j. In this case, the more specific rule ri sets an
exception to the more general rule rj . Thus, a case for which rj and ri apply is not suitable
for testing rj . Nevertheless, intuitively if there is an exceptional case to a general rule, it
means that there are other cases that will follow the general rule. The cases in which rj does
not conflict with ri can be represented as a difference of rules rj − ri.
Definition 22 (Difference of rules) The operation rk = rj − ri between rules generates a
new rule rk such that πk = πj, Ok = Oj, and:
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dk =


dataj ∧ ¬datai if datai < dataj
datak = dataj otherwise
agk =


agj ∧ ¬agi if agi < agj
agk = agj otherwise
ck =


cj ∧ ¬ci if rj is in conflict with ri
ck = cj otherwise
Given a sequence of rules [r1, r2 . . . rn] we define the operation rk = rn− [r1, r2 . . . r(n−1)]
as
rk =


rn − (rn−1 − [r1 . . . rn−2]) if n ≥ 2
rn otherwise
This finalises the description of the models that specify the behaviour of the system and
the properties for the preservation of privacy. In the following section, the definition of the
test generation process uses these elements and concepts.
4.2.2 Generating tests for a privacy policy
In this testing domain, the actual behaviour of a system is usually specified by a behavioural
model while the privacy requirements are specified as additional properties. These properties
usually describe behaviours that are not allowed under predefined circumstances and other
behaviours that are required, also under predefined circumstances. Thus, generated tests for
this domain have to build a scenario where a specific behaviour is forbidden or required and
then attempt to execute the actions that configure such behaviour.
Given a model M and a policy P , the test generation process follows Algorithm 1 to
generate test cases for the present domain. Assume that for any rule r in the list of rules
R, the condition c is represented in DNF, so that disjoint partitions can be easily identified.
Additionally, after the calculation in line 2 all references to elements of a privacy rule in the
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algorithm point to elements of r.
To simplify the discussion of the algorithm, consider that a behaviour is characterised
by a string w. This string is a sequence of parameterised actions, so given a behaviour
Bw = (σw, αw, ωw, ρw), w is the sequence of all ai(vi), a ∈ αw and v ∈ ωw, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
where n is the number of actions in αw. A string w “reaches” a state q if lastState(Bw) = q.
This framework assumes that behaviours with values are always deterministic, this is, values
resolve any non-determinism present in abstract models. Therefore, the behaviour Bw is
constructed from the definition of w.
The generation algorithm looks into each of the rules in the privacy policy, calculates
any exception to the current rule due to previous rules being applied and generates a new
rule. Then it tries to break this rule by generating test cases that execute a forbidden action,
setting the oracle to false. This indicates that a correct implementation that complies with
the policy should fail on these test cases. On the other hand, it also generates test cases
where an action has an associated obligation. These test cases pass after the obligation has
been fulfilled. A system that complies with the policy should pass these test cases.
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Algorithm 1 Test case generation
1: for all rules ri ∈ P do
2: calculate r := ri − [r1 . . . ri−1]
3: for all states qi ∈ Q such that r is applicable in qi do
4: for all disjoint partitions cn of c do
5: generate a string wn such that Bwn enables a and cn(lastState(Bwn))
6: end for
7: for all strings wn do
8: if ρ = deny then
9: let w = wn a, add the test case (Bw,false) to the test suite
10: if O 6= nil then
11: let wp be a string such that Bwp enables υ
12: let wo = w wp υ
13: let qβ be a state such that ∃ q · q
β
→ qβ
14: let p be a predicate such that p(qβ)
15: add a test case (Bwo,p) to the test suite
16: end if
17: else if π = allow and O 6= nil then
18: let wp be a string that enables υ and w = wn a wp υ
19: let qβ be a state such that ∃ q · q
β
→ qβ
20: let p be a predicate such that p(qβ)
21: add a test case (Bw,p) to the test suite
22: end if
23: end for
24: end for
25: end for
The test case generation algorithm assumes that υ is a user-triggered action. Thus, it does
not generate test cases where an obligation will eventually be fulfilled, but cases in which the
obligation is fulfilled in a bounded future defined by a finite sequence of actions.
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Table 4.1: Example of privacy rules
O
rule π a d ag c β δ υ
r1 deny b dataRoot agentRoot - - - -
r2 allow a dataRoot agentRoot - c dataRoot d
Figure 4.2 shows an extremely simple system model that serves to explain the functioning
of the algorithm. Consider also the privacy rules shown in Table 4.1 where dataRoot and
agentRoot represent the categories in the top of hierarchies DataCat and AgentCat respec-
tively. Rule r1 forbids the execution of action b in any circumstance and rule r2 allows action
a to be executed but committing the system to also execute c before d is executed.
GFED@ABCq2
GFED@ABCq0 a //GFED@ABCq1
b
77pppppppppppppppppp
c
''NN
NNN
NNN
NNN
NNN
NNN
N
GFED@ABCq3 d //GFED@ABCq4
Figure 4.2: A simple system model.
When the algorithm is applied to generate test cases, the calculation in line 2 does not
modify the rules, that is, the rules are independent of each other and the algorithm processes
them separately. Processing rule r1 the algorithm identifies state q1 as the only one to enable
action b. Then it generates string w1 = a that reaches state q1. Rule r1 exercises only the
part of the algorithm dealing with denying actions, lines 8 to 15. Thus, it generates a string
w = a · b containing the enabling string w1 and the forbidden action b. Any string containing
the forbidden action should fail to have a matching run in a correct implementation. In this
case, test case (Bw, false) is generated. The algorithm then skips lines 10 to 15 and ends
because there is no obligation (O = nil) to be processed.
Now, rule r2 is processed. The algorithm identifies q0 that enables action a. Then,
enabling action w1 is set to the empty string. Rule r2 exercises only the part dealing with
allowed actions with obligations, lines 16 to 21. Then, string w = a ·c ·d is generated, with the
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sub-string wp = c being the enabling string for action d. From the composition of the string
w we know that a successful run of w will execute action c, thus, satisfying the obligation.
Finally, the test case (Bw, true) is generated, with the predicate true indicating a successfully
execution. As there is only one system level behaviour only one test case per rule is generated.
4.3 Asynchronous systems testing
The models used in the testing domains of security vulnerabilities and privacy policies describe
the systems in a centralised way. In other words, they consider the system as a monolithic and
unique entity. Even when a system could be built out of several distinct components, these
models consider that the actions are executed by the system as a whole and don’t differentiate
between particular components.
The previously described models also assume that actions are executed sequentially in an
predefined order. In practical terms, when several components of the system interact, the
models assume that the components of the system know when it is their turn to execute an
action and they wait while other components are executing their correspondent actions. In
summary, these models describe systems from a global perspective where all the components
of the system (if more than one) execute their actions synchronously.
There are however systems in which the components execute concurrently in an asyn-
chronous way. Moreover, there are systems for which one component executes (or seems to
execute) concurrently different instances of itself. For these kinds of systems, it is not prac-
tical to carry on their testing from a global perspective. For them, testing is focused on one
(or more) defined component(s) of the system while other components become part of the
environment.
4.3.1 A different kind of system: Example
Consider a system of file exchanging where a user (the sender) connects with another one (the
receiver) and sends a file. There are, obviously, two distinguishable sides on this system. From
the sender’s point of view, his side of the system is responsible for executing only a subset
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Figure 4.3: Simplified model of a file exchanging system
of the available actions. The sender calls them, the subset of controllable actions. The other
subset of actions is executed by the receiver. However, the sender needs to be notified when
the receiver executes one of these actions. Thus, the sender calls those actions the subset of
observable actions. This example describes the actions that take place in this system mainly
from the point of view of the sender.
A user can initiate the process by executing the action sendFile. The receiver can, then,
accept the file or reject the file. From the sender’s point of view, when the receiver accepts
the file, action fileAccepted is observed. On the other hand, if the file is rejected, action
fileRejected is observed. Even when the receiver has accepted the file, the transfer can be
aborted at any time before it is completed. An aborted transfer results also in the occurrence
of action fileRejected. The sender can also cancel the transfer at any time, which is represented
as the execution of action cancelFile. Finally, if an accepted file is successfully transferred,
action fileCompleted is observed. The graph in Figure 4.3 shows a pictorial description of
the interactions of this system. Controllable actions are denoted sendFile and cancelFile for
better readability. Accepting states are also labelled with an f . Two states with the label f
are not necessarily the same state.
This system is asynchronous because controllable and observable actions can happen in
any order. For example, consider the case where a user is sending a file and before it receives
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any response, decides to cancel the operation. At the same time, the receiver observes the
requests and rejects the file. From the sender’s point of view the user either observes that the
cancel request was processed or that the receiver has rejected the file. Any of these two cases
is acceptable to the sender in the knowledge that if the file is rejected the cancel request will
never be processed. However, it can also be the case that the cancel request arrives after the
receiver accepted the transfer and it was completed. In this case the cancel request is just
discarded.
Asynchronous behaviour appears also because the sender does not need to wait for the
receiver to accept or reject a file. The sender can send a file and then another one before
he observes any action executed by the receiver. Moreover, when two or more files are sent,
the sender will expect different confirmation or rejection messages, one for each file sent,
and the system has to be able to differentiate to which file each message “belongs”. Such
behaviour is represented using LTS by interleaving the actions related to each of the files being
transferred. However, this “interleaved” LTS model needs to provide a way to differentiate
between different executions of the same action. Additionally, there is no guarantee about
the order in which observable messages will appear and thus, all possible combinations need
to be considered.
4.3.2 Modelling asynchronous systems
Systems are called asynchronous because they perform asynchronous communication between
two or more of their components. These components refer to different elements, from concur-
rent elements that execute the same code to distributed elements in networked architectures.
In an abstract way, this testing framework assumes that there exist two parts in an asyn-
chronous system. There is one part whose actions are controlled by the testing framework
and there is another part whose actions are only observed by the testing framework.
The present testing framework uses LTS for representing asynchronous systems. To dis-
tinguish between different executions, actions in A are parametrised. This is, actions in A
are denoted a(id) where a is the action name and id is a special variable such that different
values of id represent different executions of a. There are several sets of values which can
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be assigned to id for distinguishing between different action executions, e.g., timestamps,
sequential id’s. These values depend on the implementation and are discussed in the case
studies. In the general discussions, however, this thesis refers to actions only by their names
unless it is necessary to include id’s value.
In these LTS models, the set A of actions is partitioned into Ac and Ao disjoint sub-
sets of controllable and observable actions, respectively. As mentioned in the description of
the example, the testing framework calls the set of actions that can be directly invoked by
the testing environment, controllable actions. Contrarily, it calls the set of actions that are
executed independently by the SUT (or its environment), observable actions.
The LTS model of an asynchronous system shows all the possible interleavings of con-
trollable and observable actions. The present testing framework places one restriction to the
kind of models for which it can generate test cases. This restriction is called the asynchronous
property and defined as follows.
Definition 23 (Asynchronous property) Given an observable action ao and q the cur-
rent state of the system, a model M = (Q,A,→, q0) is considered to be asynchronous if
enabled(q, ao) implies that
for all qj such that q
ac→ qj and ac ∈ Ac, enabled(qj , ao)
The asynchronous property establishes that in the model of an asynchronous system, once
an observable action is enabled at some point in the execution, it can be “disabled” only by
another observable action. This effectively means that the model assumes that the state of
the “observable components” of the system and the environment does not change until these
components show an observable behaviour.
Finally, to improve readability in the following sections, given a behaviour BM = (σq, α, ω, ρ),
denote observableSuccessors(B) the set of enabled observable actions in state q, defined as
observableSuccessors(B) = {a|a ∈ Ao ∧ ∃q
′, q
a
→ q′}.
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4.3.3 Testing asynchronous systems
In the testing domain of asynchronous systems, the framework needs to specialise its definition
of test cases. The general description of the test generation process defined a test case
composed by a behaviour and a state predicate. However, this definition is not suitable
because it does not consider the case where different sequences of actions represent the same
behaviour. This case is common in asynchronous systems where the order in which actions
are observed do not necessarily represent the order in which they were executed. For this
case the testing framework needs to extend its definition so that a test case is composed by
a set of possible behaviours and a state predicate.
In order to define a test case in a more formal way, given a sequence α ∈ A∗ and As ⊆ A
this framework introduces w ↓As as the sub-word obtained by erasing all the symbols not
in As. Additionally, given a behaviour B, the framework denotes also αB the sequence of
actions α in the behaviour B. Now, the testing framework formally defines a test case for
asynchronous testing.
Definition 24 (Test case) Given a sequence of controllable actions C = ac1 · ac2 · . . . · acn
and the set of behaviours BM defined by a model M , a test case is a pair TC : (BC , SP )
where
• BC is the subset of n behaviours represented by {B|B ∈ BM ∧ αB ↓Ac= C ∧ ∀B ∈
BC , lastState(σB) ∈ QF , and
• sp is a state predicate such that for the last state of each Bi in BC , spi(lastState(σB))
holds.
The previous definition states two properties for a generated test case for asynchronous
systems. These properties are used to determine when a test case passes or fails its execution.
These properties are
1. for all sequences of actions in a given test case, controllable actions are always executed
in the same order; and,
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2. for all sequences of states in a given test case, the last state will always be an accepting
state.
The first property states what is common for testing theories based on abstract models,
which is, a test case passes if the implementation can execute the same (sub)sequence of
(controllable) actions as the model. The second property relies on the definition of accepting
states to determine whether a generated set of behaviours can be considered a test case. As
an example, a common definition of accepting states for a wide range of protocols assume that
the execution of observable actions is triggered by controllable actions. Therefore, expected
observable actions represent pending responses of the system whereas accepting states are
those in which no responses are pending. Then, for this kind of systems, the second property
states that for a test case to pass, all the required responses should have been received.
To deal with asynchronous testing the testing framework needs to execute asynchronously
with respect to the observable elements of the system. In other words, to be capable of
producing different interleavings of controllable and observable actions, just as the real system
does, the testing framework needs to be able to observe actions executed by the environment
and to execute controllable actions concurrently. Thus, for this testing domain, the framework
defines two algorithms, the test generator and the execution observer, which run in parallel
during the testing process. Both execute independently but communicate (and synchronise
if necessary) by accessing two global structures, the communication channel CC represented
as a queue of executed actions and a set So of expected observable actions.
An important assumption about the communication channel is that it is a perfect channel,
without losses or delays. This means that by using this channel, the testing framework is
synchronised with the SUT (the controllable components of the system). A change in the
SUT’s state is reflected instantaneously in the model’s state. Similarly, requests to execute
controllable actions arrive at the SUT as soon as the tester (a human tester or an automated
process that acts as a tester) decides to execute a defined action.
Algorithms 2 and 3 show the generation and observation processes, respectively. In the
algorithms, the behaviour B represents the current generated behaviour for the test case
TC, q represents the current state of the system in the model and So denotes the current
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set of observable successors. The algorithms also assume that all messages from the SUT
notifying of the execution of an action are observed in the communication channel CC. The
function extend(B, a) takes a current behaviour B and an action a as parameters and returns
a extended behaviour. Additionally, function front(Q) returns the element at the front of
queue Q without removing it and function dequeue(Q) removes the element at the front of
the queue Q and returns it to be used in the algorithms.
Algorithm 2 Test generator
1: B = (q0, ǫ, ǫ, ρ0)
2: TC = (B, true)
3: q = q0
4: while So is not empty do
5: while ∃ac ∈ Ac such that enabled(q, ac) do
6: pick an enabled ac
7: send ac to the SUT
8: wait until front(CC) = ac
9: m :=dequeue(CC)
10: B:=extend(B,m)
11: TC:=(B, true)
12: update current state q
13: So:=observableSuccessors(q)
14: end while
15: end while
16: if q 6∈ F then
17: TC:=(B, false)
18: end if
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Algorithm 3 Execution observer
1: while Qc is not empty OR So is not empty do
2: if front(CC) ∈ Ao then
3: m:=dequeue(CC)
4: if m ∈ So then
5: B:=extend(B,m)
6: TC:=(B, true)
7: update current state q
8: So:=observableSuccessors(q)
9: else
10: Test fails
11: B:=extend(B,m)
12: TC:=(B, false)
13: exit while
14: end if
15: end if
16: end while
Summarising the process, the test generator appends actions to be executed to the queue
Qc, therefore it also appends expected observable actions to the set So which, in principle,
plays the role of test oracle for the test case. The execution observer removes the actions from
Qc or So as the execution is performed by the implementation. However, as non-determinism
is resolved at certain points by implementation choices, the set of expected actions So needs
to be modified to reflect the choices. Then, the choice of an observable action ao will remove
additional actions from So which will not be executed after ao. Naturally, ao’s observable
successors will also append new actions to So.
To complete the testing process, the execution of a test case needs to produce a verdict.
The algorithms do provide the concept of a test case’s fail verdict. From this concept the
framework derives the concept of a pass verdict. A test case passes if its execution does not
fail and the algorithms terminate. An inconclusive verdict is generated when the algorithms
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do not terminate. However, the tester can force the fail verdict in those cases by introducing
proper time-out events.
4.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter has presented the specialisation of the general testing framework for the testing
domains of security vulnerabilities, privacy and asynchronous systems. Up to three elements
of the general framework were specialised; the models, the test generation algorithm and the
test execution algorithm, depending on the specific characteristics of the testing domain.
First, the specialisation of models reflected the specific characteristics of the systems that
needed to be modelled. For the domain of security vulnerabilities, the specialised models were
logically separated into three, namely the specification model, the implementation model and
the attacker’s model. This separation was necessary because of the need to describe the
specific properties of an implementation that make it vulnerable, as well as the objectives
of a malicious user. For testing privacy policies the general behavioural and data generation
models were complemented with a privacy model that represented the privacy requirements.
A general way of representing this privacy model was defined which is independent of current
privacy languages. Finally, for modelling asynchronous systems it was necessary to partition
the set of actions into controllable and observable actions. For the kind of models consid-
ered in this thesis an asynchronous property was defined such that whenever an observable
action is enabled by a controllable action, it cannot be disabled by subsequent controllable
actions. This property was needed to allow the reorder of observable actions from the tester’s
perspective.
In second place, the test generation algorithm was specialised to reflect the testing ob-
jectives for each domain. For testing privacy policies and asynchronous systems, specific
algorithms were presented. However, no specialised algorithm was needed for vulnerabilities
testing. In this domain, the objective of the testing process turned out to be that the ma-
licious user cannot reach his objectives under the described scenario, that is, by exploiting
the modelled properties in the way that was described in the attacker’s model. Instead of
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developing a specialised algorithm for the generation process, the models were translated to
first order logic predicates and a standard constraint solving algorithm was applied. Once a
solution was found, standard sequencing and execution algorithms were applied.
Finally, the only specialised algorithm for test execution was developed for the domain of
asynchronous system testing because it needed to execute and observe actions in parallel. It
was defined that the suitable way of generating and executing a test case for this domain was
to use an online approach.
The next chapter presents the application of the general approach as well as the specialised
ones to several case studies.
84
Chapter 5
Case studies
5.1 Overview
This chapter presents four case studies with the aim of demonstrating the applicability of
the general and specialised approaches presented in the previous two chapters. All the case
studies also aim to demonstrate via examples how the framework presented in this thesis can
be implemented using tools and other artefacts already developed for current test automation
frameworks. With this objective in sight, the present studies use mainly the SmartMBT tool
(described previously in Chapter 2) to drive the generation of test cases and to perform their
execution. Enhancements to this tool have been developed where necessary and are described
in this chapter. Complementary tools or frameworks are also used when necessary and are
properly described.
The four case studies that are discussed in this chapter are
Device drivers testing. This case study demonstrates the application of the general frame-
work to the testing domain of operating systems. The aim of this study is to show the
advantages of using a model-based testing framework in terms of greater fine-control
and diversity of the test scenarios. It is also an objective of this study to show how
a model-based framework can be implemented so that it reuses elements of existing
testing frameworks.
Vulnerabilities testing. In this case study the applied framework is specialised for the
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generation of test cases that reveal vulnerabilities. Two web applications serve the
purpose of demonstrating the generation process. A first exercise is focused on the
generation of test cases and a second one on the sequencing and execution of the test
cases. In addition to the model-based testing tool, a customised constraint solver is
built and used in the generation process.
Privacy testing. This study shows the applicability of the specialised framework for testing
privacy policies. Two different privacy policies are used for the demonstration. A
first exercise focuses on the generation and execution of test cases for testing how web
browsers guard the privacy of the user’s navigation information. A second exercise
demonstrates the generation of test cases for a privacy policy that includes obligations.
Asynchronous systems testing. In this case study, the specialised framework for testing
asynchronous systems is applied to an open implementation of the Financial Informa-
tion eXchange (FIX) protocol. This study uses a simplified model of the standard
specification for the FIX protocol. The tester controls the Client module of the open
implementation and observes the responses of the Server module. This study uses an
on-line approach for generating and executing test cases.
5.2 Device drivers testing
Testing operating system’s kernels and modules is difficult due to the complexity of such pieces
of software [70]. They usually include code developed by several different programmers, in
different places and time. Moreover, due to their role in a system their code usually includes
references to “low level” elements such as the hardware components of the system.
Most of what is publicly known about the development and testing of operating systems
comes from the study and observation of the development of open (source) systems, starting
with Linux and more recently, for example, OpenSolaris. Historically, until early in the
2000s, Linux testing efforts were primarily informal and ad-hoc in nature [75]. The major
testing effort in the development of these systems was usually performed by the developers
themselves. However, currently, developers of open systems are usually provided with a suite
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of tests which needs to be applied against the code they are developing. These test suites
are used as a way to ensure that the code contributed by different programmers maintains
standard interfaces and does not break other functionalities.
Test suites are software packages written for the express purpose of testing. They usually
cover a wide range of functions and they are written to expose flaws that are likely to be
in the system. In the case of operating systems, these test suites are composed of scripts
that perform shell invocations of the operating system commands. Examples of these test
suites are the ones that the OpenSolaris community∗ has developed with the aim of testing
the implementation of different modules of the operating system, storage device drivers being
among them.
In this case study we refer to the particular case of a test suite for the HBA (Host Bus
Adapter) storage driver of the OpenSolaris operating system. The aim here is to show how a
model-based testing approach can bring two particular capabilities to the current test suites
for the HBA driver. These capabilities are
• the ability to execute different test scenarios without having to modify their source code
each time a new scenario is required, and
• the ability to invoke fine-grained control over the operations that the OS executes.
This study refers to these capabilities as the flexibility of the test suite.
5.2.1 The system under test
The Host Bus Adapter (HBA) provides input/output processing and physical connectivity
with storage devices such as hard disks. A driver that controls this adapter in an operating
system (OS) provides several services to the other OS modules and applications. A non-
exhaustive list of the operations that this driver performs includes
- format a device,
- partition the device with a variable size,
∗http://www.opensolaris.org/os/community
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- convert a partition into a file system,
- mount a file system, and
- create files into a file system.
The list above is restricted to the management of file systems inside a storage device, a
device is a physical element of the system, typically a hard disk. The format of a device
defines how the structure of this device is represented. In OpenSolaris, two different formats
are available, the SMI and the EFI formats. They differ mainly in how many partitions
(also called slices in OpenSolaris) the device can contain and how they are referred to by the
other OS modules. Each partition represents some physical space in the device. Typically,
partitions in hard disks have a defined number of cylinders which defines their size. Inside a
partition, the operating system and other applications store files.
A file system defines the way to refer to and organise files inside a storage device. Different
file systems are available in OpenSolaris: FAT32, UFS and ZFS among them. File systems
are accessed by mounting them. A file system is mounted into a directory called the mount
point. File systems and mount points are in a one-to-many relationship. That is, a particular
mount point provides access to a unique file system. However, different mount points can
also provide access to the same file system.
The list of operations for the HBA driver presented at the beginning of the present section
will be useful at the time of defining a model for this driver. Hereafter, general allusions to the
HBA driver refer particularly to these functions and elements, unless the contrary is explicitly
stated. The remainder of this section describes the framework in which the current test suite
for the HBA driver is based.
Current testing framework
The current tests for OpenSolaris storage management are contained in the Storage Driver
Test Suite (SDTS)† and use the Test Environment Toolkit (TET) as the underlying testing
framework. The structure of these tests is shown in Figure 5.1. Each test suite is made up
†http://www.opensolaris.org/os/community/storage/tests/
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Figure 5.1: Structure of test suites in the TET framework
of one or more test cases. Each test case is an executable program constructed by grouping
together test functions, called test purposes. In general, a test case defines the order of
execution of its test purposes. The Test Case Controller (TCC) processes the test cases and
executes the corresponding test purposes. A test scenario file specifies the list of test cases
that the TCC processes.
The code in Figure 5.2 shows an extract of a test scenario file. This code specifies different
scenarios available for execution. For example, if the tests are invoked for execution without
specifying a particular scenario, the scenario all will take place and all test cases will be
executed. However, if the scenario format part is invoked then only test purposes 6, 8 and
9 of the test case tc format will be executed. The test cases considered in this scenario file
correspond to tests for different uses of the fdisk command, the format command and the
creation of new file systems that involves the previous and other commands of the operating
system.
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all
^fdisk
^format all
^newfs
fdisk
/tests/diskcmd/fdisk/tc fdisk
format_all
/tests/diskcmd/format/tc format
format_part
/tests/diskcmd/format/tc format{6,8,9}
newfs
/tests/diskcmd/newfs/tc newfs
Figure 5.2: Test scenario specification
When writing test cases in the TET framework, the tester is required to supply the test
purpose code that actually executes the test operation. This framework is modular so that
the code that implements functionalities common to more than one test purpose is written as
library functions and called from inside the test purposes. As an example, Figure 5.3 partially
shows the code of a test purpose included in the SDTS. This code invokes library functions
label smi and build ufs (shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5)and traps the results of their execution.
Then, it logs these results for reporting purposes. Functions label smi and build ufs are part
of a repository of common utility functions. The function label smi formats a previously
identified disk (defined in variable $stds disk) and builds an SMI label into it. The function
build ufs creates a partition into the disk, allocates a new file system into it and mounts the
created file system into a predefined directory $mp.
An analysis of the code in the test purposes as well as the code in the common library
functions shows that the test purposes on this suite are written at a high level of abstraction.
In other words, the scripts do not correspond to the invocation of simple shell commands
but to a structured sequence of invocations. This, in principle, reduces the flexibility of the
test suite because operations are only considered inside a predefined sequence and cannot be
tested in a different context without rewriting or adding more scripts.
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...
if ! label smi >> $logfile 2>&1; then
cti report "FAIL: label smi on $sdts disk"
cti reportfile "$logfile"
cti fail "tp newfs 001: FAIL"
return
else
cti report "PASS: label smi on $sdts disk"
fi
...
if ! build_ufs >> $logfile 2>&1; then
cti report "FAIL: create ufs on $rdev and mount it to $mp"
cti reportfile "$logfile"
cti fail "tp_newfs_001: FAIL"
return
else
cti report "PASS: create ufs on $rdev and mount it to $mp"
fi
...
Figure 5.3: Test purpose code
Approaches that consider tests with a strictly predefined sequence of operations, as the
one presented here, usually require the system to be in a predefined suitable state before the
test sequence can be executed. This is the case of the SDTS suite where test purposes have
been designed to be executed independently. Therefore, each test purpose modifies the initial
state of the system to enable its execution and they must clean the state of the system so
that the next test purpose can be executed without any problems. As a result, the test case
defines explicitly the order of execution but the results of one execution do not influence the
results of subsequent executions. This does not represent a real usage scenario. However,
this characteristic is useful in trying different scenarios by reordering the execution of test
purposes without having to modify their code.
5.2.2 Test generation with models based in the SDTS suite
This case study implements a model-based testing framework on top of the existing framework
with the aim of providing the current test suites with the ability to execute more and different
test scenarios without having to modify their existing code. In order to achieve this, a model
of the current test suite takes care of driving the testing process and generating new test
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function label smi
{
if ! print "label\n0\n\n\n\nq" > $testdir/label smi.txt; then
echo "create file label smi.txt failed"
return 1
elif [[ ! -f $testdir/label smi.txt ]]; then
echo "label smi.txt doesn’t exist"
return 1
fi
if is i386; then
if ! fdisk -B /dev/rdsk/$sdts_diskp0; then
if is less 1tb $sdts_disk; then
echo "The size of the disk is less than 1TB"
echo "label smi failed"
else
echo "The size of the disk is more than 1TB"
echo "label smi failed"
fi
return 1
fi
if ! fmthard -s /dev/null /dev/rdsk/$sdts_diskp0 > /dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "create partition 2 entry size equal to the full size of the disk failed"
fi
fi
if ! format -e -f $testdir/label smi.txt -s $sdts_disk; then
if is less 1tb $sdts_disk; then
echo "The size of the disk is less than 1TB"
echo "label smi failed"
else
echo "The size of the disk is more than 1TB"
echo "label smi failed"
fi
return 1
fi
return 0
}
Figure 5.4: Library function label smi code
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function build_ufs
{
if [[ ! -d $mp ]]; then
mkdir -p $mp
fi
if ! make_mp_available; then
echo "$mp is unavailable"
return 1
fi
if yes | newfs $rdev >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "using newfs create ufs on $rdev successfully"
else
echo "using newfs create ufs on $rdev failed"
return 1
fi
if mount $bdev $mp >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "mount slice $bdev to $mp successfully"
else
echo "mount slice $bdev to $mp failed"
return 1
fi
return 0
}
Figure 5.5: Library function build fs code
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Table 5.1: States of a model for the SDTS suite
state availableDisk is386 less1Tb SMILabel
s1 true true true true
s2 true true true false
s3 true true false true
s4 true true false false
s5 true false true true
s6 true false true false
s7 true false false true
s8 true false false false
scenarios on the fly.
5.2.2.1 Modelling based on the SDTS suite
In the testing framework that this thesis defines, a model contains mainly two elements, states
and action triggered transitions. This study concentrates on the reuse of the current set of
scripts in the SDTS suite. Therefore, an analysis of the current code defines the proper states
and transitions. There are four boolean functions that define the state of the system and,
thus, define if and when a particular test case (or purpose) can be executed:
• is386 that indicates if the system architecture is 386 compatible or not,
• less1Tb that indicates if the disk’s capacity is less than 1 Tb,
• availableDisk that returns the disk’s availability,
• SMILabel that indicates if the disk can have a SMI label attached.
These four functions are part of the library of common functions for the test suite. In
principle, they define sixteen states for the system under test. However, states where there
is no disk available for the tests do not lead to a useful test. Therefore, the present model
considers only eight states - namely those where there is an available disk for the tests. The
states for this model of the system are described as in Table 5.1.
Just as with the states, actions for the model also derive from the scripts of the test
purposes of the SDTS suite. In this case actions match one-to-one to the test purposes of the
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fdisk
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format
ff
newfs
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newfs
ff
Figure 5.6: Model of the SDTS suite
suite. For example, actions fdisk1, fdisk2, fdisk3 and fdisk4, derive from the test purposes in
the test case fdisk : fdisk001 up to fdisk004. The same applies for test cases format, newfs
and vtoc.
With states and actions a LTS model that represents the SDTS suite can be described.
Figure 5.6 shows a simplified pictorial description of the model for the SDTS suite. For
clarity, this description uses the test case name to label the transitions and it stands for all
the actions related to that test case. For example, format stands for actions format1, format2,
up to action format10.
Figure 5.6 shows only two states of the SDTS model, s1 and s2, mainly because of two
reasons. In the first place, it is because all states from s2 to s8 present exactly the same
behaviour, that is, actions (and the test purposes they represent) fdisk, format and newfs can
be executed in any of these states. Therefore, state s2 is sufficient to represent pictorially
all these states. However, state s1 is the only state in which the test purposes of test case
fdisk can be executed. Secondly, considering only the actions included in the test suites, the
states are independent one from the other. In other words, there are no transitions between
the states. This is because the state of the system is defined in such terms that none of the
actions can trigger a change of state. This means that, for example, if the testing process is
carried on a system with SPARC architecture there is no way that the system can change its
architecture to a 386-compatible architecture during this process.
5.2.2.2 Test generation
Test cases are generated from the model of the system with the main objective of produc-
ing as many different case scenarios as possible. As indicated before, this study uses the
SmartMBT tool to drive the generation process. This particular exercise in the present case
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study applies a random approach to the test generation. This approach provides flexibility
to the test generation process. In fact, different executions of the process using this approach
produce different test sequences which normally lead to different scenarios. This approach
also interleaves test purposes from different test cases into the test sequence. This character-
istic of the test sequence is important during test execution because it challenges assumptions
such as the premise that every script cleans the system state after execution.
For this exercise, the generated test sequence includes the following subsequence of 10
actions: format1, vtoc1, format3, newfs1, format1, newfs3, fdisk3, format6, format7, newfs2.
The execution of this subsequence is discussed in the following section.
5.2.2.3 Test execution
The model-based framework executes the generated test cases via the implementation of the
Adaptor module. Generally, the Adaptor uses a set of scripts that perform (or call) the
operations in the SUT. In this case, given that each action maps to an existing script, the
main function of the Adaptor is just to execute the appropriate script in the SDTS suite. As
indicated before, this study uses the SmartMBT tool to trigger the execution of test cases.
The Adaptor, therefore, is implemented as a service that listens for requests of the SmartMBT
tool and links them to the appropriate script.
The other function of the Adaptor is to capture the responses and the resulting state of
the system after the execution of the scripts so that a verdict is produced. The approach of
reusing the current scripts for testing presents a challenge to the Adaptor. Current scripts trap
the errors when they fail their execution and report the fail to the current testing framework.
As errors are trapped, scripts seem to execute correctly always. This means that the Adaptor
never observes an abnormal execution and never reports a failing test case. Table 5.2 presents
the verdicts for the execution of each action in a test case as reported by the model-based
tool SmartMBT and the current TET/CTI framework.
Table 5.2 shows that the SmartMBT tool generates a pass verdict for the test cases that
create a new file system while the TET/CTI framework reports an error and produces a
fail verdict. Results for action format7 present the same difference between SmartMBT and
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Table 5.2: Execution verdicts for test cases in SDTS suite
Test action SmartMBT TET/CTI
format1 pass pass
vtoc1 pass pass
format3 pass pass
newfs1 pass fail
format1 pass pass
newfs3 pass fail
fdisk3 pass pass
format6 pass pass
format7 pass fail
newfs2 pass fail
TET/CTI reports. The reason for these differences resides in the fact that the scripts in the
SDTS trap the errors and then finalise their execution normally.
Section 5.2.4 presents a more in-depth discussion of the results of the previous modelling
and test generation. However, a brief analysis of the results concludes that the implementation
of a model-based framework that reuses the code and structure of the test suites as they are
currently defined does not improve significantly the flexibility of the test suite. The major
difference between the test cases in the current suites and the ones generated, resides in the
execution order of the test cases. This normally configures different test scenarios, however,
given that each test case “initialises and cleans” the state of the system before and after
execution, test scenarios do not really change. Therefore, there is a need for a different
modelling effort that can expand the benefits of model-based testing into the current test
suites.
5.2.3 Test generation with fine-grained models
From our previous experience we know that the test purposes in the SDTS suite are not very
flexible because of their high level of abstraction. Intuitively, providing more fine-grained
control over the operations executed by the OS increases the number of possible test scenarios.
This second exercise uses models that represent fine-grained functionalities instead of current
SDTS scripts. These new models concentrate in the basic functionalities of the HBA storage
driver and restrict themselves to the list of functions described in Section 5.2.1 and to the
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elements that take part in those functions.
5.2.3.1 Modelling the HBA driver
Figure 5.7 shows an example of the current modelling approach and the differences that it
presents with respect to the previous one.
• The first part (Part 5.7(a)) of this figure shows the test purpose newfs1. This repre-
sentation assumes that the system is not cleaned after execution and, thus, there is an
actual transition of state.
• In Part 5.7(b), the same “newfs1” test purpose appears represented using a fine-grained
list of the HBA driver functions. However, this representation still suggests that after
a SMI label has been attached to the disk, a new partition has to be created. Then, in
sequence, this partition is converted into a UFS file system which is finally mounted.
• Part 5.7(c) resembles more the aim of greater flexibility where different test scenarios are
derived from the same model. For example, this model easily generates a test scenario
where the disk is formatted and a partition is created and then deleted, or where a file
system is created but never mounted because the disk is re-formatted.
The natural question that arises is how do we model the HBA driver so that these scenarios
can be derived from the model. Figure 5.7 provides hints for answering this question. This
model requires a set of actions that represents closely the basic functionalities of the HBA
driver. These actions drive the definition of the states. States of this model need to represent
the elements over which these actions perform.
Following the description of the HBA driver in Section 5.2.1, consider as elements of the
system:
• a set of devices (disks) that can be available for the tests,
• for each device, a set of partitions, and
• a set of mount points where file systems can be mounted.
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?>=<89:;q newfs1 //GFED@ABCq′
(a) New file system test purpose
?>=<89:;q fdiskSMI //GFED@ABCq1 addPartition //GFED@ABCq2 createUFS //GFED@ABCq3 mountUFS //GFED@ABCq′
(b) Sequence of actions in the “newfs1” test purpose
?>=<89:;q fdiskSMI //GFED@ABCq1 addPartition ,,GFED@ABCq2 createUFS //
deletePartition
ll
addPartition
ff
GFED@ABCq3 mountFS ++
ECD@GF
fdiskSMI

BCD@GA
deletePartition
??
GFED@ABCq′
fdiskSMI fail
uu
umountFS
ll
(c) Different scenarios derived from “newfs” test purpose
Figure 5.7: Model representing a test that creates and mounts a partition
Each device has attached the following information: name, size, formatting (either they
have a SMI or an EFI label), and a boolean value that indicates if they are available for disk
operations. Similarly, each partition has the following information attached: name (how it is
referred to), number (each partition has an ordinal number in the partition table of the disk),
size, and type of file system it contains. Finally, the mount points have a name linked to the
name of the partition mounted on them.
Consider the quantity and possible values of the information contained in this model and
compare it with the set of boolean functions in our previous model. The definition of states
for this model is more complex that the one presented for the SDTS suite.
The states of the system are defined by all the combinations of possible values that the
previous elements can have. The enumeration of states of the system before hand turns
then into a difficult task. Restrict the devices and the mount points to include a single
element each. Restrict also the partitions to consider only one of each type of partitions
included in OpenSolaris (slices and partitions). Even with these restrictions, the count reaches
approximately 144 combinations that include additionally three file systems (UFS, FAT32 and
ZFS), two formatting labels, the EFI and SMI labels, and a special value labelled none that
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Table 5.3: States in the model of the HBA driver
State Device Partition Mount
name size label available name number size file system point
s1 c3d1 500 none true none none none none none
s2 c3d1 500 SMI true p0 1 500 none none
s3 c3d1 500 EFI true p0 1 500 none none
η c3d1 500 EFI true p0 1 500 ZFS none
s4 c3d1 500 EFI true p0 1 500 UFS none
η c3d1 500 EFI true p0 1 500 UFS mp1
represents the absence of a file system, either because it has not been created yet, or because
a formatting label has not been applied. Table 5.3 shows a partial view of the states that are
part of the model.
The first column of Table 5.3 includes a state name for each combination. However, there
are some combinations of values that are not considered valid states. Such combinations are
marked with the symbol η in the state name column. These “not valid” states appear because
some values are dependent on others. Consider, for example, the ZFS file system, it can only
be created into a device with a SMI label. Thus, the combination of a ZFS file system with
an EFI label can never occur. A similar situation presents itself in the last combination. A
device cannot be available for formatting, or modifying a defined partition, if this partition
is mounted.
Definition of states for a fine-grained model turns complex not only because of the number
of combinations of values for the different elements but also because of the analysis that is
required to determine if certain combinations are valid. This is why, in general, states are
not enumerated but defined abstractly. Then, different algorithms can be applied over the
abstract definitions in order to generate a complete set of states if required.
The briefly stated list of functions of the HBA driver (see Section 5.2.1) provides an ini-
tial base to define the actions considered in the new model. Initially, these actions include
fdiskSMI, fdiskEFI, addPartition, createUFS, createFAT32, createZFS and mountFS. Addi-
tionally, actions such as deletePartition, umountFS, and other actions that represent failure
of the previous actions, such as fdiskSMI fail and mountFS fail, increase the flexibility of the
model.
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In general the execution of an action should fail if the state of the system does not allow
it. In other words, each action defines (explicitly or implicitly) a list of states from where
its execution is allowed. An attempt to execute an action from a state not defined in this
list results in a failure. Consider the case of the formatting operation of a file system, the
operating system formats a device only if its file systems are not mounted. A (normal) test
usually verifies that condition before executing the formatting action. Our failing test, on the
contrary, tries to force a scenario where the formatting is executed over mounted partitions,
therefore, expecting the action to fail. Section 5.2.4 discusses how the ability to force the
execution of an action in different states increases the flexibility of the test suite.
5.2.3.2 Test generation
The generation of test cases for the fine-grained model follows the same random approach as
the previous high level model. However, this time the system is observed in different states
and the set of available actions changes as the state of the system changes.
The selection of the random approach is justified because it allows to, eventually, execute
each action in the model in a number of different states. An exploratory approach leads to the
same result but it requires interaction with the tester. Other algorithmic approaches, such as
Chinese Postman, cannot be applied because the states in the model depend on data that is
not generated before hand but is instead produced as the generation process progresses. The
generation process becomes aware of more states of the system as it executes more actions.
For example, after a random execution of 200 actions the number of visited states in the test
sequence is 35. An increase of the number of executed actions to 1000 turns the number of
visited states into 63. As an example of a generated sequence of actions, consider the sub-
sequence: initialise, fdiskSMI(c3d1), fdiskSMI(c3d1), makeMountDir(mp1), fdiskEFI(c3d1),
fdiskSMI(c3d1), addPartition(c3d1,fat32), formatSlice0(c3d1), createUFS(c3d1,s0), fdiskEFI(c3d1).
A graphical representation provides an intuitive idea of the differences between the tests
generated in the present and the previous approaches. Consider the state chart shown in
Figure 5.8. This state chart shows the initial 4 actions of the test sequence as they were
generated. It also shows other possible paths in state s3. This means that the test sequence
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GFED@ABCs54
GFED@ABCs1 initialise // GFED@ABCs2 fdiskSMI(c3d1) // GFED@ABCs3makeMountDir(mp1)//
formatSlice0(c3d1)
OO
fdsikEFI(c3d1)

GFED@ABCs4
addPartition(c3d1,fat32)
,, GFED@ABCs6
fdiskSMI(c3d1)
ll
GFED@ABCs53
fdsikSMI(c3d1)
33ggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggg GFED@ABCs63
Figure 5.8: Extract of the state chart for the generated test sequence.
tests different actions under the same scenario. The transition with label fdiskSMI(c3d1)
between states s53 and s3 tests the action fdiskSMI(c3d1) under a different scenario than
the first subsequence but expects to arrive at the same state.
Section 5.2.4 discusses in more depth the advantages of the generated test sequence. The
following section discusses aspects related to the execution of this test sequence.
5.2.3.3 Test execution
Just as a high level model, a fine-grained model requires an Adaptor module and a set of
scripts in order to connect to the SUT and execute the tests automatically. In general, these
new scripts are not very different from the ones in the SDTS suite but are instead a break up
of them. To illustrate this better, Table 5.4 shows how the code of the scripts in Figures 5.3,
5.4 and 5.5 is divided among the new actions of the model. Action fdiskSMI takes the
relevant part of function label SMI that formats a disk with a SMI label, createUFS and
mountUFS split the relevant code of function build ufs that creates a file system on a given
partition and mounts it, respectively.
The scripts in Table 5.4 do not contain the complete code from the original script. Calls
to the CTI framework, cti report and cti fail, for example, are not present anymore. The
purpose of such code in the original script was to trap errors and provide a test report in the
CTI/TET framework. The new scripts replace these functions with a return code. Although
this replacement is not necessary for executing the tests, it is convenient because it enables
the Adaptor to determine when a script has failed and to report it to the Arbiter in the
testing tool indicating that the test has failed. Trapping errors as in the original scripts will
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Table 5.4: New model actions and their corresponding script code
fdiskSMI if ! fdisk -B /dev/rdsk/\$stds_disk; then
return 1
fi
addPartition print "partition\n0\n\n\n0\n${size}gb \
\n1\n\n\n0\n0\n2 \
\n\n\n0\n0\n3\n\n\n0\n0\n4\n\n\n0\n0\n5\n\n\n0\n0\n6\n \
\n\n0\n0\n7\n\n\n0\n0\nlabel\nq\nq" \
> ${testdir}/create_slice0.txt
if ! format -f ${testdir}/create_slice0.txt \
-s $sdts_disk; then
return 1
fi
createUFS if ! yes | newfs $rdev >/dev/null 2>&1; then
return 1
fi
mountUFS if ! mount $bdev $mp >/dev/null 2>&1; then
return 1
fi
umountUFS if ! umount $mp > /dev/null 2>&1; then
if ! umount -f $mp > /dev/null 2>&1; then
return 1
fi
fi
mean to the Adaptor that the scripts always terminate correctly and thus will indicate that
the test passed even when it produced an error report.
5.2.4 Discussion
The first exercise, that reuses completely the current scripts in the SDTS suite shows that
our approach generates different scenarios not considered in the original test case definitions.
However, this does not translate into a real advantage because the scripts that execute the test
cases erase any changes in the system state. In other words, it does not make any difference
to execute the test purposes in different orders because, before and after execution, the state
is always returned to a predefined state.
The modelling task proved to be of value because it revealed an error in the function
less1Tb. A faulty condition in the code led this function to report the wrong state of the
system. Although different testing approaches other than the model-based approach are
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probably able to reveal the same error, it is correct to claim that the effort allocated to
produce the models led, or at least contributed, to revealing this error.
The second exercise provides the test suite with increased flexibility. This exercise not
only increases the number of test scenarios but also diversifies the states in which the system
is subject to test. The addition of failing actions also increases the ability of the tests to
verify that certain operations are not allowed in predefined states (e.g., a user cannot format
a disk that has a partition mounted). Therefore, it gives more fine-grained control over the
system operations.
One of the main goals of this exercise is to provide the test suite with the ability to execute
different test scenarios. The number of scenarios is the product of different executions for
the operations in a given test purpose. Two operation executions are different if they are
performed in different states. Consider the first test purpose of the newfs test case (shown
in Figure 5.7(b)). In the original test purpose there is only one test scenario, mainly because
it executes each operation in a unique state. The model-based approach, after one hundred
executions of randomly selected actions gets the following count
Operation Count Fail operation count
fdiskSMI 3 1
addPartition 2 1
createUFS 2 -
mountUFS 2 -
In the previous list, the fail operation count shows how many different executions of
fdiskSMI fail and addPartition fail are reported. Actions createUFS and mountUFS do not
have corresponding “fail” actions in the model. Without considering the fail operations, the
number of test scenarios for this test purpose is 24. However, the fail operations execute the
same operations with the difference that the expected result for them is to fail. Moreover,
they can reveal bugs that the other operations can not. Considering the fail operations, the
number of test scenarios increases to 48.
In summary, a model-based approach that reuses the current scripts of an existing test
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suite provides more flexibility to the test suite in the sense that a reordering in the execution
of test purposes leads to more and different test scenarios. However, the utility of a bigger
number of test scenarios depends greatly on the way the scripts and the framework are written.
In this model-based approach, also depending on the architecture of the framework and the
scripts, the report of errors can present inconsistencies.
A solution that provides even more flexibility (bigger number of test scenarios and finer-
control over the operations executed) and avoids inconsistencies is to include more details into
the models and rewrite the scripts into more fine-grained versions. However, there is a trade-
off between the flexibility and the complexity of the models and this deserves consideration.
While the task of modelling current scripts can be straightforward, the modelling of a system
in a more fine-grained style can demand more effort.
5.3 Vulnerability testing
Classical examples of vulnerabilities are present in web-based systems. The use of database
engines to perform user’s authentication, for example, leads sometimes to SQL injection
vulnerabilities. Users’ desire for dynamic content sometimes also leads to other injection
vulnerabilities such as cross-site scripting.
The present case study aims to exemplify the use of a model-based approach in system-
atically testing web-based applications to reveal the presence of (security) vulnerabilities. In
a first exercise, this case study focuses on two particular aspects:
• how a model can represent, in a general form, attacks engineered to exploit known
vulnerabilities, and
• how models are used to identify (successful) instances of attacks against modelled ap-
plications.
This first exercise executes over a login functionality (login page) implemented using a stan-
dard web page and a database (SQL engine) which actually performs the authentication.
In a second exercise, this case study focuses on how a model-based approach, systemat-
ically and in an automated fashion, carries on the testing of a web-based application using
105
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDIES
login(usr,pwd)
login(usr,pwd)
!authenticated
map(usr−−>pwd)
!map(usr−−>pwd)
authenticated
Figure 5.9: Behavioural model of a login functionality
previously identified attacks. In other words, this exercise focuses more on the execution of
the test cases than on the generation of attacks. The execution of test cases still requires the
generation of suitable sequences of actions that lead the system to a vulnerable state. The
test sequences considered in this exercise are executed against a web application that contains
pre-seeded vulnerabilities, called WebGoat‡.
5.3.1 A web based login function
Consider the login functionality of a web application modelled as in Figure 5.9. Assume that
there exists a set of user names and a bag of passwords. Assume that there exists also a
boolean function map(usr→pwd) that returns true if and only if there is a relation between
the user name and the password, and returns false otherwise. Abstractly this map is a total
function.
The specification shown in Figure 5.9 constitutes an abstract model for the login function-
ality. This specification is abstract because it does not define how the map is implemented
in the real system. It is true that the concept of maps has been implemented in most (if
not all) programming languages and due to this, maps can be created and maintained in
memory. However, it is also true that for various reasons, including persistence, performance
and security, the most popular implementation of login functionalities uses a database engine
in the back for verifying this mapping and the (web based) application communicates with
the database using SQL queries.
A common implementation of a login functionality can be modelled as shown in Fig-
‡http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP WebGoat Project
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login(!wf(usr),pwd)
login(!wf(usr),pwd)
login(wf(usr),pwd)
login(usr,pwd)
error
authenticated
!error
!authenticated
sqlmap(usr,pwd)
!sqlmap(usr,pwd)
sqlmap(usr,pwd)
Figure 5.10: Specification of the implemented application
ure 5.10. This implementation model has two extra transitions when compared with the
behavioural model. This is because the implementation model considers explicit transitions
that take ill-formed input parameters. The concept of ill-formed (and well-formed) input
parameters is introduced by the function sqlmap. The function sqlmap corresponds in the
implementation to the map function used in the behavioural model. A well-formed input
parameter is a parameter that does not include elements of an SQL query or resembles the
syntax of an SQL query.
In the abstract model well-formed and ill-formed input are handled in the same way and
the result of the login function only depends on the existence of the mapping usr → pwd.
However, in the implementation some ill-formed input will lead to an unspecified behaviour
of the SQL engine which in turn affects the result of the login function.
Another difference in comparison to the specification model is that the !authenticated state
presents two sub-states, error and !error. The map function in the specification model always
returns either a true or a false value. The sqlmap function with some specific ill-formed input
will return neither true nor false values but an error message. This behaviour is introduced
by the use of the SQL engine and is captured by the error state.
The model in Figure 5.10 is permissive in that it models an oversight by the programmer
in not taking care of the minimum recommended countermeasures against SQL injection
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attacks.
With the aim of testing a system for the presence of vulnerabilities in it, the behavioural
and implementation models of the system complement themselves with a model of the at-
tacker. In general, the model of the attacker identifies specifically a vulnerable transition in
the implementation model and the way it can be exploited. For the attacker, the transition
login(!wf(usr),pwd) in Figure 5.10, represents a set of data dependent transitions. That is,
the transition will end in an unsuccessful login attempt with some particular data parameters,
while it will end in a successful attempt with different data parameters. The model of the
the attacker shows which data will be used for this transition to end in a successful attack.
For practical purposes, models are specified using a pre- and post-condition approach.
They are represented using a declarative language [98] based on the Object Constraint Lan-
guage (OCL)[126]. This exercise shows two attack models written in this language, one where
the attacker aims to perform an unauthorised authentication, and a second one that aims to
force the system to disclose information about its structure.
The first attack, specified in Figure 5.11, defines an attack over the login operation. The
pre-condition defines the data to be used for the usr parameter. The post-condition specifies
that as a result of the login execution the system reaches the authenticated state.
operation: login
pre: usr ≡
[AZaz] ∗ (′) OR (\%20)∗
(1 = 1)|(′string′ =′ string′)(−−)
pwd ≡
[AZaz] ∗ (′) OR (\%20)∗
(1 = 1)|(′string′ =′ string′)(−−)
post: !map(usr → pwd) && authenticated == true
Figure 5.11: An authentication attack
The second attack, shown in Figure 5.12, shows an attacker whose intention is to force
the SQL engine running in the background to get into an error state. The SQL engine then
will return an error statement containing structural data that should not be disclosed. This
attack defines the use of the login operation with specific data for the usr parameter. The
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post-condition defines that the attacker learns the column name in which the usr data is
stored in the database.
operation: login
pre: usr ≡ ([AZaz]∗)(′)
pwd ≡ ([AZaz]∗)(′) |
≡ (′) or (1 = 1) order by 5(−−)|
post: error && columnname ∈ error message &&
update knowledge(columnname)
Figure 5.12: An information-disclosure attack
Consider that the pictorial representations in Figures 5.9 and 5.10 are written in the same
declarative language as the attacker model. With all the models defined in a uniform way,
proceed to generate test cases that will identify the presence of the vulnerable transitions in
a real implementation.
5.3.1.1 Test case generation
The generation of test cases is based in the combination of the three models, behavioural,
implementation and attacker models. Recall the definition of the faulty contexts presented in
Section 4.1. The models usually configure one of the three contexts described in that section.
The faulty contexts define, in their turn, how the models are combined for generating the tests.
For example, the case of the authentication attack configures the context in Figure 4.1(a) in
Section 4.1.
In the case of the authentication attack, the test generation process combines the models
into the predicate PreS ∧¬PreI ∧¬PostS ∧PreA∧PostA. The intuition behind this process
is that a modelled attack (PreA ∧ PostA) will be successful if the implementation does not
correctly handle parameters that are handled by the specification (PreS ∧¬PreI) and there-
fore does not behave as expected (¬PostS). A particular instance of this predicate derived
from the actual models is
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true ∧
¬ wf(usr) ∧
¬ ((map(usr → pwd) ∧ authenticated’=true) ∨ (¬ map(usr → pwd) ∧ authenticated’=true)) ∧
usr = “’ OR (1=1) – ” ∨ usr = “’ OR (1=1) – ” ∧
¬ map(usr → pwd) ∧ authenticated’ = true
This predicate differentiates between variables referenced in the pre- and post-conditions.
A variable v is denoted v′ if referenced in a post-condition. Then, v′ refers to the value of v
after the execution of the action (e.g., authenticated’ represents the state of the system after
the login operation).
The generation of a test case (or a set of them) reduces itself to the search for suitable
values for the variables in the previous predicates. The implementation of the model-based
framework for the present exercise uses a constraint solver module for finding this set of
values. The constraint solver, built following the approach of Constraint Handling Rules [45],
is based on previous work [98]. It implements internally the functions used in the predicates,
such as map and wf, and is able to reduce them to boolean values.
The attack performed in the second exercise (information disclosure) translates into the
predicate PreS ∧PostS ∧PostI ∧PreA∧PostA. This predicate represents the case where the
implementation maintains the behaviour of the abstract specification (PreS ∧ PostS). That
is, the input parameter !wf(usr) does not provide authentication. Thus, the implementation
is a correct refinement of the specification. However, the implementation presents a new
sub-state (PostI), an error state, that is used by the attacker as specified in the attack model
(PreA ∧ PostA). This case configures the context depicted by Figure 4.1(b) in Section 4.1.
A particular instance of this predicate combining concrete values for the context predicate is
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Table 5.5: Attacks that result in unauthorised authentication
usr pwd authenticated
“’ or 1=1 –” “admin” true
“’%20or%201=1%20–” “tester” true
“’ or ’x’=’x’ –” “’ or ’x’=’x’ –” true
“admin” “’ or 1=1 –” true
“tester” “’ or 1=1 –” true
“tester” “’ or ’x’=’x’ –” true
true ∧
(map(usr → pwd) ∧ authenticated = true) ∪ (¬ map(usr → pwd) ∧ authenticated = false) ∧
sql map(usr → pwd) = “error” ∧
error’ = true ∧ authenticated = false ∧
usr = “ user’ ” ∨ usr = “’ OR (1=1) order by – ” ∧
error’ = true ∧ update knowledge(columnname)
Similarly to the first one, this exercise uses a suitable constraint solver that generates
values for the variables in the predicate. These values are used as input parameters to
configure a successful attack in a vulnerable application. In this case, the constraint solver
includes an implementation of the sql map function. Modelling the responses of an SQL server
is not practical. Instead, the function sql map queries a real SQL server and returns suitable
responses to the constraint solver.
5.3.1.2 Results
The constraint solver used to implement the model-based approach for this case study gen-
erates 21 test cases for the authentication attack. Table 5.5 shows an snapshot of these test
cases. Note that the generated test cases use different ways of forcing the where clause of
an SQL query to be evaluated to true. As a result, the vulnerable system grants authenti-
cation to any user that provides the generated values as input parameters. The requirement
of an existing valid mapping between the user and password variables in the database is over
sighted by the application.
In the case of the information disclosure attack, 12 test cases are generated and a subset
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Table 5.6: Attacks that force an SQL engine error
usr pwd authenticated error
“user’ ” “user’ ” false Unexpected token: USER
in statement [user]
“user ” “user’ ” false Unexpected end of command
in statement [select . . .]
“admin” “’ or 1=1 order by 5 –” false Cannot be in ORDER BY clause
in statement [select . . .]
of them is shown in Table 5.6. The tests in this group conform to the specification in that
they do not provide authentication to (usr, pwd) pairs that are not related in the database.
However, they try different ways of forcing the SQL engine to fail and return an error message
containing useful information that will enhance the knowledge of the attacker and will be used
in future attacks. For example, the second and third attacks return the SQL query performed
by the web application. This query contains at least the name of the table where users and
passwords are stored and probably the name of the fields.
Note that in both cases the number of generated test cases depends on the test data
provided by the data generation model. In this exercise the attacker’s model contains a
suitable repository of attacks. This repository collects different attacks described in other
vulnerability databases such as the OWASP repository [97]. The constraint solver uses this
repository as a domain for the input parameters. Thus, in this particular case, the data
generation process is carried out as a lookup into the repository. Nevertheless, different
implementations of a data generator module provide different test data.
5.3.2 The WebGoat application
WebGoat is a deliberately insecure J2EE web application maintained by OWASP§ designed
to teach web application security lessons. A user can navigate through various lessons which
present information on how different vulnerabilities can be exploited and avoided. There
are also lab activities which are small modules that contain several kinds of real vulnera-
bilities such as SQL scripting and Cross-site scripting. Although it is primarily designed to
§Open Web Application Security Project
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be a teaching environment, WebGoat is also useful to show how a model-based approach
systematically automates the search for known vulnerabilities and also shows how to exploit
them.
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openLink(′LabSQL′)
,, GFED@ABCs1
openLink(′stage1′)
,,
openLink(′stage3′)
22
openLink(′StringInjection′)
''
GFED@ABCs2
loginFail(id,pwd)
 login(id,pwd)
,, GFED@ABCs4
logout()
ll
viewProfile(id)
,, GFED@ABCs5
listStaff(id)
ll
editProfile(id)
,,
BCD@GA
logout()
??
GFED@ABCs6
updateProfile(id)
ll
GFED@ABCs3 viewCC(usr) // GFED@ABCs7
Figure 5.13: Behavioural model for the WebGoat application.
Figure 5.13 shows an extract of the behavioural model for the WebGoat application. This
model shows the actual navigation that can be performed through the web interface of the
application. It also shows some actions that are performed as “lab activities” such as logging
into the web system of a company. For didactical purposes, the login functionality of the
system has been divided into two actions, login and loginFail. Although both are triggered
by the same mechanism, a button on the login web page, the loginFail action represents the
case where the input parameters id and pwd are incorrect and thus the user is not logged in.
Figure 5.14 shows the attacker model used in this exercise. This model represents the
assumptions and knowledge of a malicious user. In this case, the attacker knows (or assumes)
that the implementation is vulnerable in state s2. This vulnerability allows the attacker to
GFED@ABCs2
attackF ield(f,v)

attackURL(v)
,, GFED@ABCs4
attackURL(v)
**/.-,()*+
/.-,()*+
...
44jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
...
**TTT
TTT
TTT
TTT
TTT
TTT
TTT
T
GFED@ABCs3
attackF ield(f,v)
,,/.-,()*+
Figure 5.14: Attacker model for the WebGoat application. The attacker believes (or knows)
that he can replace the login(employee,password) function in the behavioural model by an
attack over the URL in the bar address (attackURL(v)).
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login using a particular set of input parameters that otherwise will make the login attempt
fail. The model represents this with the action attackField. The attacker also knows that if
the input is sanitised in the field box of the web page, the values can still be injected in the
URL via the address bar. This is represented in the model by action attackURL. In both
cases, in state s2, attackField and attackURL represent the execution of the loginFail action.
The attacker model also represents the assumption that in state s4, although there is no
field to be attacked, the http request generated by the viewProfile action can be tampered
with in the address bar to perform an attack. This is represented by action attackURL (with
a suitable attack string). Finally, the attacker model also shows that in state s3 the web
application presents a field that can be attacked.
As part of the attacker’s model, the attacker also knows which values for the parameters
employee and/or password will more likely lead the attack to success. Then, the attacker
defines a repository of values for these parameters so that the right values (for SQL injection
attacks) can be retrieved from it.
5.3.2.1 Test generation and execution
For this particular case, the implementation model is represented by the WebGoat applica-
tion itself. The main function of the implementation model is to show if and when there
are vulnerable states that can be exploited. The WebGoat application contains vulnerable
states and explicitly defines which they are. Moreover, by using an interactive (on-line) ap-
proach, the implemented testing framework generates one test case from the combination of
the behavioural and attacker models, and then verifies if this test succeeds against the real
implementation. This is done several times as needed and only tests that succeed against the
real implementation are considered to be attacks.
This exercise uses the SmartMBT as the implementation of the model-based framework
presented on this thesis. Then, for this exercise the models are directly written as first
order logic structures instead of the OCL-based language. Additionally, the Prolog engine
implements the constraint solver used to identify suitable attack transitions. In Figure 5.15
this work presents an extract of the Prolog code that defines the model of the attacker for
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params(attackURL(AttackString)):-
member(AttackString,
[’&amp;action=login&amp;employee_id=112&amp;password=x\’ or \’1\’=\’1’,
’&amp;action=login&amp;employee id=101&amp;password=x\’ or \’1\’=\’1’],
’&amp;action=viewProfile&amp;employee_id=101 or 1=1 ORDER BY salary DESC’]).
transition(attackURL(AttackString)) :-
getv(currentpage,Currentpage),
getv(strSQLCompleted,StrSQLCompleted),
getv(result,Result),
(Currentpage = ’stage1’,
Currentpage = ’loggedin’),
_Result = ’’,
setv(strSQLCompleted,_StrSQLCompleted),
setv(currentpage,_Currentpage),
setv(result,_Result).
?-init_method_weight(attackURL,1).
Figure 5.15: AttackURL action of the attacker’s model
the SmartMBT tool.
In the code shown in Figure 5.15, the section params defines the strings that can be used as
input parameters for the attackURL action. Inside the transition section this code defines
that this attack will be performed when the WebGoat application is in the page labelled as
’stage1’ and that as a result the attacker expects to reach the ’loggedin’ page.
The test generation (an execution) process in the framework uses the interactive approach
of SmartMBT to generate a test sequence. Both models, behavioural and attacker models, are
translated to the Prolog language and provided as input to the SmartMBT tool. An additional
action initialise is included into the Prolog code so that it brings the models to their initial
state. The generated sequence contains actions that perform different SQL injection attacks
over the WebGoat application. The test generation is summarised as follows:
• Execute action initialise to start the test;
• Execute actions openLink(’Lab SQL’) and openLink(’stage1’) from the behavioural
115
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDIES
model;
• given that we are in the “vulnerable” state s1, execute action attackURL with the second
string shown in the Prolog code as parameter. This execution succeeds authenticating
the attacker as the admin user (employee with Id 101);
• follow the transition logout in the behavioural model;
• open a different activity by executing action openLink(’stage3’), which leads to state
s1;
• login as an employee different from the administrator (repeat the previous attack with
a different employee id);
• in the new vulnerable state s3 switch to the attack model and execute the action attack-
URL (with a suitable parameter) in replacement of viewprofile which leads to disclose
the profile of the first employee in the database’s table;
• open a third activity executing action openLink(’String Injection’);
• in state s2 execute the action attackField with the string smith’ or ’x’=’x’ ; and
• the list of credit card numbers for all employees (users) is disclosed.
The generated sequence contains three attacks which have been executed successfully
against the WebGoat application. Each action is executed by a script in the Adaptor module
of the tool. These scripts are written in Watij (a Java port of the Watir - Web applications
testing in Ruby) because they need to control the web browser in an automated fashion.
The implementation of the Adaptor module also uses the JUnit framework to manage the
execution of the test cases. Figure 5.16 shows the result of the execution of the last step in
the test sequence, a successful disclosure of credit card numbers.
5.3.3 Discussion
One of the main advantages of using models to generate tests for security vulnerabilities
in web based systems is that the models allow one to specify precisely all conditions and
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Figure 5.16: Credit card numbers disclosed by an SQL injection attack
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assumptions under which the testing is performed. Implementation models represent the
specific characteristics that make an application vulnerable. Attacker models not only specify
the data parameters that trigger the exploitation of an existent vulnerability but also the
system interface (usually an action or operation) used to perform the exploit. This provides
finer control over the test generation in the sense that for different operations, different sets
of data parameters can be specified and linked to different sets of variables in the application.
Ultimately, test cases generated from these models will reveal vulnerabilities that present
the modelled characteristics and that are exploited as specified, and will not provide any
guarantee otherwise.
The present study included cases of multiple step attacks. That is, attacks that were
performed over two or more actions in a predefined order. Automated scripts can execute
such kind of attacks. However, the use of models provides additional flexibility. A sequence
of actions composing an attack can be included as a subset of a longer generated sequence
of actions provided that the first sequence triggers the same transitions as specified into the
attack model. This characteristic of model-driven test generation leads to disguise attack
signatures. Disguised attacks can reach the applications even when (other) network level
defences have been put in place.
Although not explicitly reported in the description of this case study, the experience
obtained by performing it suggests that the use of models in this testing context reduces the
time of test execution. Executing tests against a web based SUT requires time to connect to
the web application, request the execution of the test and interpret the results. When a GUI
(a web browser rendering the web pages) is used to access the application’s functionalities,
the execution time is noticeable. Thus, executing attacks that can be flagged a priori as
unsuccessful wastes execution time. Implementation models allow the tester to filter a set
of defined attacks. These models identify those attacks that will be successful under the
conditions and assumptions specified by the models, thus reducing the time and effort of
executing tests already known as being unsuccessful.
In summary, there exist different sources that define known vulnerabilities and how to
exploit (attack) them. These vulnerabilities and their associated attacks can be represented
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as LTS models. General attack models can be derived from vulnerability repositories and can
be made more specific, thus defining which operations (actions) they are applied against in
a modelled application. The way models are combined into the present testing framework
reduces the time for the execution of a test suite if there exist test cases that will not lead
to successful attacks. Finally, model driven test generation can increase the probability of an
attack being successful even if network level defences are in place.
5.4 Privacy testing
The present case study focuses on showing how a model-based approach can be applied to
test and verify that a given implementation does comply with a predefined privacy policy.
This study is composed of two exercises. The first exercise focuses on web browsing privacy,
more specifically, it models a policy known of as the same origin policy which defines how the
privacy of web browsers’ users should be protected. In the second exercise, this study focuses
on the handling of conflicting rules in the privacy policy and the handling of obligations in a
particular rule. This second exercise focuses on the modelling and the generation processes.
5.4.1 Web browsing privacy: the same origin policy
The same origin policy is a privacy principle included in most web browsers that allows cookies
and Javascript from different sites to coexist without disturbing each other. Jackson et al.
[66] show that this principle had not been applied to other features like the caching and the
history features and that the lack of its implementation enabled tracking the user behaviour
without consent.
In the case of the caching feature, Jackson et al. [66] consider that there is a site A to
which a user provides information. Then, there is a malicious site B that intends to access
such information. They suggest that B can gain access to the information by embedding site
A. In other words, B creates a framed page and leads the user to open A inside one of the
frames. The host of site B becomes the top level domain because it “owns” the framed page.
If site A was cached before, the web browser will use the cached information to display the
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content. Then, site B gains access to the cached information. Thus, the same-origin policy for
this feature states that “if the same site embeds a previously cached content, it is appropriate
to allow the existing cached content to be used”. It also states “if a different site embeds the
same content, the existing cached content may not be used”.
In the case of the history feature, Jackson et al. consider that there is a malicious site A
that intends to know which sites a user has visited before. With this aim, site A includes links
to other sites, such as site B. When site A is displayed, it observes features of its links such
as the font colour. Then, if the link to site B has a different colour, A knows that B has been
visited before. In summary, site A forces the web browser to use the history feature by adding
links to other sites. For this scenario, the same origin policy describes two conditions, that
is, “a hyper link located on page A and pointing at a visited page B would appear unvisited
unless both of the following conditions are met:
• The site of page A is permitted to maintain a persistent state, and
• page A and page B are part of the same site, or the user has previously visited the exact
URL of page B when the referrer was a page from site A.”
5.4.1.1 Privacy model
The central element of the framework in the privacy testing domain is the privacy policy.
However, the policy description presented before in natural language provides not much help
if the intention is to generate data in an automated way. Even if the generation of data is
performed manually, natural language descriptions can lead to errors. Therefore, the policy
needs to be described into a more structured way like it is defined in Section 4.2.
Before describing the privacy policy in the framework’s privacy modelling language, it is
important to be aware of the following considerations. The same origin policy considered in
this case study is linked to the use of caching and history features of the web browser. Assume
actions getCached and markVisited that are executed by the web browser when it uses its
cache and history respectively. The rules in the privacy policy refer then to the execution of
these actions. These actions are executed over a single data category, called URLCat.
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Data elements in the URLCat category are URLs. A URL designates the address of a
web page on the internet and gives access to the contents of such a web page. Any web
page address contains a host and a path, e.g., mysite.com/pubs/mydoc.html is an address, the
host is mysite.com and the path is pubs/mydoc.html. Consider the function host(URL) that
returns the host of a given URL.
The user categories in the privacy rule define who can (or cannot) get access to a data
element using the action referred to by the rule. In this study, there are two user categories.
Consider Embed-host a category that represents the top-level domain of a framed web page
that is currently displayed by the web browser. Consider also Ref-host a category that
represents the host of a page that contains links to other pages.
Finally, consider that the web browser has a repository cache that stores cached urls
and their top level domain (tld), and a repository history that stores previously visited
urls and the URL that referred to them (ref). Assume functions inCache(url,tld) and
inHistory(url,ref) that return a Boolean value true if the respective record in the repository
exists, and otherwise return false.
Consider the same origin policy defined in Table 5.7. This description is more structured
than a natural language representation and follows the definitions presented in Section 4.2.
Table 5.7: Rules for the same-origin policy. Rule 1 refers to the caching feature. Rule 2 refers
to the history feature.
O
rule ρ a d ag c β δ υ
1 deny getCached URLCat Embed-host inCache(url,tld) ∧ - - -
tld 6= nil ∧
(embed-host 6= tld)
2 deny markVisited URLCat Ref-host inHistory(url,ref) ∧ - - -
ref-host 6= host(url) ∧
ref-host 6= host(ref)
5.4.1.2 Behavioural model
The same origin policy refers to privacy issues in the use of a web browser. Consider the
behavioural model of a web browser depicted in Figure 5.17. Note that to reduce the com-
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plexity of the graphical representation of the model, it uses actions with variables as param-
eters. Given a set of values X known of as the domain of a variable var, action a(var) is
an abbreviation for all actions a(x) such that x is a value in X. In this case study x is an
instance of var and, extensively, a(x) is an instance of a(var).
The model in Figure 5.17 shows that the main behaviour of a web browser is to visit
different websites. It also shows that (at least) three ways of visiting (or opening) a website are
available to users. These three options are represented by actions open(url), link(url,ref)
and frame(url,tld,ref). Action open refers to the opening of a web page by writing its
address in the address bar. Action link refers to the opening of a page in the top window by
clicking on a link. Finally, action frame refers to the opening of a page inside a frame of the
current page by clicking a link. For all three actions, instances of the variable url designate
the address of a web page. When executing action link, instances of url refer to the address
of the linked web page while instances of ref refer to the address of the current web page. In
the case of action frame, instances of url and ref have the same role as in action link and
instances of tld refer to the host of the current framed page, the current top-level domain.
GFED@ABCq2
link(URL,REF )



open(URL)
vv
frame(URL,TLD,REF )

GFED@ABCq0 open(URL) //GFED@ABCq1
open(URL)
EE
link(URL,REF )
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frame(URL,TLD,REF )
""GFED@ABCq3
frame(URL,TLD,REF )
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link(URL,REF )
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open(URL)
bb
Figure 5.17: Behavioural model of a web browser
A web browser that implements these operations without using a cache, this is, that always
communicates with an external server in order to get a web page, will always comply with the
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same origin policy. In the same way, a web browser that does not include the history feature,
and thus does not show links of already visited pages in different colours or fonts, will never
have problems with the same origin policy. However, as they are desirable features for users,
they are widely implemented.
The caching and history features of a web browser are modelled as two repositories cache
and history respectively. The open, link and frame actions use and modify these repositories
in slightly different ways. To explain how these actions work internally, consider the state
transitions abstractly depicted in Figure 5.18.
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(a) Internal workings of open(URL) function
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(c) Internal workings of frame(URL,TLD,REF) function
Figure 5.18: Implementation details of caching and history features
For all three actions, whenever a user tries to open a web page, the browser gets it from the
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cache repository if possible, otherwise, it gets it from the server and updates the repositories.
A web page may contain links to other pages. The markVisited( lurl) action “marks” a link
to lurl as visited if it appears into the history repository.
When updating repositories, action open inserts a record (url,nil) into the cache repos-
itory. The special value nil indicates that the contents of url are cached without being
linked to any top-level domain. Similarly, open inserts the record (url,nil) in the history,
meaning that url is visited without any referral. In the case of the link function, the record
(url,nil) is inserted in the cache, but a record (url,ref) is inserted into the history, meaning
that url is being visited from a link contained in ref. Finally, in the case of the frame
function a record (url,tld) is inserted into the cache meaning that the content of url is
being cached under the domain of tld. A record (url,ref) is inserted into the history with
the same meaning as in link.
5.4.1.3 Linking privacy and behavioural models
Rules on a privacy policy complement the behavioural model in order to describe privacy
properties of the system. These rules refer to the execution of actions in the system’s model.
However, notice that the action getCached(url) that appears in rule 1 of Table 5.7 does
not appear explicitly in the model (Figure 5.17). Nevertheless, this action is executed when
actions open, frame and link are executed and the browser has the required content in its
cache. For practical purposes, these actions replace getCached in the privacy rule generating
three rules as shown in Table 5.8.
Similarly to the case of rule 1, rule 2 of Table 5.7 refers to an action that is not explicitly
defined in the model. However, action markVisited is executed whenever actions open, link
and frame are executed. Therefore, rule 2 translates into the three rules shown in Table 5.9.
These new privacy rules are linked explicitly to the actions defined in the behavioural
model. Hereafter this study refers mainly to these privacy rules but always still considering
the rule that originated them. These rules include conditions expressed as logical predicates
over variables. To be able to evaluate such conditions, values must be assigned to these
variables. The next section discusses how data is generated for these variables.
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Table 5.8: Rules for the caching feature in the same origin policy.
O
rule ρ a d ag c β δ υ
r1 deny open URLCat Embed-host inCache(url,tld) ∧ - - -
tld 6= nil ∧
(embed-host 6= tld)
r2 deny link URLCat Embed-host inCache(url,tld) ∧ - - -
tld 6= nil ∧
(embed-host 6= tld)
r3 deny frame URLCat Embed-host inCache(url,tld) ∧ - - -
tld 6= nil ∧
(embed-host 6= tld)
Table 5.9: Rules for the history feature in the same origin policy.
O
rule ρ a d ag c β δ υ
r4 deny open URLCat Ref-host inHistory(url,ref) ∧ - - -
ref-host 6= host(url) ∧
ref-host 6= host(ref)
r5 deny link URLCat Ref-host inHistory(url,ref) ∧ - - -
ref-host 6= host(url) ∧
ref-host 6= host(ref)
r6 deny frame URLCat Ref-host inHistory(url,ref) ∧ - - -
ref-host 6= host(url) ∧
ref-host 6= host(ref)
5.4.1.4 Data generation model
The previous sections describe how a web browser works in general and how it is modelled.
That description uses variables to refer to the URLs of the web pages opened by the web
browser, and to their hosts. However, without concrete values for these variables the model or
any derived behaviour is not able to show compliance to the policy. Thus, the test generation
process needs to define a domain of values for the URL variables. This is not as easy as it
seems. The web page referred to by a URL can link to others in different ways, i.e., forcing the
browser to use the link or the frame operations to open them. Then, the domain definition
needs to describe not only the URLs but also how these URLs are linked.
Consider the scenario depicted in Figure 5.19. In this scenario the variable url is replaced
by the following instances:
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Figure 5.19: URL instances and their links
• one.pps/url1.html – (url1)
• two.pps/url2.php – (url2)
• three.pps/url3.html – (url3)
• four.pps/url4.php – (url4)
the short names (in bold) for each instance hereafter replace the complete URL to enhance
readability.
Figure 5.19 shows how the url instances are related one to another. An edge between
two urls (url and url ′) represents an html link in url pointing to url ′. The label of the edge
indicates which action of the behavioural model is used to open url ′.
The defined url instances also replace the variable ref when needed. Additionally,
instances of host(url) replace the variable tld when it is required.
In Figure 5.20, this study shows a suitable set of grammars used in the data generation
process. Action frame, for example, can be executed only with “url2” as its url parameter.
This reflects the fact that the pages that contain frames have links only to the “url2” page
(see Figure 5.19). Similarly, every page has at least one link to open another page in the top
window. However, if the current page cp is “url1” this link points to “url2” while if cp is
“url2” this link points to “url4”.
In the grammar corresponding to the open action, the guard predicates use the function
inHistory() with the intention of forcing the test generation process to exercise the links
included in different web pages. For example, inHistory(X,’two.pps/url2.php’) returns true if
there is a page X that was visited using a link from “url2”. If there is not such a page, then
the grammar generates “url2” as the value for open. This in its turn enables the link link in
“url2”. If the page X exists, then at least one link in “url2” has been used and the grammar
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does not generate this value, enhancing the probability of another value being generated.
Note than in the grammars, an empty guard condition [ ] is always evaluated to true and
the notation [;] is translated to no operation.
5.4.1.5 Test generation
In the previously described scenario with the defined concrete values for the variables, the
test generation process produces a set of test cases by applying the algorithm presented in
Section 4.2.2. Note that in the following, whenever the notation action(var) appears, it
actually refers to an instance of the action. Extensively, a reference to state q refers to an
instance qi of q.
The first step is to select the privacy rule to be tested. Select first the rules that test the
caching feature, rules r1, r2 and r3 from the policy in Table 5.8. Then calculate all exceptions
to these rules by using the difference operation over rules defined in Section 4.2.1.2. The
resulting rules are exactly the same rules r1, r2 and r3. None of them is in conflict with each
other because they refer to different actions.
Then, for each rule ri, the disjoint partitions in the condition c define the number of test
cases required to test each rule. In this case, only one test case is needed. Then, for each one
of the rules in Table 5.8, that is, for each action ai in the model, the test generation process
identifies the states q for which q
ai→ q′ holds. For example, action open is available in states
q1, q2 and q3. The same applies to actions link and frame. Therefore, each action requires
to be tested in three different states. Notice that the predicate tld 6= nil in the condition
guides the string selection by requiring it to have at least one frame action into it.
Consider the strings in Table 5.10 produced by the generation algorithm. For each action
considered in the rules and for each state (in column qF ) in which this action is available there
is one string that reaches this state. Strings w6 and w9 are exceptions because, in the current
scenario, there are no strings that lead to q3 and then execute the frame action. Then, for
all strings but w6 and w9, concatenate action a to the string to obtain the final string that
characterises the behaviour included in the test case.
From the generated strings, there is no guarantee on which action the browser internally
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[ ] [;] Sopen → URL
[!inHistory(X,
"one.pps/url1.html")]
[cp’="one.pps/
url1.html"]
URL→ "one.pps/url1.html"
[!inHistory(X,
"two.pps/url2.php")]
[cp’="two.pps/
url2.php"]
URL→ "two.pps/url2.php"
[!inHistory(X,
"three.pps/url3.html")]
[cp’="three.pps/
url3.html"]
URL→ "three.pps/url3.html"
[!inHistory(X,
"four.pps/url4.php")]
[cp’="four.pps/
url4.php"]
URL→ "four.pps/url4.php"
[ ] [;] Slink → URL REF
[cp="one.pps/url1.html"] [cp’="two.pps/
url2.php"]
URL→ "two.pps/url2.php"
[cp="two.pps/url2.php"] [cp’="four.pps/
url4.php"]
URL→ "four.pps/url4.php"
[cp="three.pps/url3.html"][cp’="four.pps/
url4.php"]
URL→ "four.pps/url4.php"
[cp="four.pps/url4.php"] [cp’="one.pps/
url1.html"]
URL→ "one.pps/url1.html"
[cp 6= ""] [;] REF → cp
[ ] [;] Sframe → URL TLD REF
[cp="one.pps/url1.html"] [cp’="two.pps/
url2.php"]
URL→ "two.pps/url2.php"
[cp="three.pps/url3.html"][cp’="two.pps/
url2.php"]
URL→ "two.pps/url2.php"
[cp 6= "" and ctld 6= ""] [ctld’=cp] TLD→ ctld
[cp 6= ""] [;] REF→ cp
Figure 5.20: Data generation grammars for same origin policy testing
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Table 5.10: Sequences of actions for testing the caching feature
String qF a
w1 open(url1) frame(url2) open(url4) q1 open(url2)
w2 open(url1) frame(url2) open(url4) link(url1) q2 open(url2)
w3 open(url3) frame(url2) q3 open(url2)
w4 open(url1) frame(url2) open(url3) q1 frame(url2)
w5 open(url3) frame(url2) link(url4) link(url1) q2 frame(url2)
w6 q3
w7 open(url3) frame(url2) open(url1) q1 link(url2)
w8 open(url3) frame(url2) link(url4) link(url1) q2 link(url2)
w9 q3
Table 5.11: Test cases for the history rule
Test string Oracle predicate
w1 gotCached(q1) = false
w2 gotCached(q1) = false
w3 gotCached(q1) = false
w4 gotCached(q3) = false
w5 gotCached(q3) = false
w7 gotCached(q2) = false
w8 gotCached(q2) = false
executes when displaying the content of a web page. In other words, for each action, the
web browser can choose to show a cached web page (if possible) or to get the page from the
server. The rules for the caching feature only forbid an action when it displays a cached
page, thus the oracle has to discern between a cached page and a server page. Consider the
boolean function gotCached(q) that returns true if the content of current page in the state
q was retrieved from the cache, and false otherwise. Then, in order to determine the verdict
of the test case, the oracle predicates are defined as shown in Table 5.11. This finalises the
generation of test cases for the caching feature.
Now, select the rules for the history feature (rules r4, r5 and r6 in Table 5.9). These
rule were generated from action markVisited, different from action getCached that generated
the first rules, thus they do not present any conflict with the previous rules. The difference
operation between rules does not modify them. For each one of these rules, there is only one
disjoint partition in its condition c. Therefore, one test case is needed for each state in which
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the actions referred to by the rules are enabled. The three actions are enabled in the three
states q1, q2 and q3. Thus, a set of nine test cases is required to test all the combinations.
Consider the strings in Table 5.12 produced by the generation algorithm. For each action
considered in the rules and for each state (in column qF ) in which this action is available there
is one string that reaches this state. String w18 is an exception because it requires two frame
operations executed in sequence and the current scenario does not consider that possibility.
Then, concatenate action a to the string to obtain the final string that characterises the
behaviour included in the test case.
Table 5.12: Sequences of actions for testing the history feature
String qF a
w10 open(url1) frame(url2) open(url2) q1 open(url4)
w11 open(url1) open(url3) frame(url2) open(url4) q1 link(url1)
w12 open(url3) frame(url2) link(url4) open(url1) q1 frame(url2)
w13 open(url3) open(url1) link(url2) q2 open(url3)
w14 open(url3) frame(url2) open(url4) link(url1) q2 link(url2)
w15 open(url1) frame(url2) open(url3) link(url4) link(url1) q2 frame(url2)
w16 open(url3) frame(url2) q3 open(url3)
w17 open(url1) open(url3) frame(url2) q3 link(url4)
w18 q3
Similarly to the rules for the caching feature, the rules in Table 5.9 do not forbid the
execution of actions open, link and cache in general but the execution of a particular instance
that internally executes markVisited over a defined URL value. The oracle predicate must
determine if the forbidden action markVisited was executed over a defined url.
Consider the boolean function shownVisited(url) that examines the page currently dis-
played by the web browser and returns true if the given url is shown as visited before
and false otherwise. The oracle is defined by the predicate shownVisited(url) = false for
appropriate instances of url as shown in Table 5.13.
5.4.1.6 Test execution
In this phase the model-based framework executes the generated tests against different web
browsers to verify compliance of the latter with the same origin policy. Consider only two web
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Table 5.13: Test cases for the history rule
Test string Oracle predicate
w10 shownVisited(url1) = false
w11 shownVisited(url2) = false
w12 shownVisited(url4) = false
w13 shownVisited(url2) = false
w14 shownVisited(url4) = false
w15 shownVisited(url4) = false
w16 shownVisited(url2) = false
w17 shownVisited(url1) = false
browsers, Internet Explorer and Firefox. This test execution considers only these browsers
because libraries to build the Adaptor and the scripts to automate the execution of test cases
against those browsers already exist. Watir (as well as Watij) and FireWatir are libraries that
provide scripting control over the behaviour of Internet Explorer and Firefox browsers.
Table 5.14 shows the verdicts produced after the execution of the generated test cases.
Internet Explorer fails on test cases tc1, tc2 and tc3 because it shows a cached web page when
the open(url2) action executes after the frame(url2) action opened the url2 web page from a
(different) TLD instance, url1 and url3.
The suite of generated test cases is able to reveal differences between Internet Explorer
and Mozilla implementations. It probably follows from different interpretations of the policy.
Nevertheless, this fact shows the utility of the generated suite for testing conformance to the
policy and, therefore, shows the utility of the testing framework.
Both browsers fail the test cases for the history feature (tc10 to tc17). This indicates that
both implementations do not comply with the modelled policy. However, it can also indicate
an error in the model, that is, that the model does not specify correctly the policy. This is
not the case in our study. The privacy model was reviewed and the browsers were subjected
to further tests that confirmed the non-compliance with the policy.
5.4.2 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act policy
In this exercise the focus is to show how test cases are generated from a modelled privacy policy
that contains obligations. The process of executing the generated test cases is similar to the
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Table 5.14: Verdicts from the execution of test cases for the same origin policy
Test case Internet Explorer Firefox
tc1 fail pass
tc2 fail pass
tc3 fail pass
tc4 pass pass
tc5 pass pass
tc6 pass pass
tc7 pass pass
tc8 pass pass
tc9 pass pass
tc10 fail fail
tc11 fail fail
tc12 fail fail
tc13 fail fail
tc14 fail fail
tc15 fail fail
tc16 fail fail
tc17 fail fail
ones described in previous exercises, therefore it is not detailed here. For this exercise, consider
a web application that subscribes users for a service. To register a new user the application
collects certain information about the user. The collection and handling of information in
web applications is regulated by different policies and laws. In principle, this application
has been designed to comply with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (available at
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/coppa1.htm) (known as the COPPA policy) that states certain
restrictions to the collection of information about children not older than 13 years.
5.4.2.1 Privacy model
The COPPA policy applies to a website operator that pretends to collect individually identi-
fiable information about a child (a user who is aged less than 13). Table 5.15 shows two rules
extracted from this policy.
• Rule 1 states that the website operator can collect contact information of the parents of
a person aged less than 13 with the sole purpose of requesting parental consent provided
that this information is deleted if consent is denied or no consent is granted after some
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reasonable waiting time.
• Rule 2 states that the website operator cannot collect a child’s protected information
unless it has previously received consent from a parent.
Table 5.15: Privacy rules in the COPPA policy
O
rule ρ a d ag c β δ υ
1 allow collect Contact Website age < 13 ∧ delete Contact deny-aut ∨
parent-aut 6= denied req-time-out
2 deny collect Protected Website age < 13 ∧ - - -
parent-aut 6= granted
Among the data categories defined by the policy, two are of interest for this study, the
Contact category and the Protected category, where Contact < Protected. Additionally, this
study considers a unique user category in the policy, the Website category.
5.4.2.2 Behavioural model
Part of the web application that this exercise studies is modelled in Figure 5.21. This model
shows the functionalities that are of interest for testing compliance to the COPPA policy.
These functionalities are intended to comply with the policy, however, for test case generation
purposes, this model also contains some transitions that violate the policy when executed
(marked as arriving to a fail state). An application that implements those actions is not
complaint with the policy.
The model in Figure 5.21 is described in an abstract way to increase readability. In this
model, q
a(var)
→ q′ is an abbreviation for qi
a(val)
→ q′i for all suitable values val that can be
assigned to var. Moreover, an abstract state q in this model represents a set of states qi. We
write qi to refer to a particular instance of state q.
In the application’s model, the action signIn represents a user starting the interaction
with the application. The user provides a user identification and age into variables user and
age respectively. This action with the variable user as a parameter defines a session. In other
words, the system deals with several users and for each user it keeps a record with the proper
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ONMLHIJKfail
GFED@ABCq0 signIn(user,age) //
signIn(user,age)
""F
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
F
@GF ECD
signIn(usr,age)
GFED@ABCq1 collect(contact) //
collect(protected)
OO
GFED@ABCq2 sendAutReq //GFED@ABCq4 setAut(′denied′)//
setAut(′granted′)
ss
GFED@ABCq6 delete(contact) //GFED@ABCq7
collect(protected)
GFED@ABCq3
collect(protected)
//GFED@ABCq5 ONMLHIJKfail
Figure 5.21: Model of a web application that subscribes users for a service.
variables to hold users’ information. However, the policy considers the system is dealing with
one and only one user at a time, that is, the policy considers that the system has only one
set of variables, e.g., one variable age and one variable parent-aut. Then, the role of the
variable user is to set the system to use only one from its set of records. Variables contact
and protected are records such that Contact(contact) and Protected(protected) hold. Finally,
this study assumes that the web application stores the data it collects in a repository called
database and there exists a function database(u) that returns a set of the data collected for
the particular user u.
Transitions in the abstract representation of the system appear to be non-deterministic.
This non-determinism is solved using (state) variables age and parent-aut. Action signIn
receives age as a parameter and retrieves internally the value of parent-aut associated with
the value of user received as a parameter. The model shows that after executing signIn the
system’s state is
• q1 if the user’s age is less than 13 and has no previous record of parent-aut,
• q3 if either the user’s age is greater than 13 or it is less than 13 and has a granted
parent-aut,
• q7 if the user’s age is less than 13 and has a denied parent-aut.
For test generation purposes, actions in the model map to actions in the policy. Sometimes,
like in the case of collect and delete actions, this mapping is done by name matching. However,
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there are other cases when an explicit mapping relation needs to be defined. In the present
study, action deny-aut in the policy has no direct mapping to the model. Thus, an explicit
mapping is declared between deny-aut in the policy and set-aut(denied) in the model.
5.4.2.3 Data generation model
An abstract behavioural model is not enough for real systems testing. The test generation in
this framework is performed over more specific model transitions. Thus, the testing framework
requires the definition of a test scenario for this study. In plain words a scenario refers to the
proper instantiation of variables in the abstract model to generate the actual system model.
Consider a testing scenario with four users, Alice, Bob, Charles, and Denis. Each user
defines its own record of variables {age, parent-aut}, as Alice={10, denied}, Bob={20, nil},
Charles={12, nil}, and Denis={11, granted}. Those records are pre-defined taking into ac-
count the conditions in the privacy rule so that each condition can be exercised at least once.
Note that there are no limits on the number of users and a larger set of them could be used.
However, these four users are enough to generate the test cases.
Then, the framework defines how the user and its associated values are chosen for each test
case being generated. The user value for a particular test case depends on which condition
from the current privacy rule needs to be exercised. Thus, consider global variables reqAut
and reqAge which are updated by the framework when a privacy rule is selected for testing.
Consider also global variable cUser which records the current user and is updated the first
time the value for user is generated. The generation of values is guided by the grammars in
Figure 5.22.
The condition [reqAut6=’’] in the grammar for action setAut always denies authorisation
requests for new users. This is because this study focuses on exploring test cases where the
privacy policy is applied and disregards general functional test cases.
5.4.2.4 Test generation
To generate test cases for this study, in the first place, take rule 1 from the list of rules in
Table 5.15. Calculate the rule r by subtracting all previously processed rules, which results
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[ ] [;] SsignIn → USER AGE
[reqAut=’denied’ and reqAge=’<13’] [cUser=’Alice’] USER → ’Alice’
[reqAge=’>13’] [cUser=’Bob’] USER → ’Bob’
[reqAut=’’ and reqAge=’<13’] [cUser=’Charles’] USER → ’Charles’
[reqAut=’granted’ and reqAge=’<13’] [cUser=’Denis’] USER → ’Denis’
[cUser=’Alice’] [;] AGE → 10
[cUser=’Bob’] [;] AGE → 20
[cUser=’Charles’] [;] AGE → 12
[cUser=’Denis’] [;] AGE → 11
[ ] [;] SsetAut → AUT
[reqAut6=’’] [;] AUT → ’granted’
[reqAut=’’] [;] URL → ’denied’
Figure 5.22: Data generation grammars for COPPA policy testing
in the same rule 1. Then, select state q1 from which rule r is applicable. Note that r would
be applicable also in q3 because of the collect action. However, age > 13 holds in q3 and this
contradicts the condition c making r not applicable. Thus, string w1 = signIn(’Charles’,12)
that reaches q1 is generated.
Given that r has a ruling ρ = allow and there is an obligation (O 6= nil), generate a string
wp = sendAutReq and append it to w1. This string enables action υ = setAut(’denied’). To
verify that the obligation is fulfilled generate the predicate p = contact /∈ database(’Charles’)
that must hold in the state after the execution of action β = delete(contact). Then, the
test case is generated and added to the test suite. The test string for this test case is
signIn(’Charles’,12) collect(contact) sendAutReq setAut(’denied’). The behaviour charac-
terised by this string starts at state q0 and ends in state q7 where the oracle predicate “contact
/∈ database(user3)” must hold.
Next, for rule 2 in Table 5.15, calculate the exceptions set by the first rule. In this case,
the rule r gets the d and c fields updated. The resulting rule is shown in Table 5.16.
Then, select states from which r is applicable. States q1 and q7 meet that condition. Note
that state q1 has an additional transition with action collect and q3 also has one, however,
¬Contact(contact) does not hold in q1 for this second collect transition and condition c does
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Table 5.16: Rule generated from the difference of rules rule2− rule1 in Table 5.15
O
rule ρ a d ag c β δ υ
r deny collect Protected ∧ Website age < 13 ∧ parent-aut = denied ∨ - - -
¬ Contact age < 13 ∧ parent-aut = nil
not hold in q3, therefore they are not considered. Table 5.17 shows the generated strings that
reach states q1 and q7, together with the forbidden action and the oracle for the test cases.
The oracle uses the boolean function fail() that indicates if the system has reached the fail
state.
Table 5.17: Generated strings for COPPA policy
String Denied action Oracle
w2 signIn(’Alice’,10) collect(protected) fail()=false
w3 signIn(’Charles’,12) collect(protected) fail()=false
collect(contact)
sendAutReq()
setAut(’denied’)
delete(contact)
5.4.3 Discussion
The present study focuses on testing compliance with a defined privacy policy. A privacy rule
specifies if a defined operation is allowed to be executed or not under a specified condition. The
generation of a test sequence that exercises this rule is comparable to the reachability problem.
The separation between behavioural, privacy and data models enables the framework to deal
with this problem in a tractable way. Firstly, privacy models define explicitly operations that
need to be tested. Conditions in the privacy models also restrict the size of the set of variables
that need to be considered, reducing in practical terms the size and complexity of the other
models. In the second instance, backward and forward search techniques over the behavioural
model are used to generate the paths that lead to the execution of the operations defined in
the privacy models. Finally, data values can be added to the data model dynamically as the
behavioural model drives the exploration of the system.
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This study also showed the importance of data models in the generation of concrete test
cases. First of all, the behaviour of the system depends on the history of previously selected
(or generated) data values, e.g., in the first exercise, pages selected to be opened will be
included into the history repository and cached. This means that the definition of the data
model restricts the number of enabled actions and behaviours which in its turn impacts the
effectiveness of the test generation process. For example, in the first exercise of the study, the
grammars defined to generate data did not contemplate, on purpose, cases where two links
had to be opened inside a frame consecutively. Therefore, the testing framework generated
and executed fifteen (15) test cases out of eighteen (18) required combinations of states and
actions.
The predicates in the rules of the data generation models are used in this study to
represent searching heuristics. Consider, for example, the grammars in Figure 5.20 where
the condition [!inHistory(X,"one.pps/url1.html")] restricts the selection of the value
"one.pps/url1.html". The first time this value is selected, it is recorded in the history
respository, thus it will not be selected again. Similar conditions for all rules of the grammar
corresponding to the open function, restrict the execution of this function to four times, one
for each rule. One can argue that this way of restricting the execution of an action is not
elegant, but it is effective. Moreover, it serves to illustrate one way of using predicates in the
data generation models to guide the selection of values.
5.5 Asynchronous systems testing
This study aims to show the workings of the testing framework in the domain of testing
asynchronous systems. The type of asynchronous systems that are of interest for this thesis
need to be aware of the occurrence of observable actions. Actions executed by the SUT (and
its environment) modify the state of the SUT. By observing the occurrence of these actions,
any change in the state of the SUT is reflected on the state of the model. Therefore, observable
actions effectively influence the test generation process. Then, this study focuses on the test
generation and execution processes.
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To deal with observable actions, an on-line approach to test generation and execution is
implemented. Automation of this approach is shown and discussed.
Although the modelling of asynchronous systems is not the focus of this study, the SUT
and its model are briefly introduced and discussed at the beginning.
5.5.1 The FIX Protocol
Stock monitoring and financial data processing applications are classical examples for asyn-
chronous distributed systems. This case study refers to a trading system that implements
the Financial Information eXchange (FIX) protocol¶. The FIX protocol defines a series of
messaging specifications for the electronic communication of trade-related messages. A trade
operation has always a buyer and a seller, represented by a client (that initiates a transac-
tion by buying or selling some security) and a server (which plays the complementary role).
Figure 5.23 shows examples of valid sequences of actions for this trading protocol described
in a plain notation, similar to the well known Alice Bob notation. The order of the actions
in these sequences reflects the point of view of the client.
In Figure 5.23, agents are denoted S for the server and C for the clients. For reading
convenience, this description distinguishes between clients that play the role of buyers (Cb)
and those who play the role of sellers (Cs). The first sequence shows a client that decides
to sell X quantity of a defined stock. Then the server acknowledges the request (sellAck).
Next, the client decides to cancel the request and the server can choose the answer by either
acknowledging the cancel request (cancelAck) or rejecting it (cancelReject).
Any system that implements the FIX protocol is asynchronous in the sense that a client
can send a message to the server and does not need to wait for the server response to send
another one. Consider, for example, the second sequence in Figure 5.23. The client sends a
request to buy X quantity of a defined stock. Then, the client changes his mind and requests
to cancel the previous buying order without knowing the answer of the server. The server,
in the meantime, rejects the buying order (buyReject). Thus, at the time as it processes the
cancel order, the server has no other choice than rejecting this order (cancelReject) because
¶http://www.fixprotocol.org
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(1) Cs → S : {sell(1, X)}
S → Cs : {sellAck(1)}
Cs → S : {cancel(1)}
S → Cs : {cancelAck(1, X) + cancelReject(1)}
(2) Cb → S : {buy(1, X)}
Cb → S : {cancel(1)}
S → Cb : {buyReject(1)}
S → Cb : {cancelReject(1)}
(3) Cb → S : {buy(1, X)}
Cs → S : {sell(2, Y )}
Cs → S : {cancel(2)}
S → Cb : {buyAck(1)}
S → Cb : {(partialF ill(1, Y ), Y < X) + (fullF ill(1, X), X ≤ Y )}
S → Cs : {sellAck(2)}
S → Cs : {(fullF ill(2, Y ), Y < X) + (partialF ill(2, Y ), X ≤ Y )}
S → Cs : {(cancelReject(2), Y < X) + (cancelAck(2, Y −X), X ≤ Y )}
Figure 5.23: Valid sequences of actions in the FIX protocol
the first order (buying order) was never processed or initiated.
In the third sequence in Figure 5.23, two (possibly different) clients send different re-
quests to buy and sell some X and Y quantity of a defined stock. Immediately, the seller
client requests to cancel the selling order. In the meantime, the server acknowledges the buy-
ing request buyAck and processes it. Then the server sends back to the client the response
indicating that either the request was completely executed fullFill or partially executed par-
tialFill. Similarly it sends the acknowledging message and the response to the seller client
and then, processes the cancel request. If the selling order was fully executed, then there is
no choice for the server other than to reject the cancel request (cancelReject). On the other
hand, if the selling order was only partially executed then the server acknowledges the cancel
request for the remaining of the selling order.
5.5.2 Modelling the FIX Protocol
Financial protocols like FIX usually have large specifications. For purposes of exemplifying
the test generation and execution processes from a system’s model this case study uses a
140
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDIES
simplified description of the FIX protocol . To reduce the complexity of the representation of
the model, it uses actions with variables as parameters. Hereafter, the notation a(x) refers
to an instance of a(var) if x is a value for var.
For modelling the FIX protocol, this study uses the concept of a transaction. A transaction
is identified by the parameter id so that all operations with the same id belong to the same
transaction. Models always refer to a unique transaction. However, the real implementation
allows several transactions to be executed concurrently. The complete behaviour of the system
is modelled by the parallel composition of as many models as concurrent transactions the
system executes.
Consider controllable actions buy(id,amt), sell(id,amt), cancel(id) and alter(id). A trans-
action initiates with actions buy(id,amt) or sell(id,amt) which place a request for buying or
selling, respectively, an amount amt of a defined stock. Action cancel(id) places a request
for cancelling the transaction identified by id, and alter(id) requests a modification on the
transaction identified by id.
The server responds by acknowledging the buy/sell request with actions buyAck(id,amt)
or sellAck(id,amt), or by rejecting the request with actions buyReject(id) or sellReject(id).
The server also fills a request, partially or completely, with actions partialFill(id,amt) or full-
Fill(id,amt) if it receives matching requests (two transactions with a buy and a sell request re-
spectively). Actions cancelAck(id,amt), cancelReject(id), alterAck(id,amt) and alterReject(id)
are suitable responses for the cancel and alter actions respectively.
A transaction is finalised when an action buyReject(id) or sellReject(id) is executed by
the server. A transaction is also finalised when the request is fullfilled, that is, when action
fullFill(id,amt) is executed by the server. Any request that refers to a finalised action is
rejected, e.g., cancelReject(id) is the only possible response for a cancel(id) request when the
transaction id has already finalised.
For illustration purposes only Figure 5.24 shows part of the LTS that describes the model
of the FIX implementation. In this model, controllable actions are denoted sell and cancel.
Notice the combinations of observable answers of the system that are triggered by only two
of the controllable actions.
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Figure 5.24: Simplified model of the FIX protocol
5.5.3 Test generation and execution
For a practical application, the generation and execution of test cases have specific require-
ments. On one hand, the test generation process requires the set of possible action executions
to be finite, otherwise, the algorithms will run indefinitely. To restrict the size of the set of
possible executions, one restricts the number of available ids to three. Consider also that the
execution process involves communication with other components of the system and requires
these components to be available. Additionally, in the real implementation, actions have pa-
rameters other than the transaction id and the amount amt of a defined stock that is traded
in the transaction. However, for simplicity, this study does not include these parameters in
the discussions.
Consider QuickFix/J ‖, an open implementation of the FIX protocol, to provide the re-
quired components for the execution of test cases. This implementation has two modules, the
‖http://www.quickfixj.org
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client module and the server module. Consider also a modified client module that translates
generated action messages into appropriate messages to the server and that receives messages
from the server and translates them to appropriate messages for the testing tool. Figure 5.25
shows an screenshot of this module during the execution of this study.
The present study uses SmartMBT to automate and implement the model-based frame-
work. Figure 5.26 shows a modified SmartMBT tool during the execution of this study. This
modified version of the SmartMBT tool includes the ability to observe actions executed by
the SUT via the implementation of the Observer module. This module receives a message
from the SUT (the modified client module from QuickFix/J) and updates the state of the
system in the model.
Figure 5.26 shows actions that have been executed and observed. They are presented as
sequential steps of the test. Each one can pass if it was expected to happen, or fail otherwise.
For example, request actions sell(1) and cancel(1) in steps 2 and 3, which are acknowledged
by the server in steps 4 and 6, are correctly processed by the server and receive a pass verdict.
However, the last step in this sequence forces a fail verdict by sending an unexpected action
to the observer. It is worthwhile noting also that after step 7 (sell(3)), enabled actions are
alter, buy, cancel, init and sell. Nevertheless, enabled cancel actions are only cancel(2) and
cancel(3) because cancel(1) has been already executed. In the same way, as no more ids are
available sell and buy actions are not available any more. Figure 5.25 shows the state of the
FIX server which does not need major discussion.
Table 5.18 summarises the workings of the implemented testing process. This table de-
scribes the whole process as a sequence of action executions that interleaves execution requests
by the testing tool and observation of executions performed by the SUT and the environment.
The first column in the table shows actions requested (and executed) by the test generator.
The second column shows executed actions observed in the communication channel. Finally,
the third column shows the evolution of the set of expected observable actions. This process
is executed in a closed environment, so that no other component than a single instance of the
testing tool communicates with the server.
Observe in the first row of the table that the generation algorithm chooses to initiate
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Figure 5.25: Linking to the SUT
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Figure 5.26: The extended SmartMBT
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Table 5.18: Evolution of the state of an asynchronous testing process
Testing Execution So
Tool Observer
1 sell(1,100) {sellAck(1,100), sellReject(1), fullFill(1,100),
partialFill(1,amt<100) }
2 cancel(1) {sellAck(1,100), sellReject(1), fullFill(1,100),
partialFill(1,amt<100), cancelAck(1,amt≤100), cancelReject(1) }
3 sell(1,100) {sellAck(1,100), sellReject(1), fullFill(1,100),
cancel(1) partialFill(1,amt<100), cancelAck(1,amt≤100), cancelReject(1) }
4 cancelAck(1,100) {sellAck(1,100) }
5 buy(2,100) {sellAck(1,100), buyAck(2,100), buyReject(2),
fullFill(2,100), partialFill(2,amt<100) }
6 sellAck(1,100) {buyAck(2,100), buyReject(2), fullFill(2,100),
buy(2,100) partialFill(2,amt<100) }
7 sell(3,40) { buyAck(2,100), buyReject(2), sellAck(3,40), sellReject(3),
fullFill(2,100), partialFill(2,amt<100),
fullFill(3,40), partialFill(3,amt<40) }
8 buyAck(2) { fullFill(2,100), partialFill(2,amt<100),
sell(3,40) fullFill(3,40), partialFill(3,amt<40) }
sellAck(3,40)
9 partialFill(2,40) {fullFill(2,60), partialFill(2,amt<60) }
fullFill(3,40)
10 cancel(2) {fullFill(2,60), partialFill(2,amt<60),
cancelAck(2,amt≤60), cancelReject(2) }
11 cancel(2) { }
cancelAck(2,60)
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the test case executing action sell(1, 100). Then, the set of expected observable actions
is updated (see column So). This execution enables actions cancel(1), alter(1) as well as
buy(2, amt), sell(2, amt). Note in the second row that action cancel(1) is executed. This
updates the set of expected observable actions. Notice also in column So that the set in the
second row has additional elements cancelAck(1, 100) and cancelReject(1) which correspond
to the expected responses for cancel(1).
In the third row of the table, the observer reports actions sell(1, 100) and cancel(1) exe-
cuted and observed in the communication channel. Internally it does check that those actions
are the ones the generator requested and discards them. Then, as the fourth row shows, the
observer also receives a message indicating the execution of action cancelAck(1, 100). This
execution triggers the update of So resulting in So = {sellAck(1, 100)}. Compare it with
the previous set of expected observable actions to notice that action cancelAck(1) has been
removed from So as it has already been executed. Additionally, this execution triggers the
removal of events like sellReject(1) as they cannot happen any more.
A similar scheme repeats until row 9 which indicates that the observer notices in the
communication channel the execution of fullF ill(3, 40) and partialF ill(2, 40) by the SUT.
This updates the set of expected observable actions by removing any fill actions with id = 3.
This also updates the amount that can be filled for transaction with id = 2 to 60.
Finally, in the last two rows there is a request for cancelling the transaction with id = 2,
which is observed and acknowledged, leaving So empty and enabling the termination condition
of the algorithms.
The execution history for this study can be read from the column of the Execution Ob-
server module. This sequence of action executions represents a test case. This test case
execution produces a pass verdict since it does not fail and the algorithms terminate.
5.5.4 Discussion
The model of an asynchronous system is described from the point of view of one of the elements
of the system. For different components the definition of which actions are observable and
which are controllable varies. In this study, the system is modelled from the point of view of
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the client component. This component is the SUT and the other components of the system
are the environment of the SUT.
The concept of controllable and observable actions is not necessarily linked to separate
components. Although the system in this study had two clearly distinct components, a client
(the SUT) and a server (the environment), internal actions of the SUT can be considered
observable actions. Replacing internal actions with observable actions enables the testing
framework to test asynchronously threaded code.
Writing LTS models for asynchronous systems deserves special consideration. A model
must include all possible interleavings of controllable and observable actions, a missing inter-
leaving turns out to be a forbidden one. Then, a wrongly specified model becomes unreliable
at the time of driving the generation and execution of test cases. Such a model will lead
to conflicting verdicts for the same test case. This study showed that even protocols (and
systems) with a low number of actions produce large models.
An asynchronous test must be very careful to synchronise with the system that it is
observing. This synchronisation is usually performed by locking the test case until a successful
change of state is observed or a defined timeout event occurs. The inclusion of observable
events in the model enables the test execution process to unblock the test case and continue
its execution asynchronously. Observable events create a new state in the SUT where the
responses to an executed controllable action are still pending. When the SUT transitions to
this state, it unblocks the execution of the test case.
The Adaptor module is responsible for synchronising with the SUT’s interface. When a
controllable action is selected for execution by the generation algorithm, the Adaptor trans-
lates it to the SUT’s interface and executes it. The responsibility of the Adaptor ends here.
If an error or exception occurs the Adaptor reports a failing test case, otherwise the test case
continues to be executed.
The need for two way communication between the model and the SUT (driven by the
testing tool) requires more coding effort than the one required for other previously studied
domains. This is mainly because the scripts in the Adaptor module need to recognise when
an action has been executed by the SUT or its environment. The implementation for the
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present study instrumented the code of the SUT.
5.6 Lessons learned
General lessons can be drawn from the experience of executing the different case studies
presented in this chapter.
• Models allow to specify precisely which elements or properties of a system are being
tested and all conditions and assumptions under which this testing is performed. This
precise specification is a necessary condition for assurance. There are domains, such
as the security testing domain, for which it is convenient to separate the specification
of those elements and properties from the specification of the system’s functionalities.
This is mainly because these properties are traversal to the functionalities. There are
other domains, however, for which the properties to be tested are directly linked to
the functionalities and, thus, they do not require specific models for them. Rather, the
testing process is documented only from the information obtained from the specification
of the functionalities and the tools and techniques used to perform the testing.
• With respect to the models, there is a general architecture for testing security proper-
ties, such as the presence of vulnerabilities and conformance to privacy policies. This
architecture considers three models. The abstract model represents the high level inter-
face of the SUT. It contains the actions (or operations) that a user can invoke from the
application. The implementation model introduces additional properties and function-
alities and serves to link the (abstract) behavioural model to the third model. The third
model represents the testing objectives. Consider for example the domain of privacy
testing where the third model represents the privacy policy. By defining this model
in terms of LTS, it can be integrated with the other two models. A privacy policy
represents transitions that should, or should not, be enabled in the other models for a
defined state, and, in the case of obligations, transitions that should be present on a
trace between two given states of the other models.
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Figure 5.27: Architecture of the implemented model-based framework
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• There are other testing domains, such as asynchronous systems and operating systems,
for which not three but one model is necessary. The reason is that in these domains the
testing objectives are not centred in additional or forbidden functionalities, thus it is not
necessary to differentiate between behavioural and implementation models. Moreover,
the testing objectives are encoded into specialised algorithms and, in this way, no third
model is required.
• There is a general framework based on models that groups the common elements for
testing systems in all previously cited domains, security vulnerabilities, privacy, asyn-
chronous systems and operating systems. There are specialised elements that are re-
quired for specific domains. These elements are composed with the elements on the
general framework to provide specialised frameworks.
• A unique test automation tool that implements the general framework can be used as
the central element that drives the testing process over different domains. SmartMBT
implements the general framework by allowing the tester to describe transition-based
models that represent the behavioural model. Implemented in Prolog, SmartMBT also
allows the definition of the data generation models by representing the grammar rules
as Prolog rules. The predicates that guard the execution of the rules are also directly
included into the Prolog rules. Prolog does not directly allow the execution of actions.
However, by declaring the global variables of the system as state variables, SmartMBT
allows changes in the valuation of these variables, effectively allowing the transition
between global states.
• Specialised domains could require additional tools or techniques to complement the
capabilities of a tool such as SmartMBT. For example, in the domain of security vul-
nerabilities this thesis focused on the generation of successful attacks for a defined vul-
nerability using a particular operation of the SUT’s interface. In the case study for this
domain, a customised constraint solver was built to generate the test cases. However,
once the test cases were generated, automated execution was not directly possible. Test
sequencing was still necessary to bring the system to a state in which these test cases
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could be executed. Then, these test cases encoded into the models were used as input
to the SmartMBT tool and test sequencing and execution was performed automatically.
The architecture of the implemented framework is shown in Figure 5.27.
• The separation between behavioural and data generation models allows concrete models
to be built on-the-fly. Concrete states (where state variables have a concrete valuation)
are added only when needed, helping to deal with the state explosion problem.
• The use of models provides finer control over the test scenarios. In currently used
test automation approaches, such as script-based or keyword-driven approaches, testers
define a priori the scenarios in which test cases are executed. The model-based testing
approach provides different algorithms that define test scenarios on-the-fly using the
information in the models and, in the case of asynchronous systems, the information
they get from the observation of the environment. This leads the model-base approach
to exercise different test scenarios.
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Conclusions and Future Research
Issues
6.1 Thesis summary
This thesis has presented a general model-based framework that can be used for testing a
wide range of software systems via diverse specialisations. One of the main characteristics
of this general framework is that it maintains a separation between behavioural (or control)
models and data generation models. Behavioural models are described using labelled transi-
tion systems. Data generation models are described using extended context-free grammars.
In these extended grammars, rules are guarded by predicates and contain associated actions.
These actions modify the context in which data generation is performed. This context is
described as a global state of the system. Actions in the grammars’ rules cannot modify the
state of the behavioural model. This is a necessary restriction to maintain the integrity of this
model. This thesis concludes its presentation of the general framework by describing briefly
the process of test generation and test execution.
The general framework requires specialisation to be applied to different testing domains.
This thesis describes specialisations of the framework for the domains of security vulnera-
bilities, privacy policies and asynchronous systems. A specialisation consists of defining an
architecture for the models used in test case generation and execution. This architecture de-
153
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ISSUES
fines three separated models for testing vulnerabilities; namely behavioural, implementation
and attacker’s models; two models required for privacy policies, the behavioural model and
the privacy model; and one model for asynchronous systems in which actions are partitioned
into controllable and observable actions. Additional specialisations are defined as particu-
lar algorithms for test case generation and execution. The generation of test sequences for
security vulnerabilities is performed following standard techniques and does not require spe-
cialisation. Privacy policies require a specialised test generation algorithm, mainly to make
sure that in all possible occurrences of a defined action, the system conforms to a given pol-
icy. Asynchronous systems require specialised generation and execution algorithms executed
in parallel and following an on-line approach.
This thesis presents four case studies that serve as a demonstration of the applicability
of this approach. One of these case studies, which is focused on testing operating systems,
shows the general approach applied without further specialisations. The other cases show
how the specialised approaches are applied to their respective testing domains.
The case study for the domain of testing vulnerabilities demonstrates how test cases
are generated for revealing SQL-injection vulnerabilities. It also explores the modelling of
different attacker’s objectives, namely, the attacker aiming to get unauthorised access to a
system and the attacker aiming to reveal structural information about the design of the system
– the structure of the database. This case study also explores the sequencing of actions that
include the generated attacks as well as attacks that are performed in more that one step.
This last exercise on test sequencing was performed over WebGoat, a web application designed
for training security testers that contains several well-known vulnerabilities.
On testing privacy policies, the respective case study explores the modelling of privacy
policies using the general structured notation presented in this thesis. Two known policies are
used to demonstrate this modelling, the same origin policy, defined for preserving the privacy
of web browser’s users, and the COPPA policy, defined to protect the privacy of children’s
personal data in web sites that require personal information for user registration purposes.
The modelled policies were used to generate test suites for generic implementations of web
browsers and web applications. The difference between the two policies is the inclusion of
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obligations in the COPPA policy and, therefore, in the generated test cases. As a side result,
the generated test cases for the same origin policy reveal a faulty implementation of the
modelled policy in Internet Explorer, while showing a compliant implementation in Firefox.
In the domain of asynchronous systems, the case study uses a simplified description of
the Financial Information eXchange (FIX) protocol to test an open implementation of this
standard, the QuickFIX/J application. In this case study, the implementation of a com-
plementary observer module is needed to perform the test generation and execution. This
module is implemented in Prolog and connected to the SmartMBT tool.
The case study on device drivers focuses on the applicability of the general framework to
an unrelated domain, operating systems. In this case study, the HBA (Host Bus Adapter)
storage driver of the OpenSolaris operating system is the target of the testing process. For this
particular driver, an automated test suite had been already developed following the functional
decomposition approach. This case study demonstrates the use (or reuse) of the elements of
this existing test automation framework integrated into the model-based approach. This case
study presents explicitly the trade-offs between flexibility in the test case generation process
and complexity of the models. More fine-grained actions in the models provide flexibility to
the test suites while generating larger models.
Finally, these case studies not only show the applicability of the general and specialised
approaches, but also demonstrate that a unique tool can be used as the core element for
model-based testing and that required specialisations can be integrated as plug-ins to this
tool, or as standalone applications whose outputs are used as inputs by the “core tool”. This
“core tool” is the SmartMBT tool. Several characteristics make it a suitable choice. For
example, its implementation in Prolog allows a direct implementation of the data generation
models, and its ability to connect to the SUT allows the use of the on-line approach required
for asynchronous testing.
The remainder of this chapter describes how the work performed during the development
of the thesis answers the research question established in Chapter 1 and then describes some
directions to future and complementary work.
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6.2 Answer to the initial research question
A model-based framework for testing security properties contains a behavioural model and a
data generation model. The behavioural model provides the control structure for generating
and executing sequences of test cases and the data generation model provides the necessary
concretisation of the test cases in a way that they can be executed against a real implemen-
tation.
Specifically for testing security properties, the behavioural model is logically separated
into three models:
• An abstract behavioural model that defines the functionalities of the system that are
available through its interfaces.
• An implementation model that defines implementation details of the system. That is, it
describes properties of a specific implementation of the system at a level of abstraction
lower than the behavioural model.
• A model that represents the testing objectives.
The three models described above are related to each other in specific ways. The im-
plementation models for example, contain description of the internal workings of the actions
described in the abstract behavioural models. The third model usually refers to the internal
actions described by the implementation models. While the behavioural and implementa-
tion models change according to the changes in the SUT, the third model usually changes
according to the testing domain.
The behavioural model and the data generation model are sufficient elements to model
other kinds of systems, such as asynchronous systems and operating systems. Nevertheless,
the process of generating and executing test cases requires some specialisation for these do-
mains.
The implementation of this framework in all of the domains cited above is possible by
using existing tools and testing frameworks. Moreover, it is possible to have a unique tool
that implements the core of the framework across all of the domains while plugging into it
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the elements that provide domain specialisation.
6.3 Future research
This section gives an outlook on possible future work on the topics described in this thesis.
One of the main uses of models in security testing in order to reveal the presence of security
vulnerabilities is to specify precisely which kind of vulnerabilities the tester is seeking for. This
thesis has presented examples where code-injection vulnerabilities, particularly SQL-injection
vulnerabilities, have been modelled in terms of labelled transition systems and associated data
generation models. Repositories containing different kinds of vulnerabilities exist to indicate
to testing practitioners what to look for when performing penetration testing. Similarly, in
order to broaden the use of models in security vulnerability testing practitioners need to be
provided with repositories of attack models for several kinds of popular vulnerabilities. This
task is quite complex. Experience obtained from the development of this thesis indicates that
models cannot be too abstract or too concrete but there exists a right level of abstraction for
each kind of vulnerability.
Another interesting research direction resides on the area of search-based software testing
[86]. From a theoretical point of view, several searching strategies exist such as simple hill
climbing, simulation annealing, estimation of distribution algorithm, or tabu search; however,
as Antoniol [7] asserts, it is not clear which ones will be adequate to be applied in, for
example, security vulnerabilities testing. A meaningful comparison of these techniques will
only be possible if a common set of utilities, tasks and problems is defined with the purpose
of performing this comparison. From a practical point of view, automated tools such the
ones used in this thesis usually include implementations of searching techniques. SmartMBT
and the custom-built constraint solver are armed with implementations of a backtracking
searching module. Moreover, the algorithms described in this thesis perform searches and
the data generation models, although described in terms of production grammars, can be
implemented using a search engine. The implementation of more efficient or specialised
searching techniques inside these tools could led to a more cost-effective test automation.
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Another important area of improvement concerning the modelling task is to provide prac-
titioners with expressive and adequate languages or notations to describe their models. The
approach in this thesis, using LTS, is general enough to allow other languages to be built on
top of it. For example, while modelling asynchronous systems our approach assumes that the
tester provides a model that describes all possible interleavings of actions. For larger systems
this task could be, at least, time-consuming. It would be desirable to have a notation that
allows the tester to describe such a model in a succinct way by just defining relationships
such as causality (following the ideas of Hendrickson [56]). An automatic translation of such
languages into LTS would allow them to be integrated into the approach presented in this
thesis.
Finally, the approach presented for testing asynchronous systems can be used to validate
the definition of communication protocols. Given two models, the client model and the server
model (just to name them), each model can be used to generate test cases to be executed
against the other model. This actually should perform a complete simulation of the protocol,
assuming that the models are an accurate representation of the protocol’s description. The
research work in this area will be to provide the theoretical basis to support the premise that
such a technique is sound and complete as to provide assurance of the protocol’s design. The
ideas of Boreale [18] on trace equivalence can provide a starting point.
158
Appendix A
Acronyms
API Application Programming Interface
CFG Context Free Grammars
DNF Disjunctive Normal Form
FIX Financial Information eXchange protocol
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTML Hypertext Markup Language
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IOTS Input Output (Labelled) Transition System
LTS Labelled Transition System
OS Operating System
PDP Policy Decision Point
PEP Policy Enforcement Point
SUT System Under Test
TLA Temporal Logic of Actions
XACML eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
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